Egypt’s Obsession and British Scheming to Seize Control of the Blue Nile

In April
1931 Sudan confirmed their financial difficulty resulting from the collapse in
the price of cotton and the serious drop in the yield and quality of the Gezira
scheme cotton.  Furthermore, Sudan
objected to the proposal that Ethiopia should take any part in the operational
control of the works. Sudan also objected to the Emperor’s redraft of paragraph
7 of the Emperor’s draft proposal, arguing that there were no potentially
irrigable areas in Ethiopia so situated that they could benefit from waters controlled
by the dam. 

Sudan also
did not see an immediate use for Lake Tsana water, and considered the financial
investment speculative in view of its economic condition.  Sudan, however, wished to retain interest in
the project, but the utmost they could afford would be a small contribution
towards the cost of an option if this were found the only means of preserving
their rights. 

On July 28
1931, Barton in a conversation with the Emperor outlined the technical
objections of Sudan and proposed that representatives of the parties concerned
suspend discussions pending completion of the study and consideration of the
survey data.  The Emperor agreed and it
was decided to hold the conference early in 1932.

In January
1932, Sudan, in spite of the promise of a good cotton crop, considered that
financial considerations would preclude for many years any extensions of the
area under irrigation in the Gezira, but they favored delaying matters and
suggested additional studies  to be
financed by Egypt.  Egypt agreed subject
to its full participation at the next conference. 

Egypt also
agreed to allow Sudan to participate in the benefits of the dam and advanced
proposals for the allocation of water in proportion to the respective
contributions to the project. These proposals formed the subject of detailed
discussion between the irrigation experts of Egypt and Sudan, and Egypt was
prepared to proceed actively with the prosecution of the project, or to secure
an option and to provide the necessary funds. 
In view of these developments, Ethiopia was requested to postpone the
conference until January 1933, and to invite an Egyptian delegate to be
present. Ethiopia agreed to both requests and invitations were issued
accordingly. 

The
attitude of Egypt had by January 1933 undergone a change due the criticism by
the opposition in Egypt accusing the Government of being the “cat’s-paw” of the
British.  The British were informed that
it was out of the question for Egypt to think of proceeding with the
construction of the dam for many years to come. 
Egypt, however, agreed to a limited proposal for further surveys, for
which Egypt would be prepared to pay. 

The
additional survey provided an opportunity for Egypt to gain further knowledge
regarding the Blue Nile and Lake Tsana basins. Egypt, in addition, attached the
greatest importance to the construction of a road from the lake to the Nile
valley, and wished this to be pressed upon the Ethiopian Government at the
conference.  In this writer’s opinion,
the purpose of the road was to provide access to Egypt, through the
impenetrable Ethiopian escarpments, should it be necessary to protect Egyptian
interests in Lake Tsana.

Early in
February 1933, the representatives of the various parties assembled at Addis
Ababa for the conference convened by Ethiopia. 
Ethiopia, on receipt of the limited proposals of Egypt, which Sudan
endorsed, was disappointed.  The joint
meeting was cancelled, but the Ethiopian Government accepted the Egyptian and
Sudanese proposals, with the understanding that they were not committed as to
their future action in the matter.  Egypt
sent the sum of £E 50,000 to provide for the cost of the additional surveys by
White’s engineers.  The survey was
completed in April of 1934. The survey team did not find considerable saving
when compared to 1931 estimates, and that construction of a motor road proposed
by Egypt from the lake to the Sudan frontier would necessitate expensive
blasting operations. 

In
December 1934, White informed Mr. Butcher (the Director-General, Southern Nile)
the Egyptian Government expert, that the 1933 report would shortly be ready for
dispatch to the Emperor   proposing three
alternative schemes: Plan A, which would be the cheapest, but which would raise
the lake level and involve damage to certain ancient Ethiopian Coptic churches,
which would be contrary to the wishes of the Ethiopian Government;  Plan B, an intermediate scheme, not fully
worked out, which would be less costly than the original scheme and which would
do less damage than Plan A; Plan C, involving no raising of the lake levels –
the original scheme as proposed by Ethiopia. 

White
advocated a meeting at Addis Ababa to discuss the report as soon as it was
presented, to reach final settlement, fearing intervention in the project by
certain foreign (Russian) engineers.   On
January 26, White was informed that Egypt would favor Plan A, despite the
damage, which it would entail.

Early in
1935, Ethiopia sent invitations to Egypt and Sudan to nominate representatives
to a conference at Addis Ababa on April 23. At that time, the report of White
on their survey of the lake had not yet been formally received either by Egypt,
the Sudan or by Britain.  The general
view of all three was that no conference in Addis Ababa could reach a final
decision until all parties had fully digested the report. They, therefore,
favored further delay.

 On the other hand, the Emperor was anxious to
make rapid progress with a scheme in which both British and Egyptian as well as
American interests were involved.  Upon
receipt of the Emperor’s invitation, Egypt, on April 6, informed Britain that,
while April 23 seemed too early for a conference, they were anxious to arrive,
in the near future, at a final agreement with the Sudan on the Lake Tsana
question.  Egypt accordingly proposed
that a preliminary conference should be held in Cairo for this purpose. 

Egypt
proposed the following terms of reference: Agreement between Egypt and the
Sudan  (i) To consider and agree on the
general scope of the project and on the leading features of the design of the
proposed works. (ii) To consider and agree on the technical and financial
arrangements necessary for the execution and operation of the project in the
joint interests of Egypt and the Sudan. (iii) To embody those arrangements in
an agreement to be ratified by the Egyptian Government and the Government of
the Sudan.

Agreement
Between Egypt and the Sudan jointly and Abyssinia.(iv) To consider and propose
the terms to be offered to the Abyssinian Government in return for the
concession to carry out and operate the works necessary to enable Lake Tsana to
be used as a reservoir. (v) To embody these proposals in the form of
instructions to the delegates who will negotiate with Abyssinia. These terms
were submitted to Sudan, who approved them. 

Lake Tsana Reservoir Project Agreement
Between Egypt and Sudan – 1935

The Egypt
and Sudan considered the report of White at a preliminary conference at Cairo
on May 11 1935.  At that Conference
agreement was reached upon (1) the general scope of the project and the leading
features of the design of the proposed works; and (2) the technical and
financial arrangements necessary for its execution and operation in the joint
interests of Egypt and the Sudan. 
Accordingly, on May 20 1935, Egypt and the Sudan signified their
intention of constructing and operating suitable control works at joint cost
and for their joint benefit, if the territorial Power (Ethiopia) gave its
consent thereto. 

The
designs of the White Corporation for the work, as contained in their report of
1935, were accepted as generally satisfactory. 
The main purpose of the agreement was to set out the terms of the understanding
between Egypt and Sudan for construction and operation of a storage reservoir
at Lake Tsana in Ethiopia and sharing of the benefits.  The agreement was subject to the “permission
of the Ethiopian Government.”

Cost of
construction and operation and benefits were to be shared jointly by Egypt and
Sudan. Sudan’s initial contribution was to be ten percent or at Sudan’s option
a reduced percentage but no less than £200,000 towards construction and £4,000
per year for operation.  Sudan was also
given the option to participate in a greater amount on giving Egypt two years
notice before completion of the dam. The Sudan also had the option to increase
the share up to a maximum of fifty percent of the net benefits in incremental
percentages of five percent each year commencing five years following
completion of the dam after an initial maximum of twenty five percent upon
completion of the dam.

 The other provisions relate to payment
schedules for Sudan’s share of the construction costs, coordination of the
Tsana reservoir with the Sennar Dam and Egypt’s rights to propose modifications
to maximize benefits to Egypt so long as Sudan’s interests were not adversely
affected.  The Tsana reservoir was a
further step in realizing Egypt’s Century Scheme and Egypt’s prominent role in
the Blue Nile Sub-basin. Sudan was willing to allow Egypt to make the initial
investment subject to the right to equally share in the benefits when its
financial circumstances improved.

The
Emperor was anxious to come to an agreement with Britain, Egypt and the Sudan
concerning the construction of the reservoir, feeling that such an agreement
would strengthen his hands against Italy who was massing troops on the
Ethiopian borders.  At the end of May,
Mr. Collier, Governor of the Bank of Ethiopia, was sent to London with a
message from the Emperor to press the British for a conference.  However, Britain felt that a conference held
in Addis Ababa while Italo-Ethiopian tension was high carried the risk of
provoking Italy. According to the British, the Italians had been deeply
suspicious of general British policy in Ethiopia, and a conference might tempt
them to decide on war. 

Therefore,
in reply to the Ethiopian invitation, Egypt and Sudan replied that they would
be unable to complete the necessary preliminaries in time for June 1.  The next step would have been a conference
with the Ethiopian Government but owing to the Italo-Ethiopian dispute and
British political considerations, the Addis Ababa conference was never held.

Anglo-Egyptian-Italian Exchange of
Notes – 1938

The
February 1933 Lake Tsana Reservoir negotiations at Addis Ababa led to a revival
of interest and suspicions in the question on the part of the Italian
Government.  The Italian Government felt
in view of the Tripartite Agreement of 1906 and of the Anglo-Italian agreement
of 1925, they expected to be informed of developments. Italy felt it “should
not be left out or be prevented from contributing in the examination of schemes
connected with the building of the dam at Lake Tsana or with any other work
whose undertaking should be considered in the [Italian sphere of
influence].” 

In 1934,
the Italian Government expressed further suspicion that the British Government
had motives other than economic ones in their treatment of the Tsana reservoir
question and protested that the question should not be settled without regard
for Italian interests.  On July 4 1935,
upon learning that the Cairo conference had taken place, Italy again protested
that respect for Italy’s rights under the Tripartite Treaty of 1906 and the
Anglo-Italian Exchange of Notes of 1925 could only be ensured by Italy’s
participation.  Italy had interests to
protect “not less important than those of the Sudan and Egyptian
Governments.” 

On October
22, 1935, Britain expressed that Italian interest in the Tsana project were
inconsistent with understandings of December 20, 1925, by which the Italian
Government “recognize the prior hydraulic rights of Egypt and the Sudan,” which
the British Government were bound to protect. 
On February 20, 1936, the Italian Government reasserted the right to
participate in the examination of the White Corporation’s report. Italy claimed
it had “ample and clear proof that Great Britain had recognized the economic
and territorial rights of Italy on the Eritrean and Somali hinterland and on
the western Ethiopian territories.” 

During
this same period, Italy commenced hostilities against Ethiopia while
concurrently assuring the British Government that Italy harbored no designs
against British interests in Ethiopia. On August 28, the Italian Government
issued a statement, which, as reproduced in the press, included an assurance,
that Britain had nothing to fear from the policy, which Italy would adopt in
regard to Ethiopia. Italian policy would not threaten British Imperial
interests either directly or indirectly. 
A month later, on September 28 (the eve of formal hostilities against
Ethiopia), the Italian Cabinet issued a statement of policy, which included a
declaration that Italian policy had no aim, either immediate or remote, which
might injure British interests. 

As the
spring of 1936 approached, the Italian forces in Ethiopia drew nearer to Lake
Tsana prompting the British Government to send a “sharp note to Italy.”  The Italian Government, on April 3 renewed
assurance that the Italians were more than ever conscious of their obligations
towards the British Government and had no intention of overlooking or
repudiating them.  At about this time
Egypt evinced nervousness with regard to the Italian advance upon Lake Tsana
and sought British assurances for safeguarding this source of the Nile, in
which Egypt and the Sudan were “vitally interested.” 

The
Egyptian Prime Minister even suggested that British troops might be sent to
occupy the Lake Tsana area.  The British
assured the Egyptian Prime Minister of the linkage of Egypt with British rights
in Lake Tsana under the Tripartite Treaty of 1906 and the Anglo-Italian exchange
of notes of 1925.  At the same time, the
Italian Government assured Egypt that the rights of Egypt in Lake Tsana would
be fully respected, and on April 8 issued to the Egyptian Government the
following written statement:

During a
visit that he paid to His Excellency the President of the Council, the Minister
of Italy has informed His Excellency that the Italian Government desires to
continue in the future its policy of peace and cordial collaboration and
sincere friendship with Egypt and to respect the Egyptian interests; and
intends to adhere to the same line of conduct concerning the question of the
waters of Lake Tsana and the Blue Nile River.

On May 6,
the British were advised that Italy would respect, inter alia, British rights
in the Lake Tsana region, but that (the capital city Addis Ababa had then just
been occupied by the Italian forces) Ethiopia was to be regarded as Italian
Territory. 

In
November 1936, the Italian Government informed the British Ambassador in Rome
that Italy would give the British every possible assurance regarding the
safeguarding of British interests in the lake. 
The general position of the British Government was that they would not
bargain about Ethiopia.  However, it
would be useful if the Italian Government could find occasion to renew the
assurances confirming British rights and interests in Ethiopia as specified in
the treaty of 1906 and the exchange of notes of 1925. 

The
British Government decided not to press the Italian Government for an assurance
specifically referring to those two instruments;  they would be glad, however, if the assurance
given on April 3, 1936 could be renewed. 
Italy confirmed the assurances given on April 3 to the British. The
British also reminded Italy that there were interests in Ethiopia, such as Lake
Tsana, which Egypt and Sudan shared with the British; and that those two
Governments would have to be associated with British interests. 

By April
of 1938, the British Government abandoned the argument that Italy had violated
the Treaty obligations not to occupy Ethiopia and recognized the Italian
annexation to protect British interests in Lake Tsana. On April 1, 1937, Sir
Anthony Eden, the then British Foreign Secretary reasoned:

The rights
of the United Kingdom in this matter rest upon the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of
the 15th May, 1902, articles 1 and 4 of the Tripartite Treaty of the 13th
December, 1906, and the Anglo-Italian Exchange of Notes of the 14th/20th
December, 1925. Everything, however, which is material in the first two has
been incorporated and expanded in the third of these instruments …

The rights
referred to … are as follows: (a) Italy must not allow any work to be
constructed on the headwaters of the Blue or White Niles or their tributaries
or affluents which might sensibly modify their flow into the main river, but,
subject to that proviso, a reasonable use of the waters in question by the
inhabitants of the region may be permitted, even to the extent of the
construction of dams for hydro-electric power or of small reservoirs in minor
affluents with a view to the storage of water for domestic purposes or the
cultivation of food crops necessary for the subsistence of the local
inhabitants. (b) His Majesty’s Government have the right to obtain the
construction of a barrage at Lake Tsana and a motor road for the passage of
stores, &c., from the barrage to the Sudan frontier, subject only (i) to an
obligation to employ, so far as possible, locally recruited labor in the
construction and operation of the barrage, and (ii) to the proviso that the
barrage must not raise the level of the waters in the lake beyond the maximum
hitherto attained during the rainy season. His Majesty’s Government are
entitled to obtain a concession for the construction of this barrage and its
operation by themselves or by persons appointed by them …

In this
event it may be desirable that the Egyptian Government should be associated
with His Majesty’s Government in their action, or at any rate that Italian
assurances on the subject should be given to the Egyptian Government as well as
to His Majesty’s Government. 

By a
declaration of April 16 1938, which they agreed should apply equally to the
Egyptian Government; the Italian Government reaffirmed previous assurances:

The
Italian Government confirm to the Government of the United Kingdom the
assurances given by them to the Government of the United Kingdom on the 3rd
April, 1936, and reiterated by the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs to His
Majesty’s Ambassador at Rome on the 31st December, 1936, to the effect that the
Italian Government were fully conscious of their obligations towards the
Government of the United Kingdom in the matter of Lake Tsana and had no
intention of whatever of overlooking or repudiating them.

Further …
the assurances given … in the above Declaration concerning Lake Tsana shall
apply equally to the Egyptian Government.

The
British and the Egyptian Governments signed the agreements giving recognition
that “[t]he territories and peoples which belonged to the Empire of Ethiopia
are placed under the full and entire sovereignty of the Kingdom of Italy as
announced in the Italian Decree.”  In so
doing, Egypt, Sudan, and Britain acknowledged the Decree abolishing the Empire
of Ethiopia and establishing the new territory of Italian East Africa (consisting
of Eritrea, Somaliland, and Ethiopia). 

The Lake
Tsana reservoir project was postponed due to British preoccupation in World War
II and Italy’s inability to effectively govern Ethiopia, and the Lake Tsana
region in particular, as a result of the Ethiopian insurgency.

Following
the restoration of the Ethiopian Government in 1941, the Emperor, in view of
experience, was no longer receptive to renewed British efforts and scheming for
a Tsana Reservoir Project.

Part
3 of the article will discuss the post-colonial agreements and Egypt’s
obstinacy and determination to hinder good faith efforts towards Nile basin
cooperation.