The mainstay of this essay is ‘the Ethiopian victory at Adwa.’ However, since Dr. Isaac makes defective premises on the onset, it is important to make a passing remark. “The Romans did not build static pyramids. They built functional edifices useful for worshiping, governing, playing, working, and for the expression of civilized living” argues Tseggai Isaac.
Luckily, in this day and age, we are not confronted by a dearth of research in historiography and we have ample evidence that ancient Egyptian civilization is unsurpassed by any contemporary civilization of the old world. In fact, the pyramids were not static; they were purposeful and served not only as burial chambers but also as observatories and as storage of scientific instruments. They were marvels of architecture and were constructed on the basis of mathematics. For instance, one of the still standing and the largest edifice among the Giza pyramids, is 481 ft tall, has a total of two million stones with each stone weighing up to 2 tons. The Egyptians invented pi (22/7 or 3.1416) as a consonant and determined the slopes of the pyramids by Pesu (one from of measurement) and the Pythagorean theorem (retrospectively an Egyptian origin ), and now it is common knowledge that Pythagoras was educated in Egypt. Other famous Greek scientists who were educated in Egypt include Euclid, Apllonius, Erathostenes, Archimedes, Hipparchus, Sosigenes etc.
Egyptian architecture was extremely advanced and so was their medicine, not to mention their written culture, calendar, irrigation, papyrus, ink etc. The ancient Greeks and Europeans of the Renaissance were honest to admit that their knowledge of science was transmitted from the Egyptians, and for this they have extended their gratitude to the African protagonists. This fact is testified by the translation of Hieroglyphica (an Egyptian document) in 1419 in Italy in an effort to trace back, not just to classical Greece, but also to Egypt of antiquity.
Putting history like it was is tantamount to capturing events as they unfold in the video. Lets try to do the same justice to Ethiopia’s victory at Adwa.
“Adwa: A Victory that was not” is first of its kind to be written by an African that I am aware of. I would not mind if this line of argument is put on the table as a scholarly discourse in so far it is supported by persuasive, if not convincing evidence, but this vital ingredient in historiography is conspicuously absent in the author’s raison d’etre. The author simply makes frivolous statements such as the following: “Italy’s acceptance of the Adwa incident, and its subsequent acquiescent stance to Ethiopia has left an indelible blemish on Italy’s glorious past.”
For a person who is not familiar with the background and ethnicity of the author, he or she could wrongly infer that such a writer is of Italian origin who at one point was affiliated to the Fascist party of Mussolini, obsessed with the glory of ancient Rome and profuse imagery of the Italians.
The author further argues that “the Adwa incident has given a false sense of self-worth to the Ethiopians who have used it to spread black racism in Africa. Adwa also has given Africans grounds for self-delusion and a perverted morale boost into believing that Ethiopia, an African state was “victorious” over Italy, an European state. What Ethiopians will not tell the world is that their Emperor, Menelik, was defeated at Adwa that he “forfeited” Eritrea to Italy.” ‘Black racism’ is a fleetingly injected abstraction that has now become a vogue among advocates of Eurocentric ideology to systematically denigrate Africans and people of African descent in the Diaspora.
Perhaps the imputation of ulterior motive in the glorification of Italian ingenuity says more about the individual making these interpretations (falsification) of Ethiopian history. Not withstanding the author’s exhortations to his Italian friends and his vilification of an African victory, it is now my obligation to present the historical facts as testified by Ethiopians and Italians alike.
The battle of Adwa of March 1, 1896 was not just an incident that took place in isolation. It was a culmination of successive battles beginning 1894 between Italians and Ethiopians. On December 15, 1894, the Italians encroached on Ethiopian territory and by March 1895, Ras Mengesha Yohannes had mobilized his Kitet forces to check Italian movements around Belessa and AkeleGuzai. While Baratieri was stationed at Kenafna in Serraye, Tosseli was to make advances with his Native Battalion to Mai Meghelta, and Amelgio was to concentrate on Hawzien.
The Italian forces encountered the Kitet army of Ras Mengesha at Debri Aila, secured temporary victory and even pushed all the way to Amba Alagie. Here they met the joint Ethiopian forces led by Emperor Menelik. The Ethiopians employed a sophisticated stratagem including psychological warfare to intrigue the Italians, and as a result, Ras Olie’s 7,000 strong had begun attacking Italian positions by surprise at 9:45 a.m. (December 7, 1895) and Ras Alula and Ras Mengesha attacked the right flank of the Italian forces. In order to secure Ethiopia’s military upper hand, both Ras Michael and Ras Mekonnen were in control of the English Road, built during the British expedition of 1867/68.
The Ethiopian forces had simply overwhelmed the Italians and by 12:40 p.m. the Italians began to retreat, but they were unable to secure a safe retreat for the rear was occupied by Ras Alula’s forces. In any event, after the battle of Amba Alagie was over, casualties on the Ethiopian side were 500 and that of the Italians were 1300. Twenty of the best Italian officers including Major Toselli, Scala, Manfredo, Anghera were killed despite their distinct strategic positions of upper ground.
Italian survivors at Amba Alagie are believed to have testified that “the Ethiopians were as many as ants and the earth seemed unable to support them,” and most importantly, General Baratieri conceded to the Ethiopian victory and had the following to say:
The whole political edifice, indispensable to our colonial defense, was shattered to its foundation, and to some extent fell to the ground, increasing the boldness, confidence, strength and pretensions of the enemy.
After the defeat at Amba Alagie, Baratieri abandoned Tigray and ordered Galliano to garrison at Mekele with 2000 soldiers. This Italian forces that garrisoned at Enda Eyesus (near Mekele) will soon be the easy prey to the unflinching Ethiopian patriots.
On the 11th of December 1895 Ethiopian forces had begun to assemble near Enda Eyesus and by the 19th of this month they managed to completely encircle the Italians. Meantime, Ras Mekonnen sent a letter to Galliano which reads:
I have not come to make war on a little fort such as you command; we are many and have no fear of your guns. Remember Amba Alagie and the end of Toselli; give over the fort to me and do not let us spill blood uselessly. I will consider the question of having you accompanied as far as Massawah, and of sending your baggage there.
Contrary to Ras Mekonnen’s reprimand, the Italians were defiant and on the 20th of December Lt. Moltedo made the first cannon shots, and on the 23rd the Siege of Mekele had begun in earnest, but serious fighting began on January 7 (Ethiopian Christmas day) and continued till the 20th of that month. Here the Ethiopians had three distinct advantages: 1) sheer number and courage; 2) knowledge of topography and control of the water supply (suggested by Empress Taitu); and 3) artillery fire range of 4500 meters as opposed to 3850 meters of the Italians.
On the 19th of January, the Italians knew that they had lost the war and hoisted a white flag. They lost two wars against the Ethiopians, but they still could not believe how the “barbarian” Ethiopians defeated them. Listen to this eye witness account on the Siege of Mekele:
For half an hour the attack was pressed home with indomitable pluck by these semi-savages, who still believed that they could “rush” a scientifically fortified wall in the face of magazines and rifles.
No “scientifically fortified wall” could spare the Italian forces at Mekele. In fact, the Italians were forced to withdraw but they have not yet learned a lesson from the two major battles they have lost to the Ethiopians. Thus, Bartatieri moved his forces on the 13th of February, now directly facing the Ethiopian forces at Adwa, and at this point not only were Ethiopian fighting forces ready to counter the Italians but the peasants of Tigray have also risen against them as testified by the Italians themselves: “quella straordinaria atmosfera di tensione…la rivolta scoppiava nell Agame” (the rebellion of the people of Agame [led by Ras Sebhat] has created an extraordinary tension of atmosphere).
On February 29, 1896 Baratieri had moved close to Ethiopian positions. The four Italian brigades ordered to take positions were the Native Brigade of General Albertone, the First Infantry Brigade of General Arimondi, the Second Infantry Brigade of General Dabormida and the Third Infantry Brigade of General Ellena.
According to carta demonstrativa del terreno e delle truppe in movimento nell battalgia di adua 1 marzo 1896 (in Roberto Battalgia) Dabormida’s Brigade was on the right flank, Albertone on the left and the two brigades of Arimondi and Ellena in the middle; the Ethiopian forces [opposite the Italians] of Ras Mekonnen, Wagshum Guangul, Ras Mengesha Yohannes, Ras Alula and Mengesha Atikem were on the left flank; Ras Michael and Ras Olie in the middle; Emperor Menelik, Empress Taitu, Fitewrari Gebeyehu and Negus Teklehaimanot on the right.
The battle started at 6:00 a.m. The forces of Emperor Menelik, King Teklehaimanot, Ras Michael, Ras Mengesha attacked and encircled Alnertone’s troops; by 8:15 a.m., the latter were virtually annihilated and while Baratieri was trying to figure out the problem, the Italian forces were surrounded by Ethiopians.
At 10:45 a.m. Albertone’s forces shot their last rounds and hand-to-hand combat had begun; Ethiopians simultaneously attacked Arimondi’s Brigade and the latter fled in disarray and due to wrong paths taken, Albertone and Arimondi never met and Baratieri was unable to coordinate movement of the Brigades. The Italians also wrongly misplaced Kidane Mihret (their rendezvous point) on the map and never detected that there were a reserve of 15,000 Ethiopian troops camouflaged at Mariam Shewito and ready for a rear assault.
By 12 noon everything was over. More than six thousand Italian men were killed, 2000 wounded, 2000 were made POWs, and another 2000 fled in the face of Ethiopian onslaught.
The Ethiopian victory at Adwa had a wide ramification in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, Asia, the Caribbean and the United States. News of the victory had reached South Africa, Somalia, and Yemen; in the latter two countries the people welcomed the defeat of the Italians and the colonizers were worried that Adwa could be inspirational for the colonized to rise up.
In the United States, Adwa symbolized as beacon of hope to African Americans; in Haiti, the first Black republic in the Western hemisphere, African pride was once more regenerated; in fact, in the tradition of the Haitian leaders such as Toussaint, after the victory of Adwa Benito Sylvian came to Ethiopia in 1897 to congratulate his Ethiopian Brethren.
Following of Italy’s defeat at Adwa, political turmoil galvanized Italian cities and the Chamber of Deputies. “Italy’s wrathful mobs” were “smashing windows and resisting the police and soldiers” and “radicals shouted Menelik’s praise,” as reported by the New York Times of March 7, 1896. Similar reports on the Ethiopian victory and its impact on Italian politics were covered by the Times of London, the Chicago Associated Press, and the Washington Post.
Moreover, the New York Times of Sunday, March 8, 1896 clearly reveals how the Ethiopian victory influenced European politics:
“For months international affairs have been growing more and more unsettled here in Europe, and now Italy’s tragic misadventure has thrown them altogether out of balance. If the battle of Adowah was fought on the slopes of the Alps it could have wrought more blind confusion and diplomatic panic.”
The victory of Adwa was also reported by Augustus Blandy Wylde, a journalist of the Manchester Guardian, who dedicates a whole chapter for Adwa in his book entitled Modern Abyssinia. Aditionally, Wylde makes an eye witness account of the trial of Baratieri in an Italian military tribune at Asmara. Baratieri was charged for losing the war to the Ethiopians at Adwa.
Adwa without doubt witnessed a major Ethiopian victory in the last quarter of the 19th century and as a result Ethiopian independence was preserved. Post-Adwa Ethiopia was a more unified nation, and never in the history of Ethiopia had Ethiopians demonstrated unity and resolve of such magnitude to fight against a common enemy. In the final analysis, however, the Adwa victory is not just an Ethiopian victory; in a broad historical context, Adwa symbolizes a victory of African people, in the Continent and in the Diaspora.
