Ethiopia’s
biased and obsolete Electoral Proclamation and the partisan National Election Board

The opposition’s  demand for
a democratic electoral  framework  and an 
impartial election management body for 2005 elections

Having
learnt its lessons from the stage-managed national and regional “elections” of 1995 and 2000, the political opposition
had requested the Parliament (The House of Peoples
Representatives) at the beginning of 2004  (i) )  to revise Electoral
Law 111/1995 to update it and make it 
more compatible with international standards, and (ii)  to 
then restructure the National Election Board (NEB) to either
include representatives of all independent political parties to balance the
influence of EPRDF, the Ruling Party, or to establish
a joint Commission  to cause the
appointment of an independent electoral Board that is acceptable to all
stakeholders, the choice of the appointment mechanism depending on the
provisions in the revised electoral proclamation.

 The request was appropriate since the
Parliament is the only branch of the Ethiopian Government that has legal
responsibility for supervising the activities of NEB which is empowered
by Article 5 of Proclamation 111/1995 to draft a revision and
submit it to the Parliament, its immediate supervising authority for approval.

Explicit
proposals were also submitted by the opposition  to serve as a basis for further discussion with the Government to
prepare the ground for free and fair elections in 2005.  Such a revision can be made within a short
time since the Parliament is used to passing legislation of national importance
within three days of receipt when such legislation proposal has come from Prime
Minister Meles.

Though he had no legal authority to
give an answer,
the Prime Minister responded negatively, as usual, to both requests in his
annual report to the House of Peoples Representatives  ( HPR) on July 9, 2004, claiming wrongly that both are of
international standard and both had done so well in the past two national and regional
elections that they had the respect of the Ethiopian people; that was far from
the truth.  On account of his undisputed
role in making all Government decisions, there is a need to take his views
seriously even when they grossly violate the Constitution and other laws, as
has been customary with Prime Minister Meles.

We
shall first briefly examine his claims separately in Part I and Part
II hereunder using his speech from the website of Walta, one
of the TPLF business monopolies, that have been put up in total contravention
of the current party organization law with the connivance of the NEB.  Then, we shall review the actual performance
of NEB and Proclamation
111/1995 since 1995 in Part III so as to expose the error in P.M.
Meles Zenawi’s claims.  Part IV
shall then present a summary of the findings for further discussion and action by all stakeholders,
including the elite in the Diaspora, all parties in the opposition and EPRDF
and its satellites.

Part I.    P.M. Meles’s claims for NEB, constitutional provisions and

                 international standards

In his annual report to the Ethiopian Parliament on July 9,
2004, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi had rightly noted that the political
opposition had requested for a restructuring of the National Election Board to
include representatives of all independent political parties to replace its
100% EPRDF recruits of the last ten years. 
He had then firmly stated, totally outside his constitutional mandate, that “ The
position of the Government is firm and unbending” in its decision of no
change in NEB,  and he cited two
reasons for that inflexible and illegal stand: 
He said, (i) “… the Board has carried out two democratic elections in
the past ten years that have earned it the recognition of the Ethiopian
people.  … In view of that it is
improper ( using the pretext of democracy) to change a Board that has
repeatedly proved its capacity to organize democratic elections…”, and (ii)
a Board which had representatives from all independent parties which had
different visions for the country  “… would
cease  to be an Election Board  and would degenerate into a forum for
incessant squabbling…”.   It is
strange that the Prime Minister appears to expect other parties to have the
same destructive vision as EPRDF !

According
to Article 50 of the FDRE Constitution, the Ethiopian Government has
legislative, executive and judicial branches, and according to sub-article 3 of
the same constitutional article, “ The House of
Peoples’ Representatives is the highest authority of the Federal Government….”.   Hence, Prime Minister Meles has no legal
authority to make that statement in Parliament regarding the National Election
Board and the Election Proclamation of 1995 since, (i) according to Article 5
of Election Proclamation 111/1995, both NEB and the Election Proclamation
111/1995 are the responsibility of the House of Peoples Representatives,
which is  “… the highest authority
of the Federal Government.”, and (ii) it is also unconstitutional for
him to dictate to the Parliament which, in addition to the provision in
sub-article 3 of Article 50, sub-article 25 of Article 55 of the Constitution has also
empowered HPR to supervise the Prime Minister and the entire Executive
branch. 

This
is, of course, on paper, in the FDRE Constitution, but the practice has always
been the opposite since the Prime Minister has always been the highest
authority of the Federal Government, and that has been the principal source of
all Ethiopia’s political, economic and social woes of the last 13 years of EPRDF
rule.  If he had respected the
Constitution, as he was obligated to do in Sub-article 13 of Article 74 of the
Constitution [Art. 74(13): “ He ( The Prime
Minister) shall obey and enforce the Constitution”]
the Prime Minister would never have 
talked down in HPR as he then did !

 .

The
arguments of the Prime Minister and his illegal decision, which contravenes Article 5 of
Electoral Proclamation 111/1965, not to change the composition  of NEB to make it  either inclusive of all parties or
independent of all political parties, are based on his strange perception that
“ … the differences between the ruling party and those in the opposition are
fundamental, wide and  marked by the
total absence of trust.  In such a
situation, there is a great danger that a Board made up by parties would cease
to be an election board and would degenerate into incessant squabbling”.   Though he is the single most powerful official of the Federal
Government, being in full charge of the Executive, Legislative and Judiciary
branches of the Government, a reaction is still in order to at least point out
that the Prime Minister is breaking the law.

The
Prime Minister appears to have misunderstood the proposal of the political
opposition: The peaceful political opposition is not asking for the
Government’s trust, but to create an independent and  non-partisan Election Management
Organization, as provided for in Article 102 of the
FDRE Constitution, precisely because of that lack of trust, to
ensure that it is (i) neutral, (ii) independent of the ruling political party
and all other competing parties by restructuring it in such a way as to
insulate it from all officials and other individuals, and any other groups or
institutions that have an interest in the outcome of the election, (iii)
efficient in implementing administrative electoral functions fully consistent
with internationally-accepted democratic election management principles, and on
the basis of the  Constitution and an
independent electoral law, and (iv) 
subject to independent and reliable control by an efficient and
effective supervisory/control body, such as an Independent Electoral Court,
to ensure the legality of all election operations.  Indeed, this was done even in Apartheid South Africa in
1994, and in Mexico, Argentina and in other countries in Latin
America, with very satisfactory results.

It
is precisely the absence of trust that has led to the provision of Article
102 in the Ethiopian Constitution, which reads as follows:

Article 102:Election
Board

1.     
There shall be established a National Election Board independent
of any influence, to conduct in an impartial manner free and fair
election in Federal and State constituencies.

2.     
Members of the Board shall be appointed by the House of Peoples’
Representatives upon recommendation of the Prime Minister. Particulars shall be
determined by law.

The
fact that sub-article 2 above provides for the recommendation to be made by the
Prime Minister does not free him from his constitutional obligation to respect
sub-article 1 above and sub-article 13 of Article 74 to “… obey and enforce the
constitution”.    The purpose of
establishing a National Election Board that is “independent of any
influence”, as provided for in Article 102 above, is to
guarantee full respect for political rights as spelt out in Article 38 below
from the same Constitution:

Article 38:The Right to Vote
and to be Elected

1. Every Ethiopian national, without any
   discrimination based on color, race, nation, nationality, sex, language,
   religion, political or other opinion or other status, has the following
   rights:
   (a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly and through
   freely chosen representatives;
   (b) On the attainment of 18 years of age, to vote in accordance with law;
   (c) To vote and to be elected at periodic elections to any office at any
   level of government; elections shall be by universal and equal suffrage
   and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of
   the will of the electors.
2. The right of everyone to be a member of
   his own will in a political organization, labor union, trade organization,
   or employers’ or professional association shall be respected if he or she
   meets the special and general requirements stipulated by such
   organization.
3. Elections to positions of responsibility
   with any of the organizations referred to under sub-Article 2 of this
   Article shall be conducted in a free and democratic manner.

The provisions of sub-Articles 2 and 3 of this
Article shall apply to civic organizations which significantly affect the
public interest.

If
political parties and the general public had mutual trust with regard to

(i)                
the
existence of ordinary government administration organ, under the

Executive branch, that acts
with professionalism, neutrality and

independence from the ruling party and all other
political parties, and is also efficient and suitably equipped, and 

(ii)               
the  existence of a judiciary that is strong and
independent to be

trusted by all political
parties and the general public to guarantee

control over the legality of
the performance of such an election

administration, 

then,
an independent electoral management organization would be totally unnecessary
and a waste of resources.  Such mutual
trust exists in the USA, Great Britain, Japan, France, Germany, Sweden and
several other democratic nations, but not in Ethiopia where we have neither an
independent and professional civil service, nor an independent judiciary to be
entrusted with the implementation of free and fair elections. 

Ethiopia
is one of those countries where there is no trust between political parties,
thereby leading to the enactment of Article 102 of the FDRE Constitution,
and to the necessity of an electoral law and an electoral management body that
are independent of the ruling party or any other party. 

Independence of NEB cannot be
assured when EPRDF has drafted the electoral law, has enacted it and has
single-handedly organized NEB as an EPRDF election management body in
accordance with that partisan law. 
Hence, the final outcome is that EPRDF ends up being the election
manager from top to bottom, the jury and the judge whenever there are
complaints and, at the same time, one of the competing parties for political
power.  This is precisely
the problem with the current National Election Board: it has never been   independent or credible over the last 10
years, as we shall  see below in Part
III.

As
for the opposition’s proposed party-based composition of NEB to protect
it from the influence of the Ruling Party, PM Meles has again lost sight of
international practice:  Mozambique was
rocked for years by Communist FRELIMO and anti-communist RENAMO
until 1992 when they agreed, after shedding so much of each others blood, to
make peace and settle the leadership issue with democratic elections.  The way they constituted their election
board was to make it up from representatives of political parties, with FRELIMO
as Chair, and RENAMO as Deputy Chair, and other parties as members, and
that was replicated right down to the level of 
polling stations at the village level. 

Lack
of trust was the very issue in Mozambique that led to all stakeholders to be
actors of equal standing at all levels of the election management
organization.  The Mozambique elections
have had fewer problems ince, and that has continued to present day Mozambique
which is one of the better governed and fast developing countries in the world
today with  a government that is much
more transparent and accountable than most in the African Continent.  That achievement was rightly recognized by
President Chisano’s election as the second President of African Union, right
After South Africa’s President Mbeki, President of a vibrant and democratic
South Africa.

Another
example of similar confidence building was in Apartheid South Africa of
1993 when De Clerk’s National Party and Mandela’s ANC and
its associates stopped bleeding each other and the country, and sat together to
work out a constitution, an electoral law, and the Independent Electoral
Commission to carry out the first successful, democratic election in South
Africa’s history in 1994.  Again, that
was a group of parties that had butchered each other for several decades, but
they built up trust among each other by appointing a truly independent
electoral commission and by institutionalizing transparent rules and procedures
to carry democratic elections, and it was evaluated as such by over 95% of
all South Africans immediately after the elections.  

Surely,
no Ethiopian parties have shed so much of each other’s blood to the extent of
that of RENAMO-FRELIMO or that of ANC and associates and the Apartheid
rulers; in both cases, dialogue was possible, mutual trust was built up,
and democratic elections were carried out since the ruling party of President
De Clerk had the long-term vision, goodwill and commitment to advance the
nation’s cause for peace, security, stability and development.  Given a comparable national commitment and
non-sectarian vision, which have lacked badly in the ruling camp over the last
10 years, Prime Minister Meles and EPRDF are in a better position than those of
Mozambique and South Africa of the 1990s to do something similar to ensure
enduring peace, stability and development in Ethiopia and in the Horn of
Africa.

Prime
Minister Meles’s  “…forum for incessant
squabbling …”  theory regarding the
composition of a national election organization made up of independent
political parties is not supported by empirical evidence.    Indeed, in one of its three guiding
principles, under Nonpartisan below, ACE recommends that “ If
a completely nonpartisan body cannot be created, then one that is balanced by
the inclusion of representatives of various parties should be created.”.
and that is one of the accepted international practices to avoid “…incessant
squabbling” which has  been  with 
us during the entire 13 years of EPRDF rule. 

In
order to define the background for an independent electoral management
organization, we shall next examine internationally accepted standards that
govern such institutions.

international
standards for credible election 
management organizations

ACE (Administration
and Cost of Elections Project) states that “An election management body (EMB) should
be founded on principles of independence,
nonpartisanship, and professionalism. It should have clear
procedures to make it accountable and have equally clear procedures for
reviewing its effectiveness both as a management organization and as a service
deliverer. It must be nonpolitical but capable of operating in a political
environment”.

These three guiding principles
are further elaborated by ACE as follows.

“Independent: In a
country with multiparty activity, an EMB attracts the confidence of all parties
only if it is seen to be independent of any party and of the sitting
government. It is essential that the EMB have this confidence or else the
process of the election and the results will be brought into question. And
while the EMB can never be wholly           independent
because it will be reliant on the legislature for the approval of funding and
possibly the appointment of its key personnel, these powers should not be used
to exert influence over the EMB. The EMB itself should also be structured to
protect it from influence. Some countries, such as Papua New Guinea and South
Africa, have constitutional guarantees for the independence of their EMBs. In
Costa Rica, it is a fourth branch of government under the constitution. Other
countries may not guarantee independence in their constitution but do nevertheless
cherish, respect and safeguard such independence (e.g., Australia, Canada, and
the United Kingdom).

Nonpartisan: Nonpartisan
is not the same thing as independent. Rather, it implies that the EMB should
not care about who wins or loses the election it is administering. Its interest
should be in establishing a level playing field on which candidates and parties
may compete, in giving all voters sufficient information so they can cast their
vote in a reasonably informed manner, and in adding up votes and declaring
results without prejudice toward any party or candidate. The EMB should be
composed of people who are, and who are perceived by the key players to be,
capable of acting impartially and who enjoy the confidence of the major
parties. In many cases, this means that the members or policymakers of the EMB
are not members of any political party. If a completely nonpartisan body cannot
be created, then one that is balanced by the inclusion of representatives of
various parties should be created.

Professional: No
matter how independent or impartial an EMB may be, an equally important
characteristic is professionalism in its approach to the huge administrative
task that is electoral management. Election management is essentially a service
industry, and people have rising expectations of the ability of the industry to
deliver a quality service. Failure to deliver that service because of
nonprofessional behavior, be it poor planning or other administrative
inefficiency, may have the consequence of calling into question the key
principles of independence and impartiality. As a result, people will be less
likely to participate in the process in future.

A
professional EMB should constantly review the law it administers and the ways
in which it advises its staff, political parties and candidates, and voters
about the electoral process. An EMB should ensure that the electoral law is
faithfully administered and that all candidates, parties, and voters are
treated equally and fairly. It should also consider how best to inform and
educate the voters about the electoral process and how to make best use of
resources, including new technology. It should have sufficient resources to
perform its functions.

ACE further adds that “ The integrity of election administration is crucial to
ensure that the electoral process is considered to be legitimate. There is
little point in holding elections, which are expensive operations, if the
outcome is questionable because of either the inefficiency of the EMB or
doubt about its impartiality. At the time of an election as well as during
the compilation of the voters list, the attention of many will fall on the
role of the EMB, and the EMB should be certain that it can withstand such
scrutiny and ensure the legitimacy of the processes for which it is
responsible. ”

The International Institute
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA) has
published a Code of Conduct for
the ethical and professional administration of elections. The code details
the five ethical principles that should form the basis of electoral
administration to ensure both the appearance and the actual integrity of the
electoral process. According to this code, the administration of elections
must

·        
demonstrate
respect for the law,

·        
be
nonpartisan and neutral,

·        
be
transparent,

·        
be
accurate,

·        
be
designed to serve the voters.”

These ethical principles are
further explained by IDEA as follows:

“Ethical
Principle 1 – Election administration must demonstrate respect for the law.
The success of an election depends on the extent to which it is accepted as
legitimate and binding by the participants in the political process. The
expression of major policy decisions in a clear legal form provides the
degree of certainty that is required for the development of a common understanding,
by all participants in the process, of how it will be administered. If the
election administration does not follow the law, and apply it equitably and
clearly explain the legal rationale for its decision, the common
understanding of the participants may be affected, and support for the
election process may be weakened. An election administration should therefore

·        
comply with the laws of the country,

·        
within the legal framework of the country, ensure
that the laws relating to elections are fully implemented in an impartial and
equitable fashion,

·        
within the legal framework of the country, ensure
that every party, candidate, voter and other participant in the election
process is treated in a way that is fair and just, considering all the
circumstances.

Ethical Principle 2 – Election administration must
be nonpartisan and neutral. 
For an election to be successful, participants in the process have to
trust that the election administrators will carry out their functions in a
politically neutral way. If the people managing an election are perceived to
have a commitment to any particular election result, the public credibility
of the election process will be so seriously compromised that it will be
difficult to restore faith in the process. Election administrators must
therefore perform all their tasks in a manner that is strictly nonpartisan
and politically neutral.

At times, a country may choose
people to be election administrators because they represent a political party
or political tendency. In that case, even though the administrators are
chosen because of their political affiliation, they must still perform their
election administration tasks in a manner that is strictly nonpartisan and
politically neutral. Election administrators should

·        
act in a strictly neutral and unbiased manner in
every matter concerning a political party, candidate, voter, or member of the
press or media,

·        
do nothing that could indicate, or be seen as
indicating, partisan support for a candidate, political party, political
actor or political tendency,

·        
at all times, conduct themselves in an
irreproachable manner, exercise sound judgment, and observe the highest
levels of personal discretion,

·        
disclose any relationship that could lead to a
conflict of interest with their duties as election administrators,

·        
not accept any gift or favor from a political
party, organization, or person involved in the election process,

·        
reject any improper influences, and, except as
provided by law or custom, refrain from accepting directions relating to the
performance of their tasks,

·        
not participate in any unauthorized activity,
including any private activity, that could lead to an actual or perceived
conflict of interest with their duties as election administrators,

·        
not participate in any activity, including any
private activity, that could lead to a perception of sympathy for a
particular candidate, political party, political actor, or political
tendency,

·        
not express a view on any subject that is likely
to be a political issue in the election,

·        
not communicate with any voter on a matter of
partisan significance,

·        
not wear, carry, or display any
obviously partisan party symbols or colors.

Election administrations
should follow each of these guidelines, to the extent that each guideline applies to an organization as well as to a person.

Ethical Principle 3 – Election administration must
be transparent.  For an
election to be successful, participants in the process have to accept the
decisions of the election administration. Participants are most likely to
accept those decisions if they can easily satisfy themselves that the
decisions were made appropriately. To do that, they must have access to the
information on which decisions are based. Of course, each election will
generate a large amount of data, extensive databases, and many documents.
Generally, it is not practical to provide access to, or copies of, all that
data or every one of those documents to every person who may want access or
copies. Election administrators should be prepared, however, to

·        
justify their decisions,

·        
make freely available the information on which
each decision was based,

·        
arrange effective and reasonable access to
relevant documents and information, within the framework of the country’s
electoral and freedom of information laws.

In addition, election
administrators and administrations should

• ensure
  that the agents of each political party or candidate can fully and
  effectively exercise their legal rights,
• consult
  with participants in the electoral process on a regular basis and in
  relation to specific decisions, if it is appropriate to do so in the
  circumstances,
• in
  response to reasonable requests, provide an explanation for a decision
  they have made as part of the electoral process, or a decision made as
  part of the general operation of the election administration,
• establish
  a system that allows interested parties to access, in a timely manner,
  all critical information, documents, and databases used in an election
  process, or used in the normal operation of the election administration,
  
• if
  any deficiency in the administration of an election comes to their
  attention, disclose that deficiency on their own initiative.

Ethical Principle 4 – Election administration must
be accurate.  It
follows from the discussion of Ethical Principle 3 that, for decisions of
election administrators to be satisfactory for the participants, the
information on which the decision is based must be accurate as well as
accessible. Inaccurate or unreliable information undermines confidence in both
the administration’s decisions and its general competence. Election
administrators and administrations must perform every task on the basis of
the highest standards of accuracy of information and objectivity of analysis.
In particular, they should

• ensure
  that information is collected, compiled, and published in a way that is
  systematic, clear, and unambiguous,
• do
  anything necessary, within the country’s legal framework, to ensure that
  all the information that they compile, use, or publish has a sound factual
  basis.

Ethical Principle 5 – Election administration must
be designed to serve the voters. Election
administrators and administrations should work to provide to every voter the
highest quality service required to enable voters to exercise their rights
with the least possible inconvenience, given the circumstances and the
country’s legal framework. In particular, they should

·        
make it as convenient as possible for voters to
participate in the election process,

·        
ensure that voters adequately understand the
election process,

·        
do everything possible to provide a way to vote for people with
special needs, such as the blind, physically handicapped, illiterate, or
those living in remote areas.”

The National Election
Board (NEB) has no such Code of Conduct and it clearly
fails f to meet international standards for democratic EMBs since (i) it is
not independent, nonpartisan or professional, (iii)  it does not demonstrate respect for the rule of law since it
has often violated the Constitution and even the partisan Electoral
Proclamation 111/1995, and (ii) it is not transparent or accountable to the electorate and
competing parties since it has consistently failed over the last 10 years,
using ACE’s guidelines given above, to “…
ensure that the electoral law is faithfully administered and that all
candidates, parties, and voters are treated equally and fairly.”, as
adequately demonstrated in Part III below.  This is why the demand of the opposition for a change in the
composition of the current NEB has been so loud and persistent over
the last 10 years.

We
will next examine the Prime Minister’s claim that Electoral Proclamation
111/1995 is of international standard.

Part II.            P.M. Meles’s claim that Proclamation
111/1995 is of international

standard

In
his annual report to Parliament on July 9, 2004, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi
had arrogantly announced that the request of the political opposition to revise
Electoral Proclamation 111/1995 was unacceptable
to his Government since, using his speech from the website of Walta,  he claimed: (i) “ The Electoral Law is
consistent with international standards…”, 
and (ii) the electoral law “… has been the basis of two elections
carried out so far…”, which, by itself, is no argument for any claim of
virtue for the Law since the law has been enforced by a de facto
one-party system, with numerous serious problems over the last 10 years.  We shall first observe the important
elements of the international standard for such laws, and then review articles
of Electoral Proclamation 111/1995 to see if they are  “… consistent with international
standards …”, and postpone a discussion of its performance to Part III below. 

Is Proclamation  111/1995 of International Standard ?

First,
we have to define what is meant by an electoral law of international
standard.  Such a definition is readily
available in several publications, including those in IFES’s website, in
USAID’s Handbook of Democracy and Governance Program Indicators,
in IIDEA and in ACE websites.  Since they are all essentially the
same, we shall quote only those of ACE and USAID as
follows:

ACE recommends the inclusion of the following 4
elements as a core for such regulations:

• elements of the
  basic right to active and passive universal suffrage, namely, an accurate
  determination of who may vote and be elected, how one becomes a voter and
  how one becomes a candidate
• conditions of the
  elections, which include a specific definition of the constituency, the
  electoral formula or principle and the form of expression of the vote
• organizational,
  procedural and territorial criteria: how and where voting takes place
• control mechanisms
  of the different procedural phases

As we shall see below, Electoral Proclamation
111/1995 fails to uphold universal suffrage, fails badly on the demarcation
of electoral constituencies, and has practically no credible monitoring and
control mechanisms of the different procedural phases of the electoral process.

ACE further emphasizes that these broad
requirements for the formulation of a democratic electoral law “…must
provide a full range of procedural guarantees that will make the constitutional
principles of the right to active and passive suffrage fully effective… The
most basic premise is not to achieve perfect procedural mechanisms, but for a
consensus to exist among all the relevant political forces on their honesty, so
that inevitable imperfections (e.g., on the electoral roll) would be assumed as
politically neutral and as such, acknowledged by all as being unable to
compromise the results of an election.

Typical Contents setting out from these two basic
elements, then, the following comprise the typical contents of an electoral
law:

• definition of the
  sphere of the regulations (which elections are affected by them)
• regulations
  referring to the electoral system (constituency, number of
  representatives, electoral formula, etc.)
• dispositions
  relevant to the right to active suffrage, definition and deprival of the
  right, regulations for the exercise thereof, including registration on the
  electoral roll
• dispositions on the
  right to passive suffrage, including the determination of who is eligible
  and who is ineligible, and the conditions for running as candidates
• regulations relevant
  to electoral administration (appointments, dependence or independence,
  procedures of operation, etc.)
• dispositions on the
  electoral campaign
• voting procedure(s)
• vote counting
  procedure(s) and announcement of those elected
• expenses and
  electoral subsidies”.

On
the other hand, in Part 2 of Section B, which is on Elections and Political Processes, in its Handbook of Democracy and Governance
Program Indicators, USAID, the international development agency of the
US government, describes Impartial Electoral in Section
2.2.1 as follows:

“The
electoral framework refers to those constitutional provisions, laws,
regulations,

and
institutions which govern electoral processes. 
Although not a sufficient condition,

an
impartial framework is a necessary
condition for free and fair elections and electoral processes. Impartiality can take a number of forms, but
it will generally be recognized by a broad
acceptance of the framework.”

Given
the above principles and guidelines for an electoral legal framework of
international standard, and those relating to election management bodies from
IDEA and ACE, we now examine articles of Electoral Proclamation
111/1995 to see how they measure up against international standards of
democratic constituency demarcation, independence, impartiality, transparency,
accountability, universal suffrage, effective, transparent  and unbiased control at all stages of the
election process, and broad acceptability by the principal stakeholders:
competing political parties and the general public.

Review of electoral Proclamation 111/1995

This
proclamation has 73 articles to lay down rules and procedures and 6 more to
relate the proclamation with other laws, all in 4 chapters. 
Our review will relate only to the first 73 articles. 

Chapter 1 ( Articles 1-2) deals with definitions, Chapter
2 ( Articles 3-12) with the National Election Board, Chapter 3
(Articles 13-68) deals with election constituencies, election principles and
election procedures, and Chapter 4 ( Articles 69-73) deals with
procedures for redressing complaints during the elections. We shall review the
law chapter by chapter.

Chapter 1:  Definitions

The law itself is incomplete and so are the
definitions.  Hence, this will be
skipped.

Chapter 2:  National Election Board

Here is where the crucial problem of partisanship is
built in with the appointment of a totally partisan National Election Board
and election management. It is also in this Chapter where we have
practically no equitable structure for constituencies to ensure that all areas
and, hence all people, have an equal say in national affairs.

Art. 4 deals with the appointment of the members of the
National Election Board (NEB).   They are all recruited and appointed by the
Parliament which is over 97% EPRDF and its close associates.  Hence, the Board members, handpicked by the
ruling party, in contravention of Article 102 of the Constitution, are in
charge of the election organization from top to bottom to oversee elections
where EPRDF itself is competing for power. 
EPRDF has also picked the election management team, set the election
rules, provided the judge and the jury, and enforced the law in its favor since
1995. Further, the duration of service of members of the Board is unlimited.

Art. 5  empowers the NEB to
submit a revised code to Parliament to improve the electoral law, to recruit
election officials and staff that are neutral, to provide extensive civic
education, to report to Parliament on its activities periodically, and to elect
its Chairman from the members, among other functions. 

The Board has
failed to see the several problems in the Law during so many years of its messy
application, has failed to give extensive civic education, and it has often
recruited election staff and officials that cannot be differentiated from the
members of the ruling party, as we see in Part III below.  The Article also clearly states that neither
the Executive branch nor the Prime Minister have legal authority to revise the
electoral law;  only the Board and the
Parliament have such powers. 

However, in view of the fact that the
Prime Minister is in charge of all three branches  (Judiciary, Legislative and Executive) of government, this may
sound painfully academic.

Art 8 deals with the appointment of the Chief Executive Officer of the
National Election Board and his Deputy. 
Both are handpicked and presented by Prime Minister Meles to
Parliament for appointment, and the Prime Minister is also the de facto Leader
of Parliament, as Leader of the Ruling Party, so that he is, in effect, the one
who appoints both Board members and the Executives of NEB.  This is, again, a violation of Article 102 of the Constitution.

Chapter 3:   Election
Constituencies, Principles and Procedures

Art. 15 attempts to define the constituencies and the bodies responsible for
demarcating constituencies.  In
Sub-article 15(2), it starts out to define a constituency as one which has a
population of 100,000, but negates this by providing for the representation (
Sub-article 15(3)) of minorities, that should have been listed here or
elsewhere with another law, to be represented in spite of this numerical
requirement.

In Sub-article 15(4), the Parliament is empowered to
define a constituency in a manner different from Sub-Article 15(2) so that the
principle of equitable representation is shoved aside.

In Sub-article 15(7), it is further provided that NEB
shall consult the appropriate
bodies and decide on the number of candidates for membership in Regional
Councils.  But, who are the appropriate bodies ?   The demarcation procedure is all confused
and far from transparent and credible.

Hence, this article, appears to define a
constituency, and yet it does not, and it has two different EPRDF/government
organs that decide on matters relating to the demarcation/size of
constituencies.  In addition, minorities
that need to be represented can be explicitly listed in this law or in another
law, but they are kept hidden from the public so as to provide another  pretext for more partisanship.

Lastly, the
size of 100,000 for a constituency is no more valid 10 years after the
enactment of Proclamation 111/1995 
since the Ethiopian population has increased  by some 30% to some 70,000,000, thereby raising the number of MPs
from the current 547 to well over 700 at the rate of 100,000 per MP.  This article requires an urgent revision if (i) the size of
parliament is to remain about 550, (ii) election districts are to be
meaningfully demarcated to ensure compliance with Article 38 0f the
Constitution to give all Ethiopians an equal chance in choosing their leaders at
all levels. 

Here is another instance where democratic
representation is not seriously taken by the Government since the national
population census is scheduled for implementation right after the national
elections in May 2005.   Indeed, by
putting the cart before the horse, the Government is clearly demonstrating a
lack of commitment to democratic representation as envisaged in Art. 38 of the
FDRE Constitution, and, by so doing, it is violating the Constitution.

Article 19 provides the criteria of duration of residence and
citizenship to qualify as a voter, but ten years after EPRDF came out from the
bush, it is no more justifiable to have a residence requirement of 2 years for
some Ethiopians and zero years for others unless the Ruling Party wishes
to continue to bus in non-residents and members of defense Forces ( See EHRCO
report for Dire Dawa in 2000) from other areas; 13 years is more than enough
for political fugitives, outlaws, political emigrants and similar people to
come back and be governed by the same legal provisions in 2005.  This article requires a revision to close
any opening for fraud.  This article
contradicts Art. 16 of this proclamation and Art. 38 of the Constitution which
unconditionally empower all Ethiopians 18 years and older to be voters.

Art.
22 deals
with registration officers.  It  does not specify who is actually responsible
for registration.  It simply states that
the Board shall designate them, thereby avoiding transparency, but it is
too important to be left at that.  There
is no role the competing parties.

Art.
23 provides
for the appointment of observers from competing political parties and NGOs, but
no provision for international observers. In practice, this provision
has been grossly violated by NEB’s appointment of  “ Peoples’ Observers“, often
largely illiterate, who have been invariably used as tools by election
officials (EPRDF) to serve as members of Grievance Committees, monitoring
committees, and to always certify that the electoral process has been
free and fair; they know very little about their roles, and they sign
whatever papers they are presented to certify that the election has been free
and fair. 

Contrary
to the provisions of this article, EPRDF has always arranged Marxist-style
stage-managed community meetings to pick them up after an invariably
pre-arranged selection has been made for the purpose.  By so doing, the Board itself has willfully violated Art.
23 of this proclamation and Art. 38 of the Constitution in the national and
regional elections of  1995, 2000, 2001,
2004, and it is again prepared to do that in its instruction manuals for 2005
elections.

Article 29 provides still more demographic criteria for
qualifying a person as a voter, but it falls short of specifying the critical
criterion of permanent residential address where House Number should
be required in urban areas, and the village name and the name of the farmers’
association for rural areas.  This
article is in violation of Article 38 of the Constitution.

Art.30   deals with voter’s identification, which is not achieved, as
further reflected in Article 32 which specifies the contents of the voter’s
identification card.  An old
identification card or an Ethiopian passport which has expired is regarded
valid as a prerequisite for obtaining a voter’s card, and this is inconsistent
with the residence requirement in Art. 19. 
Further, an old Ethiopian passport or even a new one is no more good
enough to identify Ethiopians since it has been generously given to non-Ethiopians
over the last 13 years.

Indeed, people associated with the ruling party have
been able to vote any where in the country, and this has been done publicly
by the Board with the Adere/Harari community in one of the previous
elections when all Adere/Harari residents in any part of the country could
go and vote in Harar.  This is a serious partisanship problem where the Board has
again willfully violated Proclamation
111/1995.

Art. 32 defines the voter’s identification card.  The Voter’s identification card does not contain information on
exact place of
residence,
and this has left room for manipulation and fraud.  However, when it comes to endorsements of candidates in Article
30, all those who endorse candidates have had to provide the exact
addresses of their residences.  Every such resident has had to
give an exact residential address, and that is probably designed, as evidenced
in the harassment of opposition supporters throughout the country in 1995,
2000, and 2001, for such less noble purposes by the ruling party.

Further, these incomplete
identification cards have been distributed in 1995, 2000, 2001 and 2004  by polling stations without any count of how
many have been originally received at each polling station, how many have been
used, and how many are left unused. 
Hence, they have been given out in a manner that may well have been
designed to bring in non-residents  who
may have had EPRDF instructions to vote in two or more polling stations.  

Art.
33  deals with the closing of registration “in
accordance with the  directives of the
Board”. This appears to be designed to avoid transparency and
accountability.  It does not state who
closes the registration, how it is done, or who witnesses it.  Further, there is no mechanism  for controlling the legality of the registration
process.  In
2000 and earlier, independent observers were invariably absent, and there was
no indication of the number of voter identification cards received at each
registration center, or of the manner of distribution to potential voters.   Clearly, there was plenty of room for
fraud. Competing parties have had  no role.

Art.
36 treats
conditions for cancellation from the voter’s register. It is vague on the
procedures for cancellation of registration. 
Under-age people and military personnel, the
latter of which are barred from political participation by Art. 87 of the
Constitution, and others are not mentioned for cancellation.  It also fails to take note of conditions
imposed in Art. 19, Art. 20 and Art. 46, among others.  Again, agents of
competing political parties have had no role in such critical operations.

Art.
38 has  three problems: (i) it prescribes a language
criterion for candidacy, and that violates Art. 38 of
the Constitution since it discriminates on the basis of language, and violates
the citizen’s right to make a free choice without any imposition from the
government or the ruling party. 
If voter’s want to choose a candidate, irrespective of his/her ethnic
background, they should be free to do so; (ii) the second problem is that
candidates of political parties have to be endorsed by at least 500 supporters,
and this is an unnecessary obligation for a legally registered party.  In the past, it has been repeatedly used as
one of the tools of the Ruling Party to frustrate the opposition by canceling
names of supporters for flimsy reasons; (iii) this article also discriminates
between candidates in that some have to satisfy a 5-year residence requirement,
whereas others who have been outside the country for various reasons have no
need to satisfy this residence requirement; this also contradicts the very
principle of democratic elections since a new-comer cannot adequately represent
the aspirations of the electorate which it does not know.  

This
residence issue may have had some weak validity in the elections of only 1995
and earlier, but not 13 years after TPLF/EPRDF took over the reigns of
government and created a “stable and democratic state for the last
13  years”. Indeed, it makes no
sense to have a representative who has little or no knowledge of the area that
he/she represents, and it is equally absurd to claim that he/she has been
elected by people that do not know the person at all.  In fact, such elections have always been stage-managed. This
article is perhaps designed to serve the leaders of EPRDF who reside in Addis
Ababa but make arrangements to be ” elected” in Adwa, Axum,
Endasillasie, Bahir Dar, etc… when they do not satisfy the residence
requirement of 5 years. 

It
is now time for EPRDF leaders to face the facts and agree to the same residence
requirement for every candidate in the Land; it is senseless to allow one group
to have more rights than others while claiming to be a democratic government
that obeys the Constitution, just like the two land tenure systems ( one in
Tigray and the other in the rest of Ethiopia) of the EPRDF-led
Government.  Otherwise, Article 38 of
the Constitution will continue to be violated. 
This discriminatory provision also resides in Art. 19 which deals with the
residence requirements for voters.

Art.
41 deals
with the number of candidates per political party in a constituency, and it
defines that to be only ONE, and this is not true since up to 6 had been
nominated by EPRDF itself in the City Council elections in Addis Ababa in 2000.  The number of endorsements per resident is
also equally contradictory, and that has arisen from the fact that the article fails to define the type of elections.

Art.
42: deals
with candidates’ symbols “in accordance with the  directives of the Board”. This again appears to be designed to breed confusion in an
illiterate electorate.    Party
symbols have been no less that 6 for an opposition party’s candidates in Addis
Ababa in 2000.  This chaos is dictated
by directives of the National Election Board.  

Each
competing party should have only one party symbol throughout the Country, as has been the practice
in such democratic states like India, South Africa and several others, and that
will go a long way towards enhancing the effectiveness of the exercise of
democratic rights by our largely illiterate population. 

The symbols, the constituencies and
their population sizes, and the number of 
candidates in each constituency should be made public in an official
gazette well ahead of registration on a legally determined date so that the
information will not be EPRDF monopoly as it has been in 1995, 2000, 2001 and
2004.

Art.
43 limits
the number of candidates per constituency to 12, and this lacks clarity, and it
is also  an infringement on
constitutional rights enshrined in Article 38 when there are some 75 legally
registered political parties.  It may
also open an opportunity for more fraud.

At.  46 defines those that can be candidates while retaining
their government jobs.  It discriminates
between those who are political appointees and those that are not, and it also
discriminates between EPRDF members, who are the political appointees, and
those from opposition parties, which invariably have no political
appointees.  Political appointees do not
have to resign to be election candidates, but the rest have to resign their
posts.  

Another
discriminatory content in this article is that whereas members of the civil
service can be members of a political party, (i) they cannot be leaders in
their respective parties, and (ii) they cannot, during an election campaign,
campaign or write on behalf of their party candidate, or support such a
candidate in any way.  This violates
Articles 25 and 38 of the Constitution since political appointees of EPRDF can
do that without any such constraints. 
Members of the Civil Service, including political appointees,
need to be equal before the Constitution.

Furthermore,
this article violates Art. 87 of the Constitution by allowing members of the
Defense  forces to participate in
elections provided they come dressed as civilians.  This is highly deceptive, and it is designed to create a loophole
to justify the bussing of members of the Defense Forces, as was boldly done by
EPRDF in DIRE DAWA ( See  Part III
below)  the National Elections of
2000.

Art.
48 provides
for a political campaign period “in accordance with the  directives of the Board”. This
appears to lack transparency and its purpose is suspected to be to create an
opportunity for election fraud by the Ruling Party.

Art.
50 provides
for equal access to all Government-run public mass media to all competing
political parties, but that is done in accordance with the directives of the Ministry of Information, one
of the least progressive and the leading anti-private press agencies of the
EPRDF Government.  This provision has
not been implemented in 1995, 2000, 2001 and 2004, and that has been in
violation of Article 29 of the Constitution. 
Hence, this article should be replaced by a Mass Media Commission,
composed of representatives of all competing independent political parties, to
oversee the equitable use of the press, including all public mass media that
are under the Ministry of Information.

Art.
51 deals
with the obligations of government institutions to provide equitable services
to all competing parties, and it  looks
good on paper. However, in all past elections, government vehicles, conference
halls and public mass media have been the monopoly of the ruling party, and the
National Election Board, itself an organization of EPRDF, has not attempted to
implement this legal provision.  This is also one of many reasons
why the Board has to go.

Art.
52:  provides for stopping any illegal activities
during the election period.  This is a
control/supervisory function which has had no effect in the elections of 1995,
2000, 2001 and 2004. The
Board has failed, and the court system has also failed so that it is time to
establish an Independent Electoral Court at the level of the
Supreme Court, and an independent Prosecutor to go with it, for the
elections in 2005 to be appointed jointly by all independent political parties;
that was done in South Africa in 1993. 
An independent electoral court has also been successfully used in Latin
America ( Mexico, Argentina, etc…). 

The
justification for this is the absence of an independent judiciary since the one
we have today is an appendage of EPRDF, as acknowledged by Prime Minister
Zenawi himself in 2001 (See Reporter, Amharic Monthly; May
2001, Vol. 4, No. 36, p.23) in one of his policy papers by admitting that
judges at various levels have been recruited largely on account of their
loyalty to EPRDF so that a judiciary so constituted cannot, even according to
him, ensure rule of law.  Nevertheless,
three years latter, there is no independent judiciary right to this day.

Art.
55 provides
for the opening of polling stations “in accordance with the directives of
the Board”. This is again designed to avoid transparency and
accountability, and to create a deceptive legal basis for election fraud by the
Ruling Party.  There is no reason why
the election proclamation cannot contain such information in full public’s
view.

Art.
57  deals with secrecy of balloting.  Voting secrecy has been absent quite
frequently in 1995 and in 2000, and that has been even more so in rural
Ethiopia with the full knowledge and participation of election officials ( See
DEU Report extract for 1995, and EHRCO report extract for 2000 below).  As a result, Article 38 of the Constitution
has been repeatedly violated by members of the NEB itself. This is another singular failure of the Board, as  successively observed by independent
observers in 1995 and 2000 ( See Part III below).  Further, agents
of competing political parties have had no role in such critical operations.

Art.
60  deals with the hours of voting, but this
article has rarely been observed even within Addis Ababa.  This is again a
reflection of the Board’s incompetence.

Art.
62 provides
for security of polling stations.  In all past elections the only serious insecurity was due
to  EPRDF officials  ( See DEU Report  extract for 1995 and EHRCO Report extract for 2000 below) who
were indistinguishable from election officials within the polling stations, and
that is understandable since election management officials, from the National
Election Board down to the polling station level, have been EPRDF
officials.  This is also why an INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION
needs to be reconstituted to replace the current partisan National
Election Board to check such outrageous illegality.

Art.
63  provides for the entry of journalists to
polling stations, but there is no explicit provision to give them access to
election data.  This is done to avoid
transparency and accountability.

Art.
64 deals
with the way voting is effected using the voter’s card to identify a
voter.  This article has four problems:
first, the identification card is inadequate for identification since it fails
to fully identify the person as detailed in Article 32; second, voters have had to mark their ballot in front of election
officials; several have had to go into the voting booth in groups   ( See
DEU Report  extract for 1995;  and EHRCO Report extract for 2000) so that
the essential principle of voting secrecy was not upheld by the Board. 

The
third problem is that Art. 64 also provides for assistance to the disabled and
to the illiterate using partisan elements of EPRDF.  However, since independent observers and party agents have not
been involved, that practice has opened still another door for fraud by the
Ruling Party since the disabled and the illiterate are at the mercy of partisan
election officials; agents of competing political
parties have had no role in such critical operations, as they do in democratic
elections elsewhere.

The
fourth problem with Art. 64 is that all spoilt ballot papers are returned to
the partisan officials and their role in the final count has always been
suspicious.  Such papers should be
jointly marked by agents of the competing parties and the election official and
stored in a pouch which is  clearly
labeled and visible to all observers and
party agents in the polling station.

Art.
65 deals
with vote counting and results reporting at the polling station again “in
accordance with the  directives of the
Board”.  It says nothing about
who opens the box, who officially witnesses the entire counting process, when
and how counting exactly begins and ends, who is responsible for the count, who
seals the ballot box after counting, what competing party agents can do here,
who makes the counts public at the polling station, whether competing parties
get a copy of the count results and what the exact content of the cunt report
ought to be, the availability of the voting results to the press, and the
security of the transportation of the ballot box to the office of the election
district in a manner that has the trust of all competing political parties and
the public, and the conditions under which all the activities are again  repeated in the office of the election
district.  Vote counting is one occasion
when fraud is very probable.

All
operations around vote counting have always been kept intentionally vague,
known only to EPRDF and its election officials in 1995, 2000, 2001 and 2004. A
more transparent article and an explicit role is essential for independent observers and for
agents of competing political parties.

Art.
66 deals
crudely with the public announcement of election results, and the content of
such a report.  It leaves out, among
others, any mention of the number of ballot papers that have been distributed
to polling stations, perhaps with the objective of creating still more
opportunities for further fraud.  Such
announcements need to be made (i) at the polling station, (ii) at the office of
the election district ( wereda), 
(iii) at the national level, with paralleling contents, and (iv) on election day. 
However, the
announcement of the results should be postponed until all legal challenges by
any competing party are given a complete review in court.  All operations should involve all agents of
all competing parties.

Chapter
4:  Procedures
for Redressing Election Complaints

Art.
69-73 deal
with the treatment of complaints during registration, voting and vote counting.
Complaints during the election campaign period are covered in Art. 52.  All such complaints have so far been seen by
the partisan election officials, then appeals go to partisan EPRDF courts and
the entire process takes weeks, if not years, so that a fraudulent election is
announced “free and fair” by gullible
observers, that have been observing for no more than a week, and the partisan NEB
before complaints are legally resolved. 

This
is also why an impartial National Election Board is needed to
manage the administrative function, an INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COURT and an
independent prosecutor to control illegality in election management
operations and to curb endless election violations of the Ruling Party which
will then be forced to be more legal since EPRDF will then realize that it can
no more tell NEB or the court what to do.  The partisan quality of the courts of today are more
authoritatively described by the Prime Minister himself ( See Reporter,
Amharic Monthly, May 2001,  Vol.
4, No 26, p. 23), as reported above.

Proclamation 111/1995, the constitution
and international standards

Proclamation 111/1995  violates Article 102 which provides for an independent NEB.

This
electoral proclamation starts out by violating Article 102 of the Constitution
which requires the NEB to be independent: 
Article  4 and Article
8 empower the Parliament, which is over 97% EPRDF, to appoint the members
of the NEB, the Chief Executive Officer of the Board and his Deputy.  Hence, the impartiality and independence
criteria for a democratic and credible electoral management organization of
international standard are seriously compromised.  Indeed, NEB has never been independent or impartial; it has never
demonstrated any respect for the Constitution or for the partisan Proclamation
111/1995; it has been unprofessional and it has been far from transparent,
accountable or credible.

Article 15, on the demarcation of constituencies,
does not clearly state the criteria for creating  constituencies, and there is no central authority for
demarcation.  Further, it is not
transparent since it has always failed to publish the particulars of the
constituencies in an official government gazette.  NEB has arbitrarily changed the sizes of constituencies
right in the middle of the electoral process in 2000, and the only beneficiary
has been the very organ that has created NEB and makes the election
management rules: EPRDF.

Such arbitrary decisions on demarcation have given
rise to electoral constituencies in Addis Ababa in 2000 when some were twice as
large as others, given a constitution-based electoral formula of “ First
Past the Post ” where only one candidate is elected from each election
district.  That had grossly violated
Art. 38 of the Constitution.

Further,
the current criterion of demarcation of a constituency on the basis of 100,000
persons is now obsolete since the population has grown by about 30% to some
70,000,000 so that there will have to be over 700 parliamentarians with the
current law; Ethiopia has neither the space in the current parliament building
nor the resources for 700 MPs. 

The electoral
law also fails to define the sphere of the proclamation as national or
regional; it discriminates between citizens during registration; it does not
provide adequately for concerns regarding monitoring and control, and, hence,
it has serious problems of credibility among the electorate and all opposition
parties;  it fails to ensure  election security;  it also fails to ensure equitable access to public mass media and
other government resources;  it has no effective,
credible and efficient control mechanisms for the different procedural phases
of the elections and there is absolutely no provision for the effective and
speedy redress of complaints, and no provision for a budget that is independent
of the ruling party;  there is no legal
provision for subsidies for all competing parties even though EPRDF liberally
uses government funds, government vehicles, government employees and government
facilities without any curb.  

Lastly, Electoral Proclamation 111/1995 is
poorly structured in spite of the fact the electoral process can be so clearly
demarcated in terms of the electoral district demarcation, electoral roll,
registration of candidates, registration of voters, the campaign period, the
voting process, and results announcement, in addition to lacking transparency
by avoiding any provisions for publishing the list and corresponding sizes of
all electoral districts, the election schedule, party lists and symbols
and  such other information as may be
necessary to enhance the public’s confidence in the National Election
Board. 

In
addition to being incomplete, obsolete and partisan, as described above, Electoral Proclamation 111/1995 has
no Code of Conduct and there is no limitation
on the duration of service of the members of the Board which  have been insensitive, partisan and
incompetent fixtures of the EPRDF over the last 10 years of EPRDF rule, in
spite of the continued demand for change by the opposition and the public on
account of the Board’s repeated failures and miserable performance of
mismanagement of the elections of 1995, 2000, 2001 and 2004. 

Hence, Proclamation 111/1995 has to be revised if
democratic elections are to take place in 2005, and if peace and stability are
to follow in Ethiopia and in the Horn of Africa after the elections in 2005.  The Parliament and the Board have already
received detailed alternative proposals from opposition political parties;
there is urgent need for political pressure to see it through.

Lastly,
the  Prime Minister’s claim of the
respectable performance of the National Election Board and Electoral Proclamation 111/1995  will be examined hereunder using the reports
of (a) a distinguished group of western ambassadors on the national and
regional elections of 1995, (b) Ethiopian Human Rights Council on
the elections in 2000, and 2004, and (c) All Ethiopia Unity Party on the
atrocities  committed by EPRDF
throughout Ethiopia in recent weeks as a further update of the performance of NEB
after the regional elections in January 2004.

Part III.               P.M. Meles’s
claim on the performace of  NEB and

                        Proclamation
111/1995 over the last ten years

A.  The
Elections of May 1995

The May 1995 Ethiopian national elections had such
respectable international observers as the Geneva-based International
Commission of Jurists( ICJ ) which worked in association with the American
Association of the ICJ ( AAICJ), African American Institute, and, of course,
the Donors’ Election Unit (DEU).

OAU
had also sent observers to observe only on election day on May 7, 1995 after
all major opposition parties ( SEPDC, OLF, AAPO, EDUP)
had boycotted the elections on account of the absence of a level playing field
for all competing parties.  Only EPRDF
was out there to compete with itself on election day.   Hence, OAU’s final but ill-conceived verdict was that the
elections of  May 7, 1995 were free and
fair, and that was a serious miscarriage of organizational responsibility.

The first two groups of observers had clearly
pronounced that the May 1995 elections were not free and fair, and,  as a result, both were denied further entry
to Ethiopia.  The essential message from
all three groups is basically alike so that only DEU’s report is reviewed
hereunder.

What
was DEU  ?

According
to DEU’s Report,  “The Donor Election
Unit (DEU)  was established … to observe
the electoral process leading up to the May 1995 national and regional
elections.  The DEU was created by the
Donor Group Sub-Committee on Elections, a groups that consists of the embassies
of Canada, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden,  the united Kingdom and the United States.  It is chaired by the ambassador of the
United Kingdom.”.

The Donors’ Election Unit (DEU)
was, therefore, organized by the Donors’ Group Sub-Committee
on Elections which comprised H.E. Robin Christopher, the
Ambassador of Great Britain as Chairman, and H.E. Ambassador Irvin Hicks of the
USA, H.E. Ambassador Jone Bos of Netherlands, H.E. Ambassador Ann Wilkens of
Sweden, H.E. Ambassador David Stockwell of Canada, H.E  Ambassador M. Melani of Italy and H.E.
Ambassador H. Winkelmann of Germany, which are seven distinguished ambassadors
to Ethiopia in all.  This distinguished
group of ambassadors submitted a report that was prepared by DEU to the
Transitional Government of Ethiopia with a letter dated May 31, 1995.

DEU’s Covering Letter

According
to the letter, “The DEU began operating on 
March 1 and it organized nearly 50 missions to every region of Ethiopia
by the time of the election on May 7.”. 
The letter went into some positive aspects of the election, and it then
added:   “There are, however, some
areas of concern where action will be required if democratic institutions are
to take deeper root.  These are in
particular:

1. The Need for Extensive
   Civic Education of the electorate, in particular, of political and
   administrative officials and cadres at the local level, where some
   behavior was not consistent with the democratic nature of the elections
   and the climate of tolerance and pluralism it implies
2. The Need to guarantee
   access to the rural area for all political parties
3. The Need for adequate
   time to prepare for elections …”.

DEU’s Report

The
Report had 7 Sections: (1) General
Political Climate, (2) Rural versus Urban Differences, (3) Issues Relating to
the Campaign, (4) Administrative Issues, (5) Voter Registration, (6) Voting and
Vote Counting Procedures, and (7) Final Observations.

The
Report explained that “The DEU began operating on March 1 and it organized
nearly 50 missions to every region of Ethiopia by the time of the election on
May 7….A number of countries ( the United Kingdom, Finland, Italy, Germany,
Norway, Sweden, Spain, Greece, Austria, , and the European Union) brought in a
limited number of observers from outside Ethiopia, totaling approximately 28.  In addition 50 Addis Ababa based donor
embassy officials also participated as observers… The Ethiopian Government
objected to some individuals proposed as observers on official government
delegations from the Netherlands and Canada due to their NGO backgrounds;  as a result these two states chose not to
send external observer missions.”

1.  General Political Climate

The
Report noted that “ A number of legally registered but non-participating
parties faced political intimidation, arrest, and the closure of their offices
in the pre-election period. The Southern Ethiopian Peoples Democratic Coalition
had some members in jail on dubious charges in Jinka…and was refused permission
to open an office and hold a rally in Hosaina. 
The All-Amhara People’s Organization had much of its leadership in jail
and most of its offices closed…DEU missions received numerous reports of
intimidation of the legally registered but non-participating Ethiopian
Democratic Unity Party (EDUP). … Several DEU missions received, investigated,
and judged credible reports that EDUP leaders have been imprisoned for
political reasons in Bahir Dar, Gonder, and Tigray… National and local election
boards usually refrained from intervening in cases of political harassment.  The Joint Forum for Political Parties did
not develop into a strong organization capable of monitoring or resolving
conflicts between candidates and government officials.  Recourse to the court system proved to be
slow and inadequate leaving candidates with grievances and few places to appeal
for redress.”.

2.   Rural versus Urban Differences

The
Report observed that “ In a real sense, two very distinct elections took
place.  These differences were seen in
all aspects of the election, from basic civic education, the ability of
non-EPRDF candidates to be registered, their ability to campaign, the levels of
voter registration, the administration of polling places ( particularly
regarding secrecy of the ballot) and, to a degree, the results. … Urban areas
had far greater freedom for both non-EPRDF candidates and voters…. In contrast,
in the rural areas where 85 percent of Ethiopians live, the farmers’
associations were solidly under the control of EPRDF.  The political power of 
many urban areas was diluted because constituency boundaries generally
included parts of towns along with rural areas.”.  This was one of several EPRDF machinations to deny a level
playing field to the political opposition.

3.   Issues relating to the Campaign

The
Report further added that “ In most regions we visited, the EPRDF-affiliated
party had large offices provided by the government and had access to government
vehicles and other material support. 
The boundaries between party business and regional or local government
business often were vague or not recognized. Non-EPRDF parties occasionally had
similar offices.  In general, however,
they were assigned very small offices or had to rent them privately.  Most towns did not have any non-EPRDF party
offices.”.

The
DEU report also noted that “ The presence of EPRDF officials in the Kebeles
and farmers’ associations provided EPRDF candidates with a further significant
advantage.  Kebele and farmers’
association officials affiliated with the EPRDF should have been clearly
distinct from the election officials but these lines often were blurred.  …. A large number of voters told DEU
missions that they expected repercussions if they did not follow the
instructions of the kebele leaders to register and vote for the EPRDF.”.   Such repercussions were expected in “ renting
a government house from the kebele or losing their allotment of fertilizer
distributed by the farmers association.” .

 It was further noted  in the Report that “ Some independent and
non-EPRDF candidates reported difficulties in calling or addressing such kebele
meetings.”.

4.    Administrative Issues

The
Report also observed that “Several non-EPRDF candidates complained to DEU
missions that the election boards were insufficiently forceful in investigating
claims against government officials.”

Regarding
the lack of clarity in articles in Election Proclamation  111/1995, the Report stated that “Areas
where there was confusion and inconsistent application of rules included the
issues of who must resign a government job…. The residence requirement for
candidates… and voters…and the restrictions on the use of government vehicles …”
which “…were interpreted in a variety of ways. As noted below, there was a
great deal of variation in procedures on voting day”. 

One
such variation related to the reporting of spoiled ballot papers.  The Report noted that  “ In a number of stations officials
seemed to try to discern the voter’s intent and, if reasonably clear, counted
the ballot…;;…polling officials, particularly in rural areas, denied  … the ability to put up posters” to
non-EPRDF candidates.

5.  Voter Registration

With
rural Ethiopia and the entire election management under the complete control of
EPRDF cadres and officials, the reported voter turnout was understandably large
in the countryside.  In Gonder, the
Report observed that “ there seemed to be a high number of voters listing
their age as 18, suggesting that some underage individuals may have
registered.”.

The
Report further stated that “  Voters
were rarely asked to show any identification when registering in places
observed by DEU”.

6.   Voting and Counting Procedures

The
Report observed that “ Despite the high rates of participation by registered
voters in most areas, DEU missions observed little voter enthusiasm.”.  That is to be expected when people are
forced out to vote for the ruling party and the ruling party alone.

It
was also stated that “ Some observers noted that instructions to voters were
given by kebele officials rather than election board officials, raising
concerns about the non-partisan nature of the information… the person
who handed the ballot to the voters should have been an election board
official”.

“
In many polling stations, ”, stated the Report, “the DEU
observed, the secrecy of the ballot was not fully ensured, particularly in the
rural areas.  The place for marking the
ballot was not always out of sight of other voters, election officials, or even
kebele officials.  In a number of rural
areas voters marked their ballots on the same table as the registration book or
even were told directly by an official where to place their mark.  More than one observer reported that in some
rural polling stations ballots were marked in public but placed in the ballot
box in a screened-off area.”.

The Report noted that “ One DEU mission estimated that
over a broad area in several regions more than 80 percent of the closing
reports were incomplete or contained major mistakes.   This lack of accountability provided opportunities for manipulation
and, in a significant number of rural polling stations, such manipulations
seemed evident…In Assosa ( Region 6), nine of the 32 polling stations checked
by a DEU mission found that one of the two competing parties received 100 per
cent of the votes, every one registered had voted, and no or very few void
ballots were recorded”.

7.  Final Observations

The
Report concluded that “ The EPRDF was the only major political organization
that participated in the May 1995 election… Some smaller parties participated
in a limited number of constituencies…these parties sometimes faced
intimidation and restrictions on their ability to campaign, particularly in
rural areas….The treatment of legally registered but non-participating parties,
including arrests of some officials, closure of offices and restrictions on
travel, hindered political participation….Many, but by no means all,
independent candidates either shared the EPRDF’s views on policy issues or
offered  only vague alternative
programmes.  Sometimes independents also
were harassed and thereby limited in their ability to reach voters.”. 

It
also added that “ The ability of candidates to register and campaign and
voters to vote secretly and without official interference was much higher in
the urban areas than the rural areas.”.  
The reason is clear:  EPRDF was
in full control of all rural areas except parts of southern Ethiopia where the Southern Ethiopian Peoples Democratic Coalition
provided reasonably strong opposition; in all other parts of rural Ethiopia,
EPRDF had successfully chased out the opposition by either imprisoning or
closing down opposition  branch offices
so that it ran unopposed.  Hence, in all
such rural areas where EPRDF competed with itself, there was no need for the
usual EPRDF-instigated harassment during the election period so that the
majority of rural areas throughout the Country appeared deceptively peaceful.

The
report finally concluded that “ The May 1995 Ethiopian elections had large
numbers of candidates, large numbers of voters, a generally effective administration,
and was conducted in a peaceful manner. 
Elections, however, are about choice… the ability of the Ethiopian
people to use the ballot effectively to choose their leaders is still limited.  Until alternative political organizations
participate, however, such choices will remain restricted.”.

The
DEU Report was fair; EPRDF had no problem fielding a large number of candidates
of all descriptions, and voter turnout was high since 85% of Ethiopians were
under EPRDF mercy;  the election
administration was inefficient, and for a nation that is used to thousands of
years of feudal rule, there was no problem accepting that form of “peace” in
1995.   

However,
rural and urban Ethiopia are different today. 
Rural Ethiopia wants its land back, and it will not accept peace for
continued slavery and a feudal-style land tenure system where the farmer,
outside Tigray, has land and fertilizers only so long as she/he supports EPRDF,
but not otherwise; this is the dismal story in rural Ethiopia at this time,
July 2004, when farmers who are members of All Ethiopia Unity Party (AEUP)  are promised priority for fertilizer service
if they first cancel their membership in AEUP;  otherwise, they are threatened with the usual repressive
measures, and that is also how the Government handles the national problem of
Food Security today. 

Indeed,
the essential pre-conditions for peace and stability in Ethiopia and in the
Horn  of Africa are approaching a highly
critical stage:  Either all Ethiopians will exercise their political
rights without any interference in 2005, or else an unfortunate showdown is
inevitable in this peaceful and ancient land between the Ethiopian people and
EPRDF’s leaders.  A repeat of the
election fiasco of  1995, 2000, 2001 and
2004 is totally unacceptable in 2005 to both rural and urban Ethiopia !

B.    The Elections of 2000
and 2004

The Elections of
2000

An
assessment of the performance of the National Election Board and Election
Proclamation  111/1995 also
comes from the report of the Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO), entitled “
The May 2000 General Election: A Report.”.   The report is based upon direct observation
of the elections from registration to voting day in 11 cities and towns which
have included Ambo, Dilla, Addis Ababa, Nazret, Awassa, Bahir Dar, Dire Dawa,
Harer, Dessie, Hossana and Jimma.

It
is important to note that since EPRDF was competing with itself in the Amhara
and Oromo regions, there were very few human rights violations in those two
regions.  The strongest opposition to
EPRDF was in SNNP, and that was where serious violations of human rights took
place. 

An
overview of NEB’s operational performance, in these relatively more enlightened
communities, compared to rural Ethiopia, is giver hereunder for 6 towns: Addis
Ababa, Nazret, Awassa, Bahir Dar, Dessie and Dire Dawa.

With
regard to non-violent practices in Addis Ababa, EHRCO’s observers noted:

q      
Candidates
of the ruling party continued to campaign after the official end of campaigns

q      
Only
posters of the ruling party were allowed in the polling stations

q      
Election
officials were the staff of the Kebele ( village) administrations

q      
Elections
officials were quite often from one ethnic group

q      
Under-age
reporting was common

q      
Many
NEB observers were illiterate

q      
After
locks of ballots boxes were broken, the boxes remained unsealed

q      
Partisan
observers handpicked by NEB did the tallying

q      
The
number of ballots received at polling stations was unknown

q      
More
votes were cast than the population of voting residents

q      
Soldiers
were bused in from Minilk’s Palace to vote and that violated Art. 87 of the
Constitution

 In Nazret, EHRCO’s observers again noted:

v     
Vote counting was done the
next day

v     
Officials were partisan
during voter education

v     
Posters of members of the
ruling party were posted even in ballot rooms

v     
Election officials were
caught directing voters on who to vote for

v     
Government and kebele
(village) officials hang around the gate of the polling station with no
security control

In
Awassa, observers of EHRCO found the election practice even more partisan:

Ø 
Candidates
of the ruling party continued to campaign after the end of the campaign period

Ø 
Posters
of EPRDF candidates were posted in polling stations, and “ Vote for EPRDF” was
also posted even in ballot rooms.

Ø 
Partisan
officials frequently gave suggestive directives on who to vote for

Ø 
People
who had voted were allowed to continue to sit in the  ballot room

Ø 
Officials
of the ruling party came in and out and carried on frequent arguments with
election officials

Ø 
The
number of ballot papers received at polling stations was unknown

Ø 
TV
was on at the polling station , and it was also another source of disturbance

In Bahir Dar, EHRCO’s observers had a picture which
reflected no free and fair election:

Ø 
Posters
of EPRDF candidates were posted in polling stations

Ø 
Election
officials harassed voters

Ø 
Voters
were made to enter the ballot room in groups so that voting secrecy was
non-existent

In
Dessie, another town in Amhara Region, EHRCO’s team of observers observed the
following:

v    
Election
officials wore badges and caps of the ruling party

v    
Candidates
of the ruling party continued to campaign on the road as voters walked to the
polling station

v    
Vote
counting was postponed to the next day when EHRCO’s observers were thrown out
from observing the counting

In
Dire Dawa,

v    
Election
officials were Kebele officials

v    
Local
members of the Ethiopian Air Force were bused in to vote, against Article 87 of
the Ethiopian Constitution which requires the armed forces to be non-partisan

v    
Candidates
of the ruling party campaigned right up to Election Day

The
picture has been similar in Dilla, Ambo, Harar, Hosana, and Jimma: Partisanship
of election officials was all over and balloting secrecy was largely ignored.

The regional Elections
of  January 2004 in Somali Region

That election was largely violent, unruly and
disorganized. Violations of the electoral law were several:  Under-age registration was common; threats,
beating and imprisonment were also everywhere; candidates of the ruling party
used government vehicles for campaigning; voting more than once was not
infrequent; officials directed voters who to vote for; people in one
constituency could move to another for another vote; the balloting room
serviced more than one voter at the same time so that voting secrecy was non-existent;
the voters’ register was incomplete even though people had voters’ cards;
members of the opposition were continuously harassed, and so on.  This is all the National Election Board
could do after 9 years of sleepy and partisan work.

C.   more Recent Experiences of All Ethiopia
Unity Party( AEUP)

Among the several recent appeals to the National
Election Board of  Ethiopia from
AEUP, there  were those  of June and July 2004  when AEUP submitted a detailed report on
government harassment, abductions, imprisonment, property confiscation,
destruction of farmers’ homes to take out old and rusty corrugated roofing
under the pretext of paying for fertilizer credits owed to the business
monopolies of the Ruling Party, setting homes of AEUP members on fire in the
dead of night, confiscation of members’ and party property, closing down
legally-authorized AEUP branch offices by force, imprisoning both livestock and
farm families without court warrant, isolating AEUP members from local
self-help associations like Edir, jigie and senbetie,
forcing serving priests out of their churches by pressuring the local clergy
administration to terminate their church employment through various defamation
tactics, and even killing AEUP supporters simply for refusing to cancel their
membership in AEUP. 

Such government-instigated, perpetrated and nurtured
atrocity is wide-spread, and it has a very similar pattern in Afar , Awi Zone,
Bale, East Shoa, Gedio, Gamu Gofa, Gonder, Gojjam, Hadiya, Kembata and Timbaro,
North Shoa, Sidama, Welayita, Wollo, and other parts of Oromia, involving
several hundred AEUP members and supporters. 
The latest represive approach, a reflection of utter despair by the
ruling party, is to promise to give AEUP members in rural Ethiopia priority
over all other farmers in fertilizer delivery if they only drop their
membership in AEUP.

Overall, such criminal acts and violations of the
constitutional rights of AEUP members continue unabated with very little
effective intervention from the National Election Board of Ethiopia.  After 10 years on the job, no
improvements have been observed either in its ability to be an effective
management body or in its attention to the obsolete and partisan provisions in Electoral
Proclamation 111/1995. 

Hence, this partisan election management
body should not be allowed, or supported by any one, to mess up the elections
once again in 2005 since it is totally partisan and unprofessional, and since
it has very little respect for the law or for voters. Its continued existence
as an election management body may bring further chaos into Ethiopian
political, economic and social 
life.  Today,  the level of political awareness and
participation of the general population and opposition political parties and
the general determination to take a strong stand for one’s political rights has
unmistakably no parallel in Ethiopian political history. 

Proclamation 111/1995, which is the unconstitutional
basis for the formation of the partisan, unconstitutional and unprofessional
NEB, has to
go as well since it is also partisan, incomplete, sub-standard and obsolete.

Part IV :          Summary of 
findings on the Performance of NEB and Proclamation 111/1995

The National Election
Board has been highly partisan, unprofessional, incompetent, and

insensitive to the problems
of voters and the political opposition, and it has  

v     
failed to be independent and
non-partisan as repeatedly observed in the elections of 1995, 2000, 2001, 2004
and even today in its handling of complaints of Government violations of the
rights of party members of  All
Ethiopia Unity Party and those of others

v     
repeatedly violated Proclamation
111/1995 and the Constitution  ( See
Articles 23, 29, 43, 46, 50, 51, 52, 57, 60, 62, 64).

v     
failed to demonstrate respect for the
Constitution by continuing to be partisan against the Constitutional provision
in Art. 102.

v     
failed to revise this partisan Electoral
Proclamation 111/1995 over the last 10 years to correct its various serious
problems in accordance with the powers it has been given in Art. 5 of the same
proclamation.

v     
denied any meaningful and transparent
role for party agents, the private press and independent observers in all past
elections

v     
persisted throughout the last two
national and regional elections in 1995, 2000, 2001 and 2004 to deny a balanced
role and opportunity to competing political parties comparable to that given to
the ruling party during all stages of the electoral processes  and failed to be free, fair and transparent
in all its services

v     
 failed to institute effective, credible and efficient monitoring
and control mechanisms of the different phases of the electoral process,
thereby  demonstrating serious
competence in managing elections at all levels

v     
no Code of Conduct so that being
neutral, having respect for the rule of law, transparency, professionalism, and
a commitment to serve voters have been outside NEB’s partisan functions.

v     
failed to build public confidence in
the elections and the electoral systems as a result of its repeatedly partisan
election management operations in the entire electoral processes in 1995, 2000,
and 2004

Hence, the current National Election Board has
to be replaced by one which is of international standard for democratic
electoral management organizations to ensure that there will be no more repeats
of the chronic incompetence and partisanship of NEB of 1995, 2000, 2001
and 2004.

Likewise, Electoral Proclamation 111/1995 has
to be revised drastically to make it relevant and to bring it up to
international standards since it has

Ø     
violated Article 102 of the Constitution and several other
articles of the Constitution by providing for the establishment of a partisan
National Election Board and a partisan Chief Executive Officer and his Deputy
in its Article 4 and Article 8, respectively.

Ø     
provided for a constituency demarcation that is
unscientific, vague, arbitrary, partisan, confused, inequitable and obsolete.

Ø     
failed to provide for impartial and transparent registration
for candidates and voters,

Ø     
failed to provide for a level playing field for all
competing parties,

Ø     
failed to provide for effective election security to
competing parties, competing candidates and voters in all past elections,

Ø     
failed to provide for financial support to all political
parties except the ruling party which liberally uses government resources at
all levels,

Ø     
failed to provide for effective redress for opposition party
complaints before, during and after the elections

Ø     
failed to provide for equitable access to public mass media
and other government resources, while condoning their extensive use by the
ruling party

Ø     
failed to provide for a meaningful role for competing
political parties and their agents, independent observers and the press in the
entire electoral process

Ø     
failed to provide for universal suffrage

Ø     
failed to provide for a budget that is independent of the
ruling party/Government

Ø     
such gross incompleteness as a Code of Conduct, provision
for electoral subsidies, provision for publication of essential documents such
as the list of Constituencies, sizes of constituencies, the election schedule,
election forms, ballot papers, and unique party election symbols chosen by the
parties themselves in Negarit Gazetta well in advance of the election
campaign period.

Ø     
to have a new provision to limit the term of service of the
members of the Board.

Ø     
several meaningless, vague, ineffective and contradictory
articles and still others that are not relevant or useful in today’s Ethiopia (
See Articles 5, 15, 22, 23, 29, 30, 32, 33, 36, 38, 41, 42, 43, 46, 50, 51, 52,
57, 62, 64, 66, 69-73)

Ø     
failed to be accepted by all opposition political parties
and the general public

The National Election Board and the Parliament
( House of Peoples Representatives ) have the constitutional
obligation to urgently revise this obsolete and incomplete
Electoral Proclamation 111/95 in full collaboration with the legal
political opposition so as to comply with Article 38, Article 102 and other
articles of the Constitution to create an impartial and independent National
Election Board and an environment for free and fair elections to ensure
enduring peace and stability in the Country and in the Horn of Africa after May
2005. 

In conclusion, there is an urgent need to revise Electoral
Proclamation No. 111/1995 to create an independent National Election
Board and  

Ø     
ensure
the establishment of an election management body that is independent,
nonpartisan, professional, trusted and credible among all voters and political
parties, and  one that is transparent
and accountable, and respects rule of law

Ø     
provide
adequate budgetary support that is independent of the Executive branch

Ø     
provide
for effective, credible and efficient monitoring and control mechanisms of the
different procedural phases of the elections

Ø     
establish
an independent and efficient electoral court at the level of the Federal
Supreme Court to ensure prompt compliance with the law

Ø     
establish
an independent mass media commission that will have the power to take prompt
action against those that are an obstacle to the equitable access of all public
mass media by all competing parties

Ø     
establish
an independent election security commission that shall have the power to take
immediate action against those that impede the management of free and fair
elections by prosecuting them in the electoral court

Ø     
provide
for equitable access to all public resources like public conference halls,
government-owned housing and government conference facilities, government
vehicles, government-owned communications equipment, and the like, to all legal
political parties

Ø     
provide
appropriately structured subsidies to competing political parties

Ø     
revise
Proclamation No. 111/95 to make it compatible with Articles 38, 102 and several
other articles of the Constitution ( Articles 4, 8, 15, 19, 30,  36, 38, 42, 43, 46, 50), improve several (
5,  22, 23, 29, 30, 32, 33, 41, 48, 51,
52, 55, 57, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 69-73), and create new articles for

(i)                 
an
independent Election Constituency Demarcation Commission,

(ii)               
limitation
of the duration of service of all Board members,

(iii)              
an
Independent Electoral Court  at
the level of the Supreme Court and an independent Prosecutor  to replace Articles 52, and 69-73, and
ensure effective implementation,

(iv)             
an
Independent Electoral Security Commission,

(v)               
an
Independent Public Mass Media Commission, 

(vi)             
one
gazetted symbol per party,

(vii)            
an
independent budget for the National Election Board,

(viii)          
government
subsidies and equitable access to other public resources for all competing
political parties,

(ix)             
a
common code of conduct for all political parties and candidates,

(x)               
heavy
financial and imprisonment penalties on those, including members of the
National Election Board, that obstruct elections, and

(xi)             
publishing
the list of election districts with their sizes, the registration documents,
the election schedule, and the list of parties and their chosen symbols in  Negarit Gazetta.

P.S.  On December 24, 2004, the
Ministry of Information’s ETV and Radio reported that an amendment to
Proclamation 111/1995 had been prepared by the Ministry of Justice, and
submitted to the Council of Ministers. The Council then passed the amendment
for final approval to the House of Representatives without any participation
from the opposition.   The little
information that is available appears to indicate that the amendment is
primarily designed by the Ruling Party to make sure that all Pro-EPRDF
Eritreans who have are flowing back into Ethiopia in large numbers will go
ahead and  vote in support of EPRDF,
especially in Addis Ababa and other large towns. On the other hand, nothing is
said of the pro-opposition farmers who are being dispersed right and left under
the guise of resettlement.  This is also
clear evidence that when PM Meles wants to, any amendment can be done in a few
days, if not in a few hours.  Hence,
the opposition needs to make it clear that it is either taken as an equal
partner in the preparation of the amendment, or it must opt out of the
elections altogether.