May 5, 2005

The official U.S.-Ethiopian relationship hit a bump in the road last fall and both
sides are still trying to regain their equilibrium. The proximate cause was Ethiopian
unhappiness over U.S. silence on Prime Minister Meles’ five-point plan for ending the
disagreement concerning the demarcation of the Ethiopian-Eritrean border. But there
were a number of other issues that preceded and followed that event. This was not the
first setback in relations and it will not be the last. In fact, if you review official ties
going back to 1903, they are marked by regular disagreements irrespective of the
governments in Addis Ababa and Washington. Each time in the past the two countries
overcame their differences, although it took the better part of seventeen years in the case
of the Derg government that ruled from 1974 to 1991. In the grand scheme of things, the
current tiff is pretty minor.

Since the outbreak of World War II, relations between the U.S. and Ethiopia have
been consistently important and unusually complex. It is a mistake to assess the ties in
the context of any single issue such as the Ethiopian democratization process, the
Ethiopian-Eritrean border dispute, other regional issues, trade, counterterrorism, U.S.
assistance or food emergencies. All of these questions and more form a complicated
mixture that can not be disaggregated easily. Eventually, the most recent downturn will
pass and the basic strength of Ethiopian-American relations will reassert itself.
Before commenting on the current situation, let me explain briefly why Ethiopia
is important to the U.S. Ethiopia is critical to stability or instability in the Horn of Africa.
If you have stability in Ethiopia, it will improve the prospect for stability elsewhere in the
region. If you have instability, it will almost guarantee instability in one or more
neighboring country. Ethiopia is the key to the Horn. The Horn serves as the back door
to the Middle East. The Middle East is essential to greater Western interests.
Ethiopia is the 16th most populous country in the world today. According to the
World Bank, in 2002 Ethiopia passed Egypt as the second most populous country in
Africa after Nigeria. The United Nations Population Division projects that by 2050
Ethiopia will become the 9th most populous country in the world after Brazil.
Ethiopia has one of the strongest military organizations in Africa. Unlike most
armies on the continent, it is battle tested. Because of its large population, it has a
significant pool of young men to draw from in order to ramp up its military. Among
African countries, Ethiopia has an impressive air power capability. It has comported
itself well in UN peacekeeping operations dating back to Korea in the 1950s, the Congo
in the early 1960s, the India-Pakistan Observation Mission and more recently in Rwanda,
Liberia, and Burundi. It has one of the more efficient and effective internal security and
intelligence systems on the continent.

For more than 100 years, with the exception of the Derg government that accepted
far more Soviet loans for military equipment than it could ever hope to repay, Ethiopia
has operated under a generally conservative fiscal policy. During the 1998-2000 war
with Eritrea, it surprised many outsiders by coming up with cash squirreled away in
special accounts to help pay the cost of war. As a result of this conservative policy and
with the help of the international community during times of famine, Ethiopia has been
able to survive some sharp economic shocks. Addis Ababa also serves as the
headquarters for the African Union and Economic Commission for Africa, making it a
center for Africa-wide diplomacy.

There is a large Ethiopian diaspora in the U.S. and the numbers continue to grow
significantly each year as a result of the diversity visa program and family members
joining those already here. The diaspora remains strongly divided on developments and
issues inside Ethiopia. Increasingly, however, whether Ethiopian-Americans agree or
disagree with the government in Addis Ababa, they are contributing by means of
remittances and support for non-governmental organizations in a positive way to
developments back home. Certain congressional districts have learned that they must pay
close attention to their Ethiopian-American constituencies.
Ethiopia also faces some serious challenges. It must reverse almost two millennia
of autocratic rule, albeit often benign, before it can become a truly democratic country.
Three rounds of national parliamentary elections (the third one taking place this month)
since the current government took power in 1991 will not completely reverse this
historical pattern.

Following the independence of Eritrea, Ethiopia became a land-locked country.

In fact, it became the most populous land-locked country in the world. This has
exacerbated its economic problems, which were serious enough even when it had a coast
line. The break in relations with Eritrea following the 1998 war, now works to the
detriment of both countries. Ethiopia, Sudan, and Eritrea have a history of supporting
opposition groups in neighboring countries. Although this is not occurring now between
Ethiopia and Sudan, it is taking place in the case of Eritrea. Ethiopia supports a coalition
of Eritrean organizations opposed to the government in Asmara while the Oromo
Liberation Front has its headquarters in and operates out of Eritrea.
Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries in the world. According to the World
Bank, 82 percent of Ethiopia’s population lives on less than one dollar per day. This is a
very high percentage even for Africa. These statistics can be, however, misleading in the
case of an agricultural country like Ethiopia that depends heavily on a barter economy
where the informal economy does not enter official statistics.

Ethiopian life expectancy
is 10th from the bottom for all of Africa. Even Sudan and Somalia have a higher life
expectancy. On the other hand, Zambia, Botswana, and Mali have a lower life
expectancy than Ethiopia. Per capita GDP is 6th from the bottom for all of Africa. But
Ethiopia is still ahead of countries like Tanzania and Malawi. Ethiopia’s very large and
overwhelmingly rural population (85 percent) tends to make the per capita statistics
appear a little worse than they really are. Poverty is a huge problem, but it is important to
keep it in perspective.

Ethiopia continues to experience serious, periodic food shortages and at more
frequent intervals. It is unable to feed its entire people even in a good crop year. There is
a structural food deficit in the country that affects about five million people annually. At
2.5 percent, Ethiopia has a relatively high population growth rate. This adds to the
difficulty of achieving food security and economic growth. It depends heavily on one
crop—coffee—for foreign exchange income. This also limits its ability to expand the
economy, especially when the international price for coffee drops. To some extent chat,
a narcotic, is replacing coffee as the cash crop of choice because it brings in more money
for the farmer. But chat is contributing to social problems in Ethiopia.
HIV/AIDS is a major problem. Ethiopia has more HIV positive citizens than any
country in the world except South Africa, India, and Nigeria. Nevertheless, the adult
prevalence rate is about 5 percent, relatively low by African standards. The good news is
that 90 percent of Ethiopians are still HIV-free and the country is now taking major steps
to deal with the pandemic.

Like most African countries, Ethiopia has its share of ethnic tension. The Oromo
Liberation Front and Ogadeni National Liberation Front continue their campaigns against
the government. Ethnic conflict in Gambela during the past two years underscores the
fragility of the situation in western Ethiopia and traditional Somali-Afar conflict has the
same effect in southeastern Ethiopia. Ethiopia is located on a Christian-Islamic fault line
with almost half of the population now being Muslim. Ethiopia has managed so far to
avoid serious religious conflict, but the potential exists for problems to develop. Both of
these situations contribute to long-standing human rights violations.
On balance Ethiopia has important strengths and worrisome weaknesses.

Although Ethiopia does not have Nigeria’s oil, South Africa’s economic power or
Egypt’s political clout, it has sufficient other positive characteristics and a long history of
close ties with the U.S. to put it in the top rank of African countries of interest to
Washington.
The May 15 national elections constitute the most important upcoming event in
Ethiopia. The way the election is conducted and the outcome will tell us much about the
progress or lack thereof on democratization in the country. Some 35 parties are
contesting at least some seats in the 547-member lower house known as the Council of
People’s Representatives. Voters will also elect representatives in nine regional state
parliaments that will, in turn, appoint members of the 112-seat upper house known as the
Council of Federation. The ruling party and affiliated groups now hold 519 of the 547
seats in the lower house.

The run-up to the election has had both positive and negative developments. So
far, the positives have been more important than the negatives. There has been a lively
discussion in the media representing all points of view. There have been a few debates
involving the government party and some of the opposition parties. The government
invited outside organizations to observe the campaign period and actual election. More
than 300 international observers will be present, including about 200 from the European
Union. This is the third largest EU delegation ever assembled after the one sent to
Indonesia and Nigeria.

On the other hand, ruling party views still prevail on government-controlled radio
and television. In April the National Election Board established new rules that said local
groups must be registered as election observers at the time they were originally
established before they could function in that role for the May election. This ruled out
many of the groups. They took the matter to Ethiopia’s High Court, which recently
overturned the decision. The government is appealing, however, and there may not be
enough time left to resolve the matter before the election. The government did agree to
consider registering about ten local groups that met the election observer criteria at the
time of their original incorporation.
More inexplicably, the government asked three American organizations—
National Democratic Institute, International Republican Institute, and the International
Foundation for Electoral Systems—to leave the country on short notice because they had
not been properly registered. This decision helped to sour relations with the U.S. At the
same time, Ethiopia welcomed a delegation of about 50 election observers from the
Carter Center, including former President Carter.

With the election only a week and a half away, it is pointless to judge now its
impact on the democratization process. This can be done after we have the benefit of the
conclusions of both local and international observers. The election results, of course, will
also be telling. Gains for opposition and independent candidates will suggest the
democratization process is moving in the right direction.
Perhaps the most contentious issue of the day is the continuing dispute over
demarcation of the Ethiopian-Eritrean border. The problem is, in fact, much greater than
the demarcation of the border and involves the totality of the Ethiopian-Eritrean
relationship both today and since 1991. In an ideal situation, Ethiopia would accept the
binding arbitration of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary Commission and the two countries
would then resolve their many other differences. But like so many inter-state problems,
this is not an ideal situation.
Prime Minister Meles proposed on 25 November 2004 a five point plan that said,
among other things, “Ethiopia accepts, in principle, the Ethiopia-Eritrea Boundary
Commission decision.” This was a change in policy and opened the door a crack for a
possible breakthrough in the stalemate. The statement also noted, however, that dialogue
should begin immediately with the goal of implementing the Boundary Commission’s
decision. Eritrea quickly rejected the five-point plan as nothing new and took the
position that demarcation should take place first, followed by dialogue. The deadlock
continues.

The problem has become complicated recently by suggestions from the Eritrean
side that Ethiopia’s unwillingness to accept the demarcation decision will lead to war.

There is, however, no reason for Ethiopia to initiate war. It holds those parts of the
border awarded to Eritrea by the Boundary Commission. The United Nations force
continues to monitor the 15-mile buffer zone, all of which is located in territory
administered by Eritrea prior to the 1998 war. The buffer zone separates Ethiopian and
Eritrean forces. Nor does Ethiopia wish to risk international opprobrium by attacking
Eritrea. So long as this dispute remains a public shouting match, however, there is
virtually no chance it will be resolved. It is at the point where only quiet, behind the
scenes discussions, preferably assisted by the good offices of an outside party acceptable
to both sides, will achieve a solution.

Another issue that will soon impact the Ethiopian-American relationship is
Ethiopia’s need for more emergency food aid. The problem is becoming particularly
acute in the pastoral areas of Afar and Somali regions. The current situation follows the
pattern of the 2002-2003 emergency. This comes as something of a surprise because the
government has been touting the good harvest of 2004. Unfortunately, a change in the
way cereal production is calculated gave the impression that a normal harvest in 2004
was a bumper one. International partners will have to gear up one more time to deal with
the crisis. USAID is already making plans. This underscores the fact, however, that the
U.S. is a reliable partner in efforts to avert a serious, new problem. This year the problem
appears to be widespread in the region. Eritrea is experiencing a major shortfall in the
availability of cereals. An estimated one million Somalis in Somalia will need assistance.

Small amounts of food aid may also be required for Kenya and Djibouti.
In order to emphasize the complex nature of the Ethiopian-American relationship,
it is useful to cite the annual State Department report on terrorism released last month
that covers 2004. It states that “Ethiopia’s support in the global war on terrorism has
been consistently solid and unwavering.” It commends Ethiopia for cooperating in the
sharing of information with the U.S. on terrorist activities, for installing new security
systems at Addis Ababa airport that allow the tracking of terrorists, and for introducing a
new and more secure passport that includes anti-tampering features.
Finally, Ethiopian Airlines signed an agreement with Boeing last month for the
purchase of five Boeing 787 aircraft over the next three years with an option to purchase
five more. Ethiopian Airlines will be the first African airline to use the new Boeing 787.

The agreement is worth at least $600 million and as much as $1.3 billion.
All these points underscore my opening remark that it is impossible to measure
the state of Ethiopian-American relations based on one issue. They must be seen in their
totality. Both countries will continue to disagree on some matters, occasionally important
ones, but history suggests the overall relationship will survive the bumps in the road.