With the upcoming elections just around the corner, one discernable
dissimilarity between the EPRDF, still clinging to incumbency after
almost two decades in power, and the multitude of its electoral
opponents, is in how they perceive, exercise and have thus structured
power.
Scratch beyond the surface and the EPRDF is really not the monolithic
dinosaur as it is most commonly stereotyped. If what defines an
organization is the unique amalgam of its history, quality of
leadership, cohesion, grass root presence, vision, and perhaps even
its luck, then the EPRDF, fast approaching its twentieth year, has
evolved into a coalition of four distinct phenomenon: the increasing
confusion of the dominant TPLF, the acute cynicism of the ANDM, the
desperate nihilism of the OPDO and the inevitable irrelevance of the
incongruent SEPM.
A nasty, but so far bloodless, backstage interplay of these dynamics
in what is now a battle to succeed Meles Zenawi has inaudibly
developed into a real threat to the cohesion of the EPRDF, arguably
more dangerous than the electoral threat posed by its opponents. We
now know that disaster was only averted this year with the extension
of Meles’ term in office — something he had always counted on,
according to diplomats — but this has yet to result in the much
anticipated — or rather, hoped for — ceasefire between two bickering
claimants to the throne — OPDO and ANDM. What will be the spillover
from this rivalry is hardly hard to predict in this election year, but
the signs are already out there that both have calculated that a
significant win by the opposition in their regions will undermine
their claim, and are thus determined, by hook or crook, to garner as
many seats as possible. The ANDM in particular, which was reluctantly
forced to concede the most seats in 2005, seems bent on improving on
its last performance. Not the best scenario for the opposition this
year, though no serious pundit has yet written them off.
It is the vast power vested in the chair of the EPRDF that sets it in
marked contrast to its opponents in general; but particularly its
principal electoral opponent this year, Mederk, which has surprisingly
employed the anarchic working ethos of decision-making by consensus
rather than majority vote. To operate by consensus, all issues are now
being discussed until they are resolved to the satisfaction of all
parties. The unsustainability of such an arrangement has already
become all too evident, its open implosion only a question of time.
By contrast, the EPRDF is clearly a hierarchal organization with a
singular power at the top in Meles Zenawi and subsequent levels of
delegated power beneath him. Though collective leadership is formally
acknowledged, it has no relevance in practice. And because of a
complex matrix of history, socio-economy, politics and psychology, a
hierarchal arrangement with a strong leader at the top is, I believe,
best for Ethiopian political organizations; and, I would argue, the
decisive advantage of the EPRDF over its opponents.
But the question remains if the prestige and power of EPRDF’s
chairperson will endure after Meles. Both the OPDO and the ANDM are
betting on it, but none of the EPRDF’s four constituent members have
been able to come up with a political heavyweight remotely capable of
ensuring a seamless transition. The one figure that has appeal beyond
his own party, OPDO’s Girma Biru, who leads the important Commerce
Ministry, is noted only for his managerial competence, not the grand
vision and ruthlessness deemed crucial to keep the EPRDF vibrant and
intact.
The ANDM head, Addisu Legesse, is famous for his subdued demeanor and
is purportedly held in particular high esteem by Meles for refusing an
offer of the Prime Ministership by Seye Abraha et al just before their
expulsion from the party [in 2001]. But the ANDM’s unanimous rally behind Meles
under the leadership of Addisu had been widely interpreted as a
Machiavellian maneuver by Amharas to weaken the dominant TPLF,
something that still seriously irks a significant number of
strategically placed TPLF veterans. Aside from this obvious Achilles
heel, Addisu is one of EPRDF’s leaders who stir little passion for or
against his name. He is a clear underdog in this race to succeed
Meles, and he is already being seriously undermined by a campaign to
quietly push him aside on health grounds.
His deputy, Bereket Simon, whose support is generally deemed critical
to the eventual successor, was instrumental in marshalling pressure
for Meles’ term extension, but his considerable influence is expected
to wane once Meles eventually leaves the limelight. His health
notwithstanding, Bereket is still, along with Meles, EPRDF’s dynamo,
his clear genius for intrigue a cause of much resentment both inside
and outside the EPRDF. His reputation with the opposition for
arrogance, insincerity and rigidity was contemptuously set aside by
his party and he has emerged, yet again, as the lead EPRDF negotiator
for the upcoming elections, a clear message that the EPRDF intends to
play rough. Those who had hoped that this would mean less of his time
for EPRDF’s intra-party politics have so far been profoundly
disappointed; this is a man who has habitually worked overtime
throughout his adult life.
The enigma of this drama is the role of Sebhat Nega, the king maker
two of decades ago whose backing was vital for Meles’ accession to the
helm of the TPLF. The side he chose at the climax of the fallout
between Meles and Seye Abraha et al was no less crucial for the final
outcome. Sebaht has chosen to leave TPLF’s politburo but remains a
member of the CC. But both count for much less since the departure of
Seye Abraha et al, his continued influence has more to do with his
access and the propensity of Meles to listen to him. Most pundits are
puzzled about his stance on the succession issue, but almost all agree
that the side he chooses will be considerably emboldened.
The surprise of the last few years has been the performance of the
OPDO chairman, Abadula Gemeda, whose dubious ethnicity, embarrassing
weight problem and a somewhat comical intellectual pretension (he has
written a book) has made him a favored subject of the city’s political
jokes. However, his management of the vast Oromo region, which is
larger than many African countries, and the relatively restive OPDO
has won him high marks both inside and outside the EPRDF. But few
believe that this has propelled him into a serious contender for
Meles’ seat. Whether he will surprise again is an open question,
particularly since no one contends that he has counted himself out.
So though the EPRDF enters this election season confident that its
victory is assured, it is less united than it has ever been in its
history. How the opposition utilizes the fault lines in the EPRDF to
their advantage will test the acumen of their best leaders.
