President
Saleh had said that Yemen is not Egypt or Tunisia—-meaning he was not going
to be chased out by street protesters or ‘mobs’, as he prefers to
call them. He repeatedly pointed out to Yemenis that change in government could
only come about by constitutional process, otherwise what the protesters are
trying to do is tantamount to a coup d’état.
But the
Yemenis have no faith in the constitution he was referring to. How can they
when they see it being adjusted and circumvented according to his whims? They
have watched with resentment how the so-called elections are orchestrated to
favor the incumbent government. Two elections had been held so far, in 1999 and
2006, none of which were ‘free and fair’. Yemenis have learnt to go
to those elections with resignation, knowing all too well the same people will
be in power—-Saleh and his General people’s congress party.
Yemenis are
baffled by Saleh’s assertion of his constitutional rights to finish his
term as president—-his term ends in 2013. They are amused that he would want
to call upon the laws of the constitution to finish his term. They ask, how
about their constitutional rights? Hadn’t Salah transgressed the writ of
the constitution when he clamped down on their rights to political freedom,
such as freedom of speech, the right to association and peaceful protest, the
right to a free press, and other citizen rights guaranteed by the constitution?
Hadn’t he arbitrarily imprisoned and tortured and some times murdered
citizens simply because they questioned his authority?
Yemenis have
given Salah more than enough time to redress their grievances. They have given
him three decades to unite the country and respond to their needs. But he
failed in building the nation; he was more interested in building his own power
and destroying any one covetous of replacing him. He has been in power since
1978. Till the first direct national elections in 1999, he allowed no
contenders for his position. For all those years the Yemenis have been
passively watching as he consolidated his power, surrounded himself with loyal
coteries and family members and embarked on corrupt practices to enrich himself
and those around him.
President
Saleh presides over a poor country, the poorest in the Arab peninsula. GDP per
capita is about $2600; 45% of the population is under the poverty line and over
40% of Yemenis are unemployed. Most people live off unproductive agricultural
land where water is scarce. In a land where water is alarmingly scarce, 40% of
the available water is used to grow Qat, a mild stimulant, which most Yemenis
are obsessed with. One report estimates that in ten years time, the capital,
Sana, will completely run out of water. It will be interesting to see how the
water problem all over the country will be handled considering a present
population of 24 million that is growing at about 3% a year.
Saleh’s
government has so far been able to stay afloat financially with oil revenues
and what it could importune from his main benefactors such as the Gulf States,
particularly Saudi Arabia, and the United States. Some of the money received
keeps the government running, a significant portion is embezzled by Saleh and
the elite of the regime, and a token amount is earmarked for development.
The
government is in deep financial troubles and will plunge even deeper as the oil
wells it is depending on is fast depleting. According to Extractive Industries
Transparency Initiatives (EITI), oil production in Yemen is expected to dip
below 250,000b/d by 2014. Oil accounts for 85% of export earnings;
approximately 70% of government revenues come from oil.
Considering
the problems Yemenis are afflicted with, Corrupt government, dwindling oil and
water resources, poor economy and tribalism, Yemenis have only recently came
together to forge a new way to fight saleh’s inept and corrupt government. Last
January they came out in droves to say ‘enough is enough’, as had
been said in Egypt and Tunisia.
Yemenis are
determined to move away from the old ways of dealing with the government. They
have yearned for democracy and the freedom to shape their destiny through the
old and trite method of the ballot box. But that opportunity was denied them in
two consecutive elections by a government willing to play democracy but
shunning from playing by the rules. They have grouped themselves as an
opposition force in line with their ideological persuasion, from Islamist to
socialist and some other, but the sham elections left them powerless, gaining
only a paltry number of seats in parliament, while Saleh’s People’s
congress party always comes up on top with an incredibly high number of seats.
Yemenis have often asked themselves why they even bother to go through the
motion of elections every seven years (it used to be six, Salah had to make
reforms in the constitution to make it seven), wasting their energy and
resources only to have Saleh and his people all over again?
But, for lack
of any other political avenue, they went along and participated in those
elections each time hoping, just hoping, that it would be different.
Unfortunately, the last election (2006) turned out to be more disappointing
than the previous one (1999). And not having any recourse to deal with the
injustice, Yemenis became apathetic and distrustful of their government.
The awakening
call came when Yemenis witnessed, via satellite TV, the non-violent uprisings
in Tunisia and Egypt. Seeing that got them off their apathy and stimulated them
to replicate what transpired in those countries. And since last January, what
started out as demonstrations by a few Sana University students have evolved
into a highly organized, broad-based and potent non-violent force against
Saleh’s dictatorial regime.
The
protesters exerted a mounting pressure on Saleh to abdicate power. Saleh
responded by dangling some concessions to appease the protesters—-he promised
not to seek another term in office nor bequeath the presidency to his son
Ahmed. He also promised to raise the salary of civil servants, even though the
government is practically insolvent. The 1.5 billion that he receives each year
from the Saudis used to cover his budgetary expenses, but in the last decade
insurrections in the north and south of the country, in addition to his
intermittent attempt to counter Al Qaeda, have been bleeding his coffers.
The
protesters have been relentless in their quest to remove Saleh and institute a
new government. They believe the concessions he had made are inadequate,
besides they don’t have faith in him to carry it out. He had made many
promises before, but it had all turned out to be just empty words.
Unable to
reach a consensus with the protesters, Saleh resorted to violence. On a Friday,
last march, which the protesters refer to as ‘black Friday’, Saleh’s
loyal forces, sniped at demonstrators as they flocked out of the mosque after
Friday prayers. Close to fifty protesters got killed, most, according to some
reports, were shot in the head or heart, suggesting that the killers were
professionals and were shooting to kill. Saleh’s bold move to crush the
peaceful movement by brutal force had only the effect of making the movement
more resolute and invincible. Soon after that day’s massacre, his power
got more attenuated as key figures in his regime defected to the opposition’s
side.
The balance
of power tipped on the side of the opposition as Saleh’s kinsman, some
say half-brother, General Mohsin Ali, commander of the first division army
threw in his weight behind the protesters. General Mohsin and his troops
quickly moved to ‘change square’ to protect the protesters from
Saleh’s slaughter.
The most
potent blow to Saleh’s power was made by the tribal confederacy when they
too decided to stand against Saleh and support the opposition. Yemen’s
tribes are important players in the power politics of Yemen. No Yemeni
government had ever survived without the support of the powerful tribes. Two
previous Yemeni presidents were murdered because they did not play the tribal
card safely. Saleh, a cunning political survivor, well versed in tribal
politics, have so far survived by manipulating the tribes using the carrot and
stick strategy. He is reported to have said that ruling Yemen is like
“dancing on the heads of snakes”. So far, he has managed through
his creative finagling to avoid being bitten by the snakes. But the snakes are
not charmed by Salah any more; they are increasingly agitated to encroach on
Salah and bite.
The
opposition has forced his back against the wall, leaving him only two options
to set himself free. Either he consents to step-down or fights back with part
of the armed forces that are still loyal to him. The republican guard, an elite
force, well trained and equipped, mainly with American expertise and money, is
headed by his son Ahmed. The equally professional security force is headed by a
nephew of his and other relatives are in command of various divisions of the
army. These forces are not negligible, combined and assuming absolute loyalty
without any defections; it can be a formidable force to challenge.
The oil-rich
gulf countries, weary of a possible spill-over from an unstable neighbor to
their south, in the littoral of the Arabian and red seas, along a major
shipping lane crucial to the global economy, have intervened to resolve the
political impasse. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) came up with a proposal
that will require Saleh to resign and hand over power to the vice-president,
who will form a transitional unity government with the opposition and then hold
elections within two months. A stipulation in the proposal demands that the
opposition desist from pressing criminal charges against Saleh and his family.
He is to be granted full immunity in exchange for his resignation and the
peaceful transition of power to the vice-president.
But
Saleh’s faithlessness had become more apparent when he refused to endorse
the agreement after verbally promising to do so. The GCC team, the EU, and
Americans, for the third time, had tried to coax him into signing the
agreement, but he balked, citing various futile objections to the terms of the
agreement.
It had been
obvious that Saleh had tried all the tricks he could conjure to wriggle away
from the negotiated accord that would have ended his rule. On the agreement
signing day, he came up with absurd reasons to avoid endorsing the deal, from
refusing to sign in his capacity as president and leader of his party,
insisting that he would only sign as leader of his party, to trying to pick who
from the opposition’s representatives should be signatory to the pact.
Some analysts
suggest that Saleh’s dilly-dallying is either a delay tactic aimed at
procuring solid concessions from his bosses in Saudi Arabia and America or an
attempt to buy time to pool his resources and try, once again, to crush the
opposition that has been undermining his regime.
Saleh’s
intentions became clear a day after the third attempt was made by the GCC to
get him endorse the agreement. Just like many predicted, he opted for a
military solution to preserve his regime. On 23rd of May, he
dispatched his loyal forces to arrest the leader of the tribal confederacy,
Sheikh Sadeq Al Ahmar, where clashes with the tribal militia ensued. He went
straight for his nemesis, the Al Ahmar family, who has been arch rivals of
Saleh for years, at least after their father’s death in 2007.Their father,
Sheikh Abdullah, was chief of the tribal confederacy and a close ally of Saleh.
The Al Ahmar
family became staunch critics of Saleh’s rule openly. Hamid Al Ahmar is
the most vocal of the Al Ahmar brothers. He is probably one of the wealthiest people
in Yemen with business interests in various sectors of the economy. He has
publicly denounced Saleh on many occasions, chiding him for nepotism and mis-government.
In wiki leaks on Yemen, a cable sent by the US ambassador in Yemen to the state
department describes a conversation between Hamid Al Ahmar and the Ambassador in
which Hamid intimates his plan to topple Saleh. He had told the Ambassador that
he was interested in an Indonesian- type of peaceful uprising and creating a “controlled
chaos” to push Saleh out of office. He wanted to emulate the non-violent
uprising that brought down the fall of Suharto’s regime. The encounter
between Hamid and the Ambassador happened in 2008, which brings the question,
if the revelations of wiki leaks are true, whether the seemingly spontaneous
uprising in Yemen is not after all a free and natural occurrence but a
premeditated one master-minded by Hamid himself?
Indeed, Al
Ahmar and the tribal confederacy had thrown in their lot behind the protesters
early on. The business tycoon, Hamid, has been bankrolling the coalition of
opposition parties (the Joint Meeting Party) and the youth-led movement, giving
them sustenance and the impetus to probably bring about the “controlled
chaos” he had envisioned.
It’s no
coincidence, then, that Saleh went straight for the Al Ahmar family. In the
layers of foes that Saleh has to contend with, the Al Ahmars stand on the top.
They have the money, the fire power, and an unlimited number of tribesmen ready
to sacrifice their lives for them. But Saleh’s hasty foray to over- power
the Al Ahmar family proved to be a costly adventure. After clashing with each
other, for weeks, with all kinds of armaments in their arsenals, it took one rocket
(some say a planted bomb), whose origin is so far unknown and under
investigation, to hit the palace mosque where Salah and some officials were
praying. Salah and some of his aides survived, but were seriously injured and
had to be scurried out of Yemen to seek medical care in Saudi Arabia.
Now that
salah is out of the way, at least temporarily, as some of his officials
maintain, it would be interesting to see how the political contention for power
works out. In accordance with the constitution, the vice-president assumed the
role of the president while Saleh is gone. But it’s not clear how much
power is vested in the vice-president, Abdul-Raboh mansour Hadi. Saleh’s
son, Ahmed, leader of the Republican Guard, has moved swiftly into the presidential
palace. Hadi is working out of the Ministry of Defense, trying to run the
country.
Ahmed’s
move to occupy the palace may suggest that he is trying to defend his
father’s regime. If that’s the case, then it is possible that he would
fight any attempt by Hadi to form a transition council. With confidence in the
elite forces under his command, Ahmed is likely not to allow the dissolution of
his father’s regime. If Hadi relents to the demands of the general
opposition to put in place a transition council, then it’s likely Yemen
will spiral into a civil war. It’s going to be a fierce battle between
Saleh’s loyal forces, and the tribal militia. General Ali mohsin’s
1st division army, which defected to the side of the opposition, may
or may not join the conflict. In the recent fighting between Saleh’s
loyal forces and Al Ahmar’s tribal militia, he stayed clear out of the
conflict even though some of his troops were attacked by Saleh’s forces. But
if Ahmed decides to go for an all out war to save the regime, then it is
possible that General Mohsin may get dragged in and fight on the side of the tribal
militia. So far, though, he has been laying low, content in his role as
protector of the street protesters. Some say that the general is just waiting
for the right opportunity to insert himself in and take over power. This is
unlikely because he had said in the past that he had no desire to be the leader
of the country. In a New York Times report on Yemen (23rd of June)
the General was quoted saying: “I don’t have any desire to keep my
position in power or no aspiration for power either. Our genuine aspiration is to
lead the revolution into safe harbor and to ensure its success.” Supposing
he contends for power, with the assumption that politicians are inclined to
double-speak, it is unlikely that he would garner much support considering his
brutal involvement in the war against the Houthis (zaidi Shiites), and his
allegedly shady business dealings that connects him to diesel- fuel and arms
smuggling. Besides he was part and parcel of the regime, built his career on it
and benefited from its corrupt practices.
In the event
of a civil war, other armed groups may join the fray. In the south of Yemen,
there are a number of well organized armed groups scattered all over the
region. The most important of whom are the south secessionist movement. These
groups may go against Saleh and support the opposition. The secessionists have
early on conveyed their support for the opposition. But it is also possible, in the event of
a civil war, that they would take advantage of the possible break-up in
security to cede from the north and to try to form their own independent state.
The secessionist movement presently is fragmented with constant struggle
between the leaders for political power. Furthermore, at its present situation,
it does not have the resources to militarily challenge the north. It would be
interesting to see, though, what role the secessionists may play in the messy
politics of Yemen.
Recently, as
the crisis in Yemen deepened, and Salah forced to pull out his troops from the
south to confront the opposition in the capital, armed groups with probable
ties to Al Qaeda have emerged. These groups have been active in Abyan region
and in Lahaj. They have recently capitalized on the lack of security in the
region to wage attacks on Salah’s remaining troops and security forces.
According to some reports, the city of Zinjibar, Abyan’s main city, has
fallen under their control. In Lahaj too, Islamist armed groups have taken over
surrounding villages and towns. There has not been any confirmed information on
these groups, whether they operate in unison, or are just disparate groups with
unknown goals. There are reports that the group in Abyan is working under the
name ‘Ansar Al-sharia’ and that they are interested in forming an
Islamic state governed by Sharia laws.
Two other
armed groups that have played a de-stabilizing role in Yemen are the Houthis in
the north and Al-Qaida in the remote mountainous regions of the south. The
Houthis are Zaidi Shiites who have been fighting Saleh’s marginalization
policy for almost a decade. They have been complaining about Saleh’s
crack-down on their rights to worship freely. Saleh, prodded by Saudi Arabia, the Saudis
don’t want to see a strong Shiite presence in close proximity to their
border, tried to counter the influence of the Shiites in the area by allowing
the building of many schools that taught Sunni Islam (most Yemenis are Sunnis)
with wahabist orientation. It is Sunni domination and economic deprivation that
they have been rebelling against. Salah’s attack to suppress the Houthi
insurrection has cost hundreds of lives and thousands more have been displaced,
causing them to live in refugee camps sponsored by NGO’s and the UN. The war
against the Houthis has so far been deadlocked, Saleh’s attention is now
more on regime survival, and the Houthis have joined the protesters to throw
out Saleh.
Al Qaeda has
never been a direct threat to the Yemeni government. The group is mainly
interested in committing terrorist acts in Saudi Arabia, Western Europe and
America. In 2000, Al Qaeda in Yemen bombed the US navy destroyer, USS Cole,
causing a number of casualties. Since 2006 numerous attacks were made: two
attacks on the US embassy in Sana, attacks on British and Italian embassies,
also in Sana, and an assassination attempt, in 2009, on Saudi prince Mohammed
Bin Nayef, Saudi Arabia’s counter-terrorism czar. Al Qaeda in Yemen is
also behind the attempted bombing of an air- line in the sky over Detroit and
the foiled cargo plane bomb plot.
Al Qaeda has
been operating in the remote regions of the south, in regions where control of
the central government is lax or absent. They have placed themselves in tribal
areas unwieldy to central rule. According to some reports, there are about
300-500 Al Qaeda fighters in Yemen. The group is getting larger, though, as
many of the Saudi Al Qaeda cells, due to the diligent crack-down in Saudi
Arabia, have moved to Yemen and affiliated with the Yemeni cells to form
‘Al Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula’
All these
armed groups are taking advantage of the power vacuum in central government to
dominate the regions they have been operating in. In the absence of a strong
central government, some regions in Yemen, particularly in the south, may
descend into disorder and insecurity that would remind us of the state of
affairs in Afghanistan and Somalia. Unless Salah and his sons face the reality
that they would have to relinquish power and concede power to a transition
government that would eventually lead to a representative government,
Yemen’s integrity, security and stability would be at risk
The GCC
proposal needs to be implemented as soon as possible to avert further chaos in
Yemen. The sooner the Saudis and western powers use all the tools available to
them to exert pressure on Saleh to quit, the better the chances are for Yemen
to keep its integrity intact. The Saudis have been a major influence on
Yemen’s politics, it is believed they will do their utmost to keep Salah
away and help in the formation of a transition council that will probably be
comprised of individuals approved by them. This may not go well with the
youth-led street protesters who have from the beginning refused the GCC plan
and are suspicious of Saudi’s design for Yemen. The protesters are afraid
that the Saudis and the western powers might push for another henchman in the
likes of Salah who would be amenable to their biddings.
If the GCC
plan is executed, with the blessings of the Saudis and western powers, the
street protesters would be sidelined, allowing the tribal leaders and military
commanders to shape and form the future government. The tribes and the military
are the real pillars of power in Yemen; they have been and will be in the
future. It is unlikely that the protesters will get what they have aspired and
sacrificed their lives for, a genuine democratic government, but if by a fluke of turn in events, they do get
what they wanted, then Yemen and all those nations who are being trampled by
dictatorial rule will make a big sigh of relief.
