One of the key reasons
why dictators remain in power is the fragmentation of the society across
ethnic, religious, ideological, and professional lines. Whenever their
power is threatened, dictators resort to using the societal fault lines to
foment division and weaken dissent. Therefore, waging vertical resistance
against oppressive systems require strategically addressing the horizontal
tensions within the population.
a. The likelihood of
success for nonviolent resistance increases with broad societal participation
by diverse and all segments of the population.
b. In the presence of
intra-group fear, suspicions and competition, movements are vulnerable to the
divide and destroy tactics of the regime.
The regime’s divisive methods need to be
countered with unifying strategies and tactics. For such a strategy to work,
having accurate information on the causes of the fault lines and concerns of
each segment of the society as well as studying past tactics employed by the regime
to instigate conflict is critical. This should be followed up with
strategic planning to counter the regime’s divisive methods with tactics that
not only undercut the measures but also make it backfire against the regime. On the
day the Egyptian resistance organizers announced their plan of January 25th
march, a Coptic Church was bombed. In a dramatic contrast, on the second day of the uprising, the
world watched Egyptian Christians protecting Muslims during Jum’a prayer.
We also saw members of the Muslim Brotherhood forming human chains against
possible attack on a church. In a popular slogan, repeated by the protesters,
Egyptians chanted Regardless Of Which God You Pray To, We Are All Egyptians.
A picture of an Imam and a Priest holding Koran and the Cross together
sent a powerful message of unity. Such a change in a week’s time might
sound as if a miracle had struck Egypt. But the truth is all of these actions were
results of prior planning. From the outset, the organizers acknowledged the fact
that Egypt has a history of communal conflict and violence. The legacy of
extremist and violent religious movements still lingers. Therefore, resolving
the insecurity of the Christian minority was important not only to bring that
constituency onboard and withstand Mubarak’s divisive tactics but also
address the fear of the West about a possibility of an Islamic Egyptian state.
They were successful beyond expectations. It is important to note that most of
the ground work was done months, if not years, before put to test at Tahrir
Square.
Overcoming Meles’s Divide and Rule Tactics
Ethiopia’s history
and contemporary politics has led to the development of tensions among various
ethnic groups and acute ideological polarization among the political elite.
Over the years, competing nationalism with contradictory assessment of the past
as well as diverging visions of the future has emerged. The current regime
practices open discrimination and publicly promotes communal hostility. This
might make civil resistance difficult but not impossible. It is possible to
overcome these conditional challenges by expanding knowledge about nonviolent
tactics and through careful strategic planning. Meles has effectively utilized the ethnic card in the
past. Early in his rule, he survived the Oromo resistance by scaring the day
light out of the Amhara. He preached the Oromo rebels would not only exact
revenge against the old ruling class but also split the country to form an
independent Oromia state. Meles survived the wave of urban resistance in 2005
by scaring the previously marginalized communities about the return to the
past—the Amhara oppressive rule. Furthermore, he was able to maintain the
loyalty of his support base, the Tigreans, by convincing them about the
possible retribution they would face, if they abandon him.
The efficiency of these strategies has significantly
decreased in the past five years because;
1) The prisoner’s
dilemma between the Amhara and Oromo constituency is reaching its final stage
as each side is realizing that neither benefits from the status quo. The
multiple efforts at forming alliances and the significant improvements in
dialogue—both in public and behind the scenes—are evidence to this.
Hardliners are no longer the leading voices of each political community
and the shift in rhetoric has opened the door for calmer consultations.
2) The Tigrean constituency
is no longer an uncontested domain of the ruling party. This can be attributed
to two reasons.
a) Tigreans have begun to
realize the only beneficiaries of current policies are Meles and a small circle
of his cronies at a great cost to their people.
b) The emergence of
‘their own’ credible alternatives among the opposition is chipping
away at the secure base that served Meles well. The defiance showed by the
people of Tigray in support of the opposition during the recent election is an
irrefutable evidence of the shifting ground.
This does not mean that
all sources of divisions have disappeared. There is still a fear about post
Meles era. The unrelenting rhetoric of Amhara groups to replace the current
federal system is a serious concern for previously marginalized groups.
Similarly, the refusal of ethno-nationalist movements to renounce demands for
independence is worrisome to the Amhara. Both of these concerns are legitimate.
However, a regime change via nonviolent resistance is unlikely to lead to
realization of those fears. During the Egyptian uprising, many feared the Muslim
Brotherhood will take over after Mubarak and establish an Islamic caliphate.
Similarly, in Pinochet’s Chile and Marcos’ Philippines, moderates
and business elites feared a communist takeover.White South Africans worried about
economic expropriation and physical revenge by black nationalists.Now we know none of these fears were
realized. This is one of the main differences between change through armed
struggle and via nonviolent resistance. In armed struggle, almost always a
single dominant force emerges. Moreover, as conflict is waged
between two armies, the defeated military of the state is often dismantled and
replaced by the rebel soldiers. This allows the winning party to have the
ability to monopolize power and impose its partisan will.
Victory in civil resistance is an outcome of collaborative work among various
political and social organizations and largely that of unaffiliated
individuals. Thus, the likelihood of a single group determining the
outcome is negligent. Whereas the dictator and top cronies are removed, most of
the state institutions, including the military remain intact. As a result, no
single group will have the capability to impose partisan objectives
unilaterally. In a sense, regime change through nonviolent resistance open
doors for reform rather than ushering in a full revolution as in the case of
armed insurgency.
Therefore, the post Meles era should not be scary
because;
a) The immediate power
vacuum will not be filled by a single group rather by a transitional government
likely dominated by moderates including those from the old guard.
b) Constitutional writing
will not be a unilateral work of a single party but a product of an inclusive,
long, and tiresome bargaining. My bet is that the current constitution will be
adopted with slight amendments. Even in case of a gridlock, the issue will be
settled through an electoral process.
c) Because the army and
state institutions will remain intact, secessionists will not be able to break
away any part of the country and have to wait for the due process.
d) If secessionists or
hardcore ‘unitarists’ are unwilling to compromise on their agenda,
they will have to do it through free, fair, and competitive election and
referendums. If they can garner the necessary public support, then the people
have spoken, no one can stop it.
e) All of the groups
calling for self-determination have indicated in different occasions that they
would settle for a genuine federal structure built on a firmly democratic,
representative, and equitable foundation.
Nonviolent Conflict and Fear of Civil War
When we speak of nonviolent resistance, we are talking about waging
a conflict against often a repressive government to destabilize it, obstruct
its normal routine, and create nervousness and uncertainty within the pillars
of power to drain the systems endurance and bring it down. But unless carefully
managed and guided, such confrontations create a precarious situation and could
make the country and the people vulnerable to prolonged chaos.
Dictators are most dangerous at the end of their reign. They will do whatever
it takes without any concern for consequences. They would use saboteurs to
instigate conflict among the population and even within the military and
security apparatus—and such actions will have serious long-term
consequences particularly in fragile multinational states like Ethiopia. But
these dangers could be avoided through strategic planning.
Organizers should anticipate
every possible action the regime will take and prepare responsive tactics.
Every repressive or divisive action by the regime should be met with
action that strengthens the movement towards unity while delegitimizing
the system.
Nonviolent discipline is the
key to the movement’s ability to manage conflicts. The less
physical violence on the part of the resisters, the more control they have
over the course of the conflict and ability to maintain momentum. This can
be achieved by training as many organizers as possible to build the
necessary skills. Such preparation helps to identify and pacify the impact
of agent provocateurs that aim to turn the situation unto uncontrolled
chaos.
Aim for quick victory but
prepare for a long struggle. A prolonged conflict could lead to a
stalemate and power vacuum where neither side controls large part of the
country making it vulnerable to opportunistic spoilers. With well thought
out strategic planning, it is possible to bring down a dictator within a
brief period of time. Tactics can be sequenced to reinforce each other and
multiply their impact on raising pressure on the status quo to quickly
dismantle the pillars of support. But unforeseen circumstances, mistakes
in implementation of strategies and external factors could derail the
efficiency of the movement. In such cases, it is crucial not to lose
momentum for prolonged periods which gives the regime breathing space
while weakening the movement’s cohesion by inducing skepticism.
Diversionary tactics should be
employed to cover strategic vulnerability. In the case of a
stalemate, new combat front should be opened. Halfway through the Egyptian
revolution, Mubarak stopped attacking protesters and tactically waited for
the movement to run out of momentum. On the last days of the second
week, the Egyptian regime looked unmovable. The number of protesters began
dwindling with onlyfew
thousands hardcore leaders left at the square. Some opposition members
began advocating for negotiation while America walked back from pressuring
Mubarak, fearing the survival of his regime. The organizers responded by
mobilizing a nationwide boycott. They opened new battle
fronts, with fresh combatants—this time workers reinforcing the
youth. This counter offensive strategy escalated the conflict,
destabilizing the remaining institutions and completely crippling the
state.
If momentum continues to
decline, suspending the campaign by emphasizing concession gained should
be considered. There will be another round. Learn from mistakes,
improvise strategies, and prepare better for the final push.
Another way of avoiding a civil
war is to make sure that no segment of the population (ethnic, religion or
region) remains as the last strong hold for the dictator. Cornered in
Tripoli, Gaddafi is trying to frame the conflict as a civil war between
Western and Eastern Libya. I could anticipate Meles fleeing to Mekele and
fortifying himself there to use Tigray as his shield. Such a move can be
prevented by organizing resistance in every part of the country thereby
creating unwelcome environment everywhere. Statement of denunciation and
rejection by high profile members the specific community could also help
in discouraging the dictator.
Every dictator
wants to limit his subjects’ imagination to a choice between living under
tyranny and facing Armageddon. However, time and again, unified, disciplined
and strategically planned nonviolent movements have disproved such prediction.
Once people break the chain of fear and tear down the wall of tyranny, they can
use the resulting civic environment to find creative solutions to their
multifaceted problems. Under the watch of the free press and demand of
practical results by the population, politicians who now rely on populist
rhetoric will be forced to be realistic and moderate their position in order to
broaden their appeal and garner electoral victory. Extremist ideologies will be
put to test in competitive election or can be resisted peacefully. Public
sympathy for such ideologies during repression usually does not translate into
electoral support afterwards.
Conclusion: Word of Caution
There is no model revolution: The quick success of the latest revolutions have given rise
to simplistic perceptions of nonviolent resistance. Commentators are
debating whether the Egyptian, Tunisian, Libyan or East European model should
be adopted in Ethiopia. This is a misguided debate because no country can serve
as a model for another. Due to differences in social structure, nature and
strength of the regime, every movement must develop realistic strategies based
on careful and detailed assessment of the realities on the ground. Strategies
and tactics that worked in one country may fail in another. We should look into
both successful and failed movements not with hope of replicating what they
have done, but to learn from their experiences and devise our own strategies to
suit our unique realities.
“It’s so easy even a caveman can do it” attitude: This is yet another simplistic interpretation that
underestimates the level of preparation that is needed for a nonviolent
uprising to succeed. Deceived by seemingly spontaneous swelling of
crowds, the importance of leadership and organization are sometimes written off
as unnecessary. A nonviolent movement needs leadership, but it does not require
a figurehead. Leaders of nonviolent movementare usually
invisible because such resistance is not organized in the traditional
hierarchical manners. There is also a need to detach the movement from
personalities and their politics.
It
is also important to clear up the confusion between two social phenomenons:
protest and movement. Both are group action by means of expressing views aimed
at influencing public opinion to bring change policy. The difference is
that protest is a specific reaction to a particular event or situation.
A movement however is a sustained series of contentious and collective public
campaigns that employs varieties of tactics and methods. In a movement there is
a common objective, and not only do the actors know what need to be changed but
they also have strategies to achieve it.
On the other hand, a protest could be one of the
tactics used by a movement just like boycotts, sit-ins, and strikes. For
example, take a rally in the aftermath a stolen election as a tactic for a
movement. In case of a protest, participants would disperse after brief
standoff. In a movement, protests could be preceded and followed by actions targeting
the system—a sign for a larger objective than just airing grievances.
Prior strategic planning can be evidenced from the unity, sequential tactics,
and discipline shown by demonstrators. We would see a sustained build up of
momentum, and the demonstration survives and even gets stronger in the face of
a violent response from the opponent.
It takes building a movement to bring down a dictator
and replace it with a democratic system. It is true certain riots could bring
down a regime. But only an organized movement guided by well planned strategy
can sustain the uprising, maintain focus and unity of the public to prevent a
return to dictatorship either in the hands of a military junta or due to a
consolidation power by new hardliners.
Therefore, while it looks quite simple, successful
nonviolent revolution is usually the result of a sophisticated and innovative
strategies and tactics. Expanding our knowledge of nonviolent strategies and
building our tactical skill is essential to successfully crushing a determined
and well financed regime with absolute control over all means’ of
coercion.
—
*Jawar Mohammed is an independent researcher and a recent graduate of Stanford University. He can be reached for comments at [email protected]; you can also access his articles at www.dhummuugaa.wordpress.com or on OPride – Jawar’s Corner.
