Response to ECX’s statement on the alleged fraud and corruption

By Wondwossen Mezlekia | March 27, 2012




An Ethiopia Commodity Exchange (ECX)
response to my article why ECX is flagged for fraud and corruption is commendable in many ways. To start with, the statement was issued by the company’s External Relations manager, effectively delineating the roles of company communications from the CEO’s interactions with persons and entities outside of the company.
This etiquette and separation of duties is a step in the right direction.

In addition, and most importantly, the civility and courage in which ECX came out to publicly defend itself on an obviously painful subject is a manifestation of ECX’s emerging maturity as an institution. I tip my hat to ECX for its participation in nurturing a culture of engaging in dialogue by breaking away from the age-old political culture of ours, where emotions triumph over objectivity, and differing views are not tolerated.

When it comes to its content, however, the statement does not provide any new information that wasn’t already uncovered during the research previously conducted for the article, so it won’t affect the fundamental questions raised in the article. Leaving the sometimes self-contradicting and irrelevant assertions aside, the main points of the response are: 1) the article “has overstepped the boundaries of factual and honest commentary” because it failed to disclose the conversation I had with ECX’s CEO; 2) the extension of the bid submission date by one month was what caused Millennium IT’s bid security validity period to miss the requirement by 30 days; 3) the World Bank canceled the award because no other bidder was considered responsive by its standards; 4) the bid approval process involved four layers of controls with an extensive review period; 5) the oversight of Millennium IT’s bid security validity period was a minor technicality in comparison to the complex parameters evaluated; and 6) the fact that both the World Bank and the Prime Minister’s Office had conducted full investigations in 2011 is well known and sufficient. I will address these by briefly discussing each point.

1) The article omits references to the CEO’s explanation

It is true that I had the privilege of speaking on the phone with the ECX’s CEO in January 2012 during which time we discussed a range of topics. When I raised the complaints surrounding the said bidding process, the CEO’s expressed reaction was a mix of astonishment and disbelief that I knew about the issue and the conversation about this particular issue effectively ended. I saw no point in pursuing it any further after the CEO said, “I am uncomfortable discussing the details of a matter that is being investigated”. I totally agreed and quickly moved on to another policy related issue, which happened to be of interest to both of us, and discussed it at length. It was a cordial and very productive call that I valued and appreciated. At the end of the call, the CEO made it a point to remind me that the conversation was off the record, to which I responded affirmatively and kept my promise; thus the omission of any reference to that conversation in my article. How can I be accused of not mentioning it in the article if I was also expected to keep my word to the CEO?

For what it’s worth, I could have insisted and asked the CEO to go on record with or without a comment, but any information that I may have gathered would not be of material value as it only represents ECX’s version of the story which I am already aware of. I had knowledge of the allegation for quite some time and had tried in vain to get the government’s response on the status of the case; thus the need for the public scrutiny.

2) The extension of the bid submission date by one month is what caused Millennium IT’s bid to miss the requisite

This is inaccurate. As clearly indicated in the bid document, the bid security must be valid for at least 148 days after the date of bid opening. In this case, the tender that was advertised on May 3, 2010 had the bid opening date set for June 15, 2010. The opening date was later extended to July 12, 2010. Millennium IT’s bid security, which was due to expire on October 9, 2010, would have been short of the required validity period of 148 days even if the bid opening date had not been extended.

3) The World Bank canceled the award because no other bidder was considered responsive by its standards

The processes of cancelling a proposal for award and awarding a contract to the next responsive bidder are two distinctly independent and mutually exclusive activities. The World Bank cancels a proposal for award and the portion of the loan allocated to the contract when it determines that the bidder and the borrower have engaged in corrupt, fraudulent, collusive, coercive or obstructive practices. It is not clear if the World Bank had considered awarding the contract to another bidder, but according to its email, the award was canceled because the World Bank “takes allegations of fraud and corruption seriously.” Therefore, the presence or lack of another qualifying bidder had no bearing on the World Bank’s decision to cancel the award.

Additionally, it is misleading to assert that there was no other responsive bidder. As it happens, there were at least two other qualifying bidders whose bids were responsive enough to satisfy the initial evaluation requirements, at the point where Millennium IT’s bid should have been disqualified. It may be difficult to draw conclusions on whether either of the bids meets ECX’s technical requirements without reviewing the results of the technical evaluation, but it is evident from the bid documents that the bids submitted by CMA Small Business Systems and Securities and Trading Technologies were both responsive as per the bidding guidelines. Interestingly, the opening bid price offered by these bidders was even less than Millennium IT’s price by USD 1,133,393 and USD 1,585,105, respectively. Millennium IT’s opening price was USD 3,585,105, which was further boosted up by USD 1,270,695 to a total cost of USD 4,855,800.

4) The bid approval process involved four layers of controls with an extensive review period

ECX seems to be suggesting here that the “minor technical error” by the bid evaluation committee had also been overlooked by everyone in the bid approval process that involved four layers of controls and an extensive review period of over six months. What this confirms is the significance of the second line of defense in risk management which is the readiness to intercept fraudulent activities after the fact as it was effectively demonstrated by the World Bank’s action to promptly cancel Millennium IT’s award. Apparently, one of those layers, which happens to be the World Bank, knows the difference between an oversight and fraud. And that is why ECX’s alleged fraud and corruption needs to be investigated by the Federal Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission.

5) The oversight of Millennium IT’s bid security validity period was a minor technicality

The oversight of the invalidity of the bid security may be claimed to be a minor technical error, but the subsequent cover-up acts are suspicious.

Asking all bidders, the winner and the ones who had already known that their bids were rejected alike, to extend the bid security validity after the completion of the evaluation is deliberate. It seems that ECX had chosen to fix the records in a way that would outwardly qualify Millennium IT’s bid for evaluation rather than taking corrective measures as soon as the invalidity of Millennium IT’s bid security was pointed out by the complainant bidder. This is not a minor technicality.

6) The World Bank and the Prime Minister’s Office had conducted full investigations and that should suffice

The World Bank’s investigation is not sufficient as the sole purpose of such an investigation is to protect the Bank’s own business as evidenced in this case by the Bank’s action to cancel ECX’s proposal to award the contract to Millennium IT and secure its money. As a sovereign nation, it is the government’s responsibility to investigate every allegation of fraud and corruption in the public’s interest and hold purported perpetrators accountable. In Ethiopia, the Anti-corruption law is cut and dry and the duty of the executive branch of the government is to implement the law impartially, without cherry picking to afford preferential treatments to some suspects over others. Unfortunately, this sense of fairness and rule of law is what has been missing in Ethiopia.

According to the revised proclamation for the establishment of the Federal Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission, investigating and prosecuting alleged or suspected corruption offenses committed by public officials or employees is the duty of the Commission, not that of a de facto investigation committee. The difference between the two is that the former is bound by law, at least supposedly, to prosecute anyone suspected of committing a crime of corruption, whereas the latter is an informal administrative body that can only serve the government’s political purposes. That is why the handling of ECX’s alleged fraud and corruption outside the Commission’s jurisdiction becomes very suspicious and concerning.

The purpose of the article to which ECX responded is to publicly make the case for why the alleged perpetrator(s) at ECX should be treated like anyone who is suspected of corruption as provided by Article 25 of the Constitution which guarantees that “all persons shall be equal before the law and shall be entitled to equal protection of the law without any discrimination whatsoever.”

ECX cannot be the defendant and plaintiff at the same time. So, instead of trying to cast doubt on the article’s integrity with hopes of mystifying the alarming phenomenon it has publicized, it would be better if ECX just steps aside and let the authorities join the discourse and help restore the public’s trust.

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