The
“Arab Spring” that signaled the emergence of democracy in Libya,
Egypt, Tunisia, Yemen and a number of Middle Eastern countries currently faces
severe challenges. It seems overthrowing a dictatorship is much easier than
building a
functioning democracy and a stable society to
replace it. The main reason is, of course, the absence of a democratic culture.
In order to mold an obedient and docile citizenry, a
totalitarian political systemencourages a
culture of passivity and apathy, therefore purposefully
discourage free thought and suppress the emergence of various institutions -political
parties, civic associations that would have created a culture of civil
participation and with it the practice of peaceful negotiation and compromise.
In the case
of Ethiopia, the regime deliberately sowed the seeds of hatred and paranoia, and discouraged
any active civic participation in public life as well as dissent. Therefore a
carefully crafted transitional plan is of paramount importance.
If we want to
avoid past mistakes in our history and chart a path to a prosperous and peaceful
future for our embattled country, there are several factors we should consider
Election is not an instant
panacea
Elections are the
inescapable sin qua non of democracy and a key component of
legitimate power, but without democratic institutions prior to and after
elections to operate, elections will only produce the shell of democracy
without the benefits of a truly accountable government. As we have seen in many
institutionally weak countries elections have the potential to compound the
existing problem and create a fertile ground for an
increasingly disillusioned
population that will opt for stability over more decisive democratic changes.
The graveyard of history is full of betrayed revolutions and democratic
aspiration by clever demagogue spouting populist rhetoric, while forging new
dictatorships. That is what we witness in almost all postcolonial regimes in Africa,
Asia and Middle East. Even in the Western World where constitutional liberalism
is a deeply rooted tradition to protect the individual
from coercive powers of the state, populist rhetoric can be appealing. After all, Adolf
Hitler became chancellor of Germany via free elections. Close to home, who doesn’t remember the
accolades and even kisses bestowed upon Colonel MengistuHailemariam by none other than the hyperactive and progressive students of Addis
Ababa University, who would later on become his primary target for elimination?
An election
without the safeguard of the basic “rules of the game” and firmly entrenched
democratic institution (i.e. independent judiciary, free press, civic groups,
etc.) does not produce a lasting result. To get elected, populist candidates appeal on instincts and emotions. And,
the easiest emotions to address are those of envy and hate.
Populist candidates
typically present clear pictures of the “enemies”. They often are
elected on the basis of what they oppose, not of what they support. Such
agendas typically false are not in the best interest of those governed because
the assumption is always that only others will suffer from the hate policies,
and that the individual supporter of a populist will not be affected. This
indeed is a dangerous error, because governments that are popular because of
their opposition to certain “enemies” of society develop their own
momentum. When they get rid of one enemy, they will need another and sooner or
later even the initial supporters of a populist will suffer. No one can deny
the current situation in Ethiopia is emotionally charged-a fertile ground for hatred
and manipulators. Therefore, coming up with a creative solution to deal with this
quagmire is a tall order.
The ethnic factor
TPLF started as a parochial
struggle for the liberation of Tigray, not as a broad
based movement with a vision for a complex nation such as Ethiopia. It had
neither the capability nor the foresight to administrate the country. Therefore,
resorting to populist rhetoric is the predictable outcome. Initially the bogeymen
to blame were the Amhara. They were the easy target, but
it didn’t stop there: the Gurage, the Eriterean, etc. were further stigmatized to secure power.
This foray of TPLF exclusionary politics finally resulted in the creation of
ethnic enclave or Kilil. This policy has been in place for the
last 20 years. During this period boundaries have been redrawn and resources reallocated
in an arbitrary manner; mainly, to reward its allies and punish the
“enemies”. Most of all the policy has created an entrenched view of
identity and entitlement, not to mention suspicion and hatred among the various
groups.The fact that the high
echelon of power is held by TPLF loyalists adds another layer of complexity and
puts Tigrigna speaking population in an unviable position of being seen as
beneficiary of largesse at the expense of other group despite their minority
status, or even worst being a collaborator of an unpopular regime. Whether these
are true or not is irrelevant once the genie of ethnic hatred is out of the
bottle. Moreover, Melese and his cohorts have done
everything, but dispel this suspicion. In fact they actively fanned the hatred and
created insecurity among the Tigrigna speaking population.
Sociologist Charles Tilly makes
a compelling analogy between the authoritarian regime and a racketeer. He
defines racketeer as someone who creates a threat and then charges for its
reduction in order to gain control and consolidate power. In this regard, the Melese
regime differ little from racketeers, to the extent that the threat against
which they claim to protect the Tigrigna speaking population are mainly the
consequence of their own action, and in some cases imaginary.
The military
The regime has consolidated
its power through ethnically defined institutions as well as from interlinked
set of TPLF-affiliated businesses. The pervasive control of the economy has
enabled the regime to extract loyalty by threatening to deny service or public-sector
jobs to its opponents, or simply using violence as a means of coercion.
Similarly, the military has been organized along ethnic lines. While the lower levels
of the military are multiethnic, its top officers are overwhelmingly members of
TPLF; according to Center for Strategic & International Studies (2011)
“As many as 58 of the top 61 officers are members of the TPLF”. Organizing the army along ethnical lines deprives
the country a national army with a unified national
character needed to confront its
numerous security threats. Indeed, it’s a callous disregard for the
security of the country and treason of very high order unparalleled in the nation’s
history. Despite much touted military strength of the regime, the centre
dominated by TPLF is holding only because of the mixture of threat and largesse.
If there is a crisis, however, the military might unravel and breakup into
ethnic factions allowing the regional power brokers to strengthen their
position in various regions, a dynamics that might put the unity of the
Ethiopian state at risk.
Regional factors
Ethiopia is Africa’s
second largest populated country and a significant player in a region where political
instability, civil strife and interstate conflict have been defining features
over the last few decades. Any change in the Ethiopian political landscape will
be viewed in the region at best with apprehension and at worst with suspicion.
The most troublesome borders might be the ones with Eritrea and Somalia. Eritrea
and Ethiopia are still technically at war (having never signed a peace treaty after the 2000 war). Any
political changes in Ethiopia would be closely followed by Asmara, and
potential miscalculation on either side is real. As for Somalia, there has been
no effective government since 1991, the threat is more an Eritrean proxy war
through ONLF or an OLF sprinter group to weaken Ethiopia or exert some
influence in the ensuing power struggle.
On the positive side,
Ethiopia occupies an important position in the volatile and strategically
important Horn of Africa. It has used its position to its advantage, offering
its assistance as a security partner with the West. As a result, the West –mainly the
United States- has a stake in seeing the country united and stable. It’s
a trump card that can be used to leverage diplomatic as well as sorely needed
financial assistance.
The opposition
The spaces for dissenting voices and alternative views have effectively
been closed. Those who have challenged the regime have been harassed, killed,
forced into exile, and had their property seized and jobs taken away. Barring
some dissenting voice here and there, the latest by Ethiopian Muslim, well
organized domestic opposition is virtually non-existent. Disengagement and
cynicism have for now replaced the remarkably energetic participation witness
during the 2005 election. This apparent capitulation, however, may be pragmatic
and tactical retreat. It could evaporate quickly if the regime’s power seems
to be weakening. The diaspora community on the other hand, has been growing
steadily more vocal. In spite of its clout and potential
resources at its disposal, however, has yet to make inroads in influencing
events in Ethiopia. The movement (if it can be called such) has to evolve
beyond protest and present an authentic political agenda. By this I don’t
mean an agenda to assume power. Diaspora
communities tend to adopt more extreme positions to compensate for being removed from the realities
at home. Instead, the challenge for the Diaspora, as John Holloway once put it,
is to “change the world without taking power”. That is, to build
and strengthen the alternative institutions of democracy, such as human right
organization, media, civil society. Institutions providing the foundation for
liberal democracy and are defined by their own autonomy.
Humanitarian concern
Ethiopia has
been the largest recipient of foreign aid for the last twenty years. Most of it
is in the form of food aid. Despite the massive injection of aid, food security
in Ethiopia has been an elusive goal. At any one time upwards of four million
people are affected by famine or food shortage. If the country becomes
unstable, the situation can easily degenerate into serious humanitarian crisiswith
potential for civil strife spreading in large areas of the country.
Ethiopia is
a complex country in a complex region where an intolerance of dissent and
acrimonious issues are deeply rooted in its history. Despite a history marred
by tragedy and injustice, the country has projected the outward appearance of
deceptively calm nation relativeto the rest of Africa. This
might have created a sense of complacency and a belief the country will once again
emerge from the current crises with its unity intact. I would love to be proven
wrong, however, this time around the circumstances and the difficulty facing
the country are much more pernicious and its effects can be
far-reaching and with sweeping consequences. This is not
to say we have no control on our future, on the contrary we have all the
resources required to shape our future. In fact, as I will argue in my
follow-up commentary, albeit its risks, our recent past might even present us a
unique opportunity to forge a union based on equality and respect for each
other.
In this commentary, I tried to touch on some of the issue we should
consider in the event the situation in Ethiopia changes drastically. It’s
not, by all account, an exhaustive list of issues the country could face. My
aim is quite modest –to elicit discussion and remind us anew that “those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it”.
In my follow-up (Part II) commentary I will try to suggest some solutions
that might be considered to tackle the various issues herein presented.
— Based in Ottawa, Canada, the writer can be reached at [email protected]
