The Humanitarian Aid-Corruption Nexus in Ethiopia


By Seid Hassan, Murray State University

June 21, 2013



Professor Seid Hassan
Prof. Seid Hassan

The
Amharic version of the Voice of America (journalist Solomon Abate serving as
moderator) entertained a discussion on corruption which was broadcast on May 17
and 18, 2013. Participants included Messrs. Mulugeta Aragawi of Addis Ababa
University, Abebe Gutta (attorney at law in Addis Ababa), Berhanu Assefa (Ethical Education and Communication Affairs Director of the
Federal Ethics and Anti Corruption Commission-FEACC) and
I.

The first two gentlemen who really knew the sources, extent and potential
solution to the rampant Ethiopian corruption politely provided their views,
including the approaches that the government has to take to fight the
corruption that the government has admitted to be rampant. As expected and is
customary of the members of the EPRDF, Mr. Berhanu Assefa of the FEACC was on
the defensive and mostly on the attack mode, instead of listening to the
complaints and suggestions of the two citizens.  As those who listened to the debate can
easily attest, Mr. Assefa spent most of his time talking about unrelated to the
topic of discussion –yes, you guessed it right: the same old and tired double
digit growth rates that all EPRDFites like to parrot each other ad nauseam.  He also suggested that the current
decision to fight against corruption is for real and the arrest of Minister Melaku Fenta, director general
of the revenue and customs authority and his deputy Gebrewahed Woldegiorgis

along with several officials and
businessmen merchants 
should
serve as proof and we ought not to discourage it.  I partially agreed with Mr. Assefa’s
suggestion in that all of us have to encourage the fight against corruption, if
indeed it is for real while at the same time expressing my serious doubts.

I will
perhaps address this issue (whether Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn’s
government is both serious and capable of fighting the rampant corruption in
the country) with a separate short write-up. Delay such a commentary also allow
us to give the current authorities a little more time and the benefits of doubt
to show it to the world, as promised, that they have ended embarked on fighting
against the debilitating corruption in the country. This and the next two
(probably more) series of short commentaries instead focus on my soon to be
published research findings related to the foreign-aid–corruption-nexus
as applied to Ethiopia. These two forthcoming articles are included in the
upcoming Ethiopian e-Journal for Research
and Innovation Foresight-
Vol.5,
no.1-Special issue on the Ethiopian Economy which incorporates seven
professionally written manuscripts. The contributors include Professors Abu
Girma Moges (two articles: one on federalism and the second one on the extent
of and the sham nature of calculating and indexing of poverty in the country),
Minga Negash (on the peculiar nature of corporate governance in Ethiopia and
the way forward), Getachew Begashaw (on the effects of landlockedness), Zeleke
Worku (on
Traditional Financial
Structures such as Iqub,

etc.) and I (two articles on the foreign aid-corruption nexus).  Both of my research articles are related
but t
he first one tries to exclusively focus on the humanitarian
aid-corruption nexus (that is, corruption when the TPLF was a rebel front) while
the second one focuses on the development aid-corruption nexus (that is,
corruption after the TPLF seized political power). They both are byproducts of
many years of my extensive research and fact documentations regarding the
nature and causes of corruption in Ethiopia. I expect readers of these articles
to find the extensive literature, testimonials and interviews that I consulted to
be highly beneficial to them.

The State
Capture Onset in Ethiopia: Humanitarian Aid and Corruption
. Forthcoming:   Ethiopian e-Journal for
Research and Innovation Foresight-
Vol.5, no.1-Special
issue on the Ethiopian Economy.

Abstract: The first part of this paper shows that a substantial part of the money
that aid agencies gave to feed
the 1984-5 Ethiopian famine victims, including those
raised by
Band Aid and Live Aid were siphoned off by the Tigrayan
Peoples’ Liberation Front (TPLF)
to buy military weapons. I also use newly found evidences, interviews and
testimonials accumulated over many years to show that
famine aid scamming by the TPLF had gone
beyond using humanitarian aid to purchase military weapons and feed the rebel Front’s
red army. I show how humanitarian aid, as a resource in the midst of extreme
scarcity, has enriched some quarters, fuelled corruption and intensified and
prolonged conflicts among the warring factions of Ethiopia and legitimized the
rebel fronts’ operations. Humanitarian aid lured the Fronts, particularly
the TPLF, to parade hundreds of thousands of peasants to Sudan, which led to
the deaths of tens of thousands of them (due to
overcrowding, disease epidemics, lack of regular food
supplies, poor water and sanitation problems, and from being exposed to targets
for bombing)
. The documents I
examined, the interviews that I conducted and the testimonials I have gathered
over many years indicate that the refugees were abused by the TPLF both during
their trek to the Ethio-Sudanese border which took 4-6 weeks and within the
refugee camps. According to some ex-TPLF veterans, (and their claims to be
indirectly proved by the written work of foreign nationals), a good portion of
the humanitarian food aid was not made available to the starving peasants of
Tigray. Their statements regarding this issue are indirectly corroborated by
the field and research work of foreign nationals. By all these three counts,
according to them, the TPLF has committed crimes against humanity (and, the
International Committee of the Red Cross –ICRC agrees with them on this front).
The documents I examined
and the interviews and testimonials I gathered indicate that donors and aid
agencies knew that the Relief Society of Tigray (REST) was the flip-side of the
same coin- the TPLF and aid agency personnel knew a portion of the humanitarian
aid that they were providing was being diverted for military purposes by the
Fronts, indicating a violation of the principle of neutrality and impartiality
on the part of aid agencies. There are also indications suggesting that the
cross-border interventions by donors and aid agencies were against the
multilateral agreements such as the Lomé conventions (Duffield and Prendergast, 1994).  This shows that the provisions and
delivery of humanitarian aid have been used to violate and perhaps diminish
the sovereignty of Ethiopia. Looked in a
different way,
a good portion of the humanitarian aid
provided by donor countries to the TPLF and other fronts fighting the Derg
regime was in part for the advancement of the diplomatic and foreign policy
goals as well as political and military tools of donor nations and aid agencies.  It may be for this reason why they cared
less about how humanitarian aid was spent or abused.  The literature that I examined
also provides reasons why the abuse
of humanitarian aid would be inevitable in conflict ridden countries such as
Ethiopia. The evidence gathered have
allowed me to inductively test one of my fundamental hypotheses: that
humanitarian aid resources were and still are the sources of predation and
capture in Ethiopia and that the culture of corruption and political malaise
that we observe in today’s Ethiopia is a byproduct of what the TPLF/EPRDF
learned and adopted when it was a rebel front and such a culture of corruption
was aided and abetted by humanitarian aid. 

 Summary,
Implication and Conclusion (abridged)   



The
accounts of several donor agency personnel and the testimonials of ex-TPLF
combatants indicate that humanitarian aid has showered the TPLF with more hard
currency than the $100 million it received from
Band Aid and similar activities. They include, for
example, the millions of dollars that REST and its “employees” and
supporters received for providing their services (transporting the donated food
and related aid, as guides, etc.), from selling of “excess”
humanitarian aid into the Sudanese and Middle Eastern markets, from scamming
and defrauding humanitarian agencies such as  the $500,000 that Mr. Max Peberdy of Christian Aid was seen passing to Mr. Araya and
others
and the $2 million the Australians gave in cash to purchase
food from local merchants, etc.) 
However, my investigation is unable to determine the exact amount of
money that the TPLF made from selling humanitarian aid. Both the fungibility of funds and the secretive nature of the Front
also played and would continue to play as huge obstacles in ascertaining
if
and how much of those funds which have been allocated as described and as
decided by the Front’s leadership were actually implemented I am further
convinced that no one, including top leaders of the TPLF would be able to
ascertain the exact allocations, expenditures and conversions of humanitarian
aid for military purposes.

The second part of this article presented an abridged version
of both the theoretical and practical case for aid to be a source for
corruption and for prolonging conflicts among warring nations. I examined
documents and the information obtained from various
credible voices already aired by
ex-TPLF veterans. I cross-examined previous testimonies provided by high level
donor aid officials and aid agencies’ personnel who were deeply involved
in the delivery of humanitarian aid at the time. I also sought out and
investigated documents written by journalists who happen to report the extent
of donor aid flow and to whom they were given. This led me to uncover one of
the hard to find non-classified CIA documents, thanks to Google’s search
engine, which in turn reinforced the claims made by donor aid officials and aid
agency personnel who attested that
humanitarian aid was indeed siphoned off to military uses by the TPLF.  The examination of the facts also
indicates that both donor nations and aid agencies took a blind eye to the
misuse and diversion of humanitarian aid to military uses. Some attribute this
to the fact of channeling of humanitarian assistance along the Ethio-Sudanese
border in the 1980s being partly political (see,
Evil Days, pp. 356-62, for example).

 The cross-examination of the documents that
I gathered along with the testimonials of individuals also indicates that the
TPLF skillfully captured humanitarian aid resources, with full intent. The
desire to capture and use humanitarian aid resources motivated the Front to (in
large part forcefully) parade already weakened peasants to trek to Sudan, which
led to the death of tens of thousands of them (to the tune of 25,000 by some
humanitarian agencies’ estimates and calculations and a lot more by
ex-TPLF combatants) and to their increased suffering. This article has also presented the case in which the
provision of humanitarian aid could have the opposite and damaging (largely
unintended) effects on the recipient country and its people using Ethiopia as
an example.
To the extent that the desire to access humanitarian aid
resources lured organized groups such as the TPLF to commit crimes against
humanity, and to the extent that these same resources have benefitted the
elites and have enabled the TPLF establish a highly corruptive and oligarchic
system that we observe in today’s Ethiopia, we conclude that humanitarian
aid resources were the basis for the onset of state capture that reigns supreme
currently in Ethiopia.


Seid Hassan is professor of econommics at Murray State University.


Ethiomedia.com – An African-American news and views website.
Copyright 2012 Ethiomedia.com.
Email: [email protected]