“Addis Ababa is rife with rumors about my alleged complicity with the
enemy,” lamented the Brigadier to the Chief of Staff, Lt General Hadis
Tedla, who received him in his office the following day. “But the
problem is bigger than me.” The President wants you to write a report
about what happened in Baher Dar, told him a sympathetic Hadis.
Everyone feared the worst; Mengistu has killed for much less.
This
sounded too much like a request for his final words. Abebe was not
offered an office, nor was he given a timeframe. He was politely but
firmly told to prepare and submit the report from his home.
Isolated, confused, profoundly slighted by the rumors, and quite
obviously preparing for the worst, a defiant Abebe went on to produce
a stunning report that most probably saved his life.
“The enemy attacks with nominal strength,’ wrote Abebe in his report
to Mengistu. “It knows our troops scrupulously. It need only sprinkle
the area with few artillery fires. Our troops will then routinely
abandon their positions without a fight, turning into a human wave as
they retreat in droves. Pandemonium takes over. Soldiers fire
randomly; NCOs and Officers are suddenly no where to be found; no
chain of command; no discipline; all semblance of an army ceases to
exist. And all is inevitably lost.(This has become the norm.)”
Such was the crisis of faith, confidence and leadership that afflicted
the Derg in its last days. It was the essential cause of its brisk
collapse between 1989, when it made the strategic blunder to withdraw
prematurely from Mekele for political rather than military
considerations; and 1991, when it was finally — and easily – routed in the
vicinity of Ambo, West Shoa.
Faced with the most spectacular thrashing — by way of rigging, of
course — of its two decades history, the Ethiopian legal opposition
now stands face to face with an analogous crisis of faith, confidence
and leadership. As the Derg’s withdrawal from Mekele was a
psychological turning point some 21 years ago, so is poised this
year’s alleged election outcome as a decisive turning point for the
nation. How this crisis is handled will decide not only the fate of
one or two organizations, but critically, will chart which way
Ethiopian politics — and history — will go hereafter.
Now is the time for the legal opposition to address the challenges it
faces, exploit the political opportunities, and isolate the hazards
that need to be shunned. Sadly, so far, avoiding the hazards seems to
loom larger than addressing the challenges and exploiting the
opportunities. And perhaps the role of the Shimagles (elders) — who are
shuttling between Meles and opposition leaders — is influencing the
course of events. But this may be a fatal error for an opposition
facing an existential threat. Certainly, imprisonment must not be
avoided at the expense of relegation to permanent irrelevance.
This is not a call for the opposition to mastermind a revolution. The
people are not ready, yet. But this is clearly a plea by a member of the
public, one who cherishes the notion of a peaceful change in his
country, for the opposition to show vision, integrity, leadership and
guts in the face of naked tyranny.
A clear picture of the opposition’s vision is glaringly lacking.
Almost two weeks after tens of millions have been provoked by the
“election results”, the opposition has yet to set the tone of its
response to the crisis by expounding the goals it has set. This delay
puts into question the leadership’s perseverance and undermines the
fostering of a permissive environment for the public to stay
engaged — and more importantly, to hope. Too many people — but not
catastrophically — are already losing hope and confidence in the legal
opposition. And as the experience of the Derg with its army after 1989
lay bare, once confidence and hope are lost, they are awfully hard to
reclaim.
Indecision, it seems to me, has now become a mortal threat to
Ethiopia’s legal opposition. But I am at a loss why this is so. The
opposition has an ample supply of leaders who have confidence in their
capabilities and potency of their belief; and also have the audacity
to act in situations where success is not assured. It is time for them to
lead us. Genuine leaders risk failure; the worst thing, I think we can
all agree, is to do nothing.
But as Lenin had famously asked: What is to be done? Plenty. But for
lack of space (as an American friend of mine always reminds me, who,
after all, would have time to read an article of more than 1000 words
on the web?), let me stick with the big ones.
The first essential step has already been taken. That is, a re-run of
the election has been demanded. We know that Meles reacted with his
usual assortment of threats; to which, many of us learned with much
relief, leaders of the opposition refused to acquiesce. The next
logical step is to seek permit from Corporal Kuma Demeksa’s city
administration for a rally in support of the re-run at Meskel square
in Addis Ababa; which, if stretched to the limit as in 2005, is
capable of hosting up to a million people. Whether it gives the green
light or denies the permit, the EPRDF is poised to lose. If it grants
the permit, it will set the stage for a massive turnout — a tsunami — by
the people, which will eloquently undercut its claim of a sweeping
majority. I doubt it will tread along this path. If it denies the
permit, which is the more likely outcome, only few weeks after staging
its own post election rally there, it will clearly show the narrowing
of political space that EU observers said had affected “both the
process and the outcome of the election.” This will embarrass its
international partners further, reinforcing the growing pressure to do
something. Domestically, it will steal its thunder; for the first time
putting it on the defensive since the announcement of the “election
results.”
The second vital step should be the upping of the diplomatic
challenge. To date, the legal opposition has responsibly refrained
from lobbying in support of economic sanctions. But the EPRDF has
consistently used aid money — in the words of HRW — “to build a one
party state.” It has recklessly politicized aid to the point that it
could not be ignored anymore. This abuse is unprecedented both in
Africa and in the context of the wider world. For Western governments
to persist on looking askance is to risk serious scandal at some point
in the future. This is clearly a window of opportunity for the
opposition. Isolating the EPRDF from its increasingly restless Western
partners will be difficult, but it is feasible under present
circumstances. A change of heart on the part of the Americans will
have transformative effect in the donor community. Meles Zenawi’s
bluff notwithstanding, the support afforded by Ethiopia’s Western
partners is key to the nation’s macro-economic stability — the core of
his argument in favor of the status-quo. Its time economic aid — but of
course not humanitarian aid — is used as an important bargaining chip in
support of democratization. China will continue to fund major
infrastructural projects, but will not step in to fill a vacuum
created by a complete or substantial Western withdrawal. We know that
from Zimbabwe, where the Chinese bond with Mugabe is deeper and longer
than the affiliation with Meles
The “election result” has made everyone uneasy. This includes
opposition supporters, the international community, and, quite
interestingly, the vast majority of EPRDF members. Only a handful of
hardliners — the usual list — relish the prospect of a return to a one
party state. They must not be allowed to take the nation back. The
opposition needs to stand up to them.
