A minority rule brings neither democracy nor stability

The minority rule in Ethiopia has been greatly benefited from the
paralyses to create effective and sustainable rapprochement between the
Amharic speaking and Oromiffa speaking elites. Oromiffa and Amharic
speaking people in Ethiopia account about 70 percent of the total
population of the country, occupy about 50 percent of the landmass,
with relatively better-educated manpower and resource availability.
Neither the Amharic speaking, nor the Oromiffa speaking people lose in
a genuine democratic transition, effective ethnic groups right or
genuine federal arrangement in Ethiopia. These two language groups can
constitute a Statsvolk or a core national people, as they are
demographically and electorally dominant groups in Ethiopia to
guarantee stability, rights and democracy in the country.

Recently, there are some encouraging initiatives. However, the
initiatives have been compounded with confusions and difficulties. To
start with, the minority regime in Ethiopia, which has worked very hard
to exacerbate mistrusts and confusions between these dominant groups,
is again restless in using various tactics to destroy the initiatives.
Internally, the minority rule has advantages in commanding the national
economy, national army and deceptive media, and externally, its
opportunistic foreign policy has been pegged to the interest of a
‘neo-conservative’ interests of the super power that can guarantee
material, moral and political support in order to countervail its weak
internal legitimacy. These are the obvious behaviours of a minority
rule: a total control of an economy, rely on a brutal army, utilising a
deceptive media and act as a surrogate to external interest. It is
logical and consistent that the minority regime in Ethiopia should do
these in order to survive in power.

However, to emasculate the opportunistic and brutal tactics of the
minority rule, the majority groups in Ethiopia must effectively do
their homework with an effective, sustained and powerful popular
resistance inside Ethiopia. The power of the ‘Statsvolk’, or the
core
and majoritarian national people would be the best way that could
guarantee stability and democracy in Ethiopia. But not to install
themselves as oppressive bi-ethnic hegemony over other groups, rather
they can be protectors of rights of other minority groups. The people
of the two language groups would certainly benefit more from a
democratic political arrangement and respect of the rights of other
groups in Ethiopia.

The Oromiffa speaking elite have to understand that firstly, the
Amharic speaking people in Ethiopia have a considerable political power
that cannot be easily undermined or disregarded. The unjustly and
brutally imprisoned CUD’s leadership, for their considerable and
crushing victory over the TPLF in May 2005 election, is a living and
powerful example to get an important lesson. Secondly, there have been
generational interconnections between these two larger groups; it has
been both conflictual and harmonious, as it is the case of human
interactions. The history of any human society, even a small
homogeneous kin group, is full of past brutalities, killings and
enmities. Self-readings of the past should not become an obstacle for
current and future progresses. Thirdly, it is very difficult to find a
peaceful way for the Oromiffa speaking people to get out of Ethiopia.
It could be easier and possible to live together in peace, respect and
democracy rather than to suffer or perish together simply to wish for
break up. Political communities or human societies not necessarily need
a peaceful past to live together; rather they need more peaceful
present and common future: cultural identities and political identities
can be reconciled or co-exist.

The Amharic speaking elite also have to understand that the struggle
for ethnic rights or secession is not inherently undemocratic. In many
democratic countries such as Belgium, Canada, France, Great Britain,
India, Spain, USA the demands for ethnic rights or secession have been
treated democratically. ‘Secessionists are on TV and in newspaper,
and
compete freely for elected office’. And secessionist political
parties
often get substantial support in elections- 40 percent in Quebec; 30
percent in Scotland; 15 percent in Flanders, the Basque country or
Catalonia; and 5 percent in Puerto Rico’ (Will Kymlicka, ‘Emerging
Western Models of Multinational Federalism: Are they Relevant for
Africa?’, 2006:45). As, a distinguished scholar in the field of
ethnonationalism, Walker Connor, indicates, that minority nationalism
is a global phenomenon, it is:

“to be found in Africa (for example, Ethiopia), Asia (Sri Lanka),
Eastern Europe (Romania), Western Europe (France), North America
(Guatemala), South America (Guyana), and Oceania (New Zealand). The
list includes countries that are old (United Kingdom), as well as new
(Bangladesh), large (Indonesia), as well as small (Fiji), rich
(Canada), as well as poor (Pakistan), authoritarian (Sudan) as well as
democratic (Belgium), Marxist-Leninist (China) as well as militantly
anti-Marxist (Turkey). The list also includes countries which are
Buddhist (Burma), Christian (Spain), Moslem (Iran), Hindu (India) and
Judaic (Israel)”. (Walker Connor, ‘National Self-Determination and
Tomorrow’s Political Map’ 1999: 163-4)

Thus, democracy may induce or reduce a demand for secession. If it
creates an opportunity for fair representation and accommodation of
politically significant groups, it may discourage a demand for
secession, but there is no good evidence to claim that it would
completely reduce or destroy ethnonational movements. Democracy would
create an opportunity for all political groupings to compete for votes
of the people. As a result, the ethnonational movements can also have a
right to advance their political agenda in a democratic manner to
attract the votes of their assumed constituency. Thus, democracy can
create an opportunity or danger in multiethnic society in which
separatist ethnonational movements are politically visible.

In connection to the situation in Ethiopia, it is obvious that
ethnonational movements have been visible in country’s political
arena
since 1960s. No matter what we have labelled them, such as ‘narrow
movements’ or ‘liberation movements’; ‘enemies of Ethiopia’
or ‘assets
of Ethiopia’, ‘mercenaries’ or ‘genuine fighters’, the
ethnonational
movements have been a great irritation to the desire and project of a
unified and melting-pot Ethiopia.

Nonetheless, separatist and regional movements are not unique phenomena
that have happened only in Ethiopia; they are common political problems
in state structuring processes everywhere in our planet. As we
Ethiopians are part of this planet, ethnonational movements can also
occur in our country. Therefore, it is important to consider the
challenges rationally rather than to hide into some kind of a sacred or
spiritual destiny that advocates the immunity of Ethiopia from
ethnonationalist movements.

Ethnonationalist or liberation movements are part and parcel of the
problems of politics in Ethiopia, as it has been the case in some other
places; therefore they require a political solution. We may desire them
to vanish or we may want them to be destroyed by force or by whatever
metaphysical power, but the empirical evidences are trivial for success
of such desires.

Consequently, if we assume that democracy will be a best option to
tackle the major political problems in Ethiopia, thus the demands of
the ethnonational or liberation movements would also be addressed in a
democratic principle, in which the judge and jury would be the voices
and votes of the Ethiopian people. Democracy is a system in which rival
groups and hostile political philosophies and position would compete
for the vote of the people in a peaceful manner. As a result, the
ethnonational organisations such as ONC, OFDM, TAND, as well as the
liberation or secession movements such as OLF, ONLF in Ethiopia can
have a right to advocate their political programmes and compete for
votes. In a democracy, any individual or political organisation has a
right to advocate secession in a peaceful manner and to get elected, as
it has been the case in many democratic countries such as Canada, Great
Britain (Scotland), Spain, USA (Puerto Rico).

A democratic political system could bring an opportunity or danger for
the unity of Ethiopia. If the ethnonational and liberation movements
able to secure vast support and votes in a democratic election based on
their appeal for separatism and exclusive group rights, we may be
forced to accept the verdict of the people, as it is always very
difficult to determine in advance the outcome of a democratic election.
Are we envisioning such kind of democracy in Ethiopia? Or, are we
envisioning a different model of democracy in Ethiopia that will put
pre-conditions or restrictions on ethnonational and liberation
movements? Although there may be different variants of democratic
political systems, is there a consensus in Ethiopia among the major
political groupings, civil society groups, ethnic communities and
ordinary people regarding a democratic model that would be appropriate
and acceptable to the Ethiopian people. The answer to this question has
not been still determined and will not be also resolved so easily; it
is an awesome political challenge that has been confronting the
Ethiopian people.

The May 2005 election, however, signalled an important political
direction in Ethiopia. Although many prominent political organisations
like EPRP and OLF were excluded, the election reflected that a
pan-Ethiopia and non-ethnonational political organization, CUD gained
victory in major urban centers, including 100 percent victory in Addis
Ababa, and overwhelming majority votes in the Amhara region and Gurage
zone. Whereas, the ethnonational organizations within UEDF (such as
ONC, HNDO and SEPDC), gained victory in Hadiya and western Shoa, and
OFDM in Western Wellega area that reflect the ethnic background of the
organizations. To be more specific regarding CUD, firstly, from the
total of 140 national parliament seats of CUD’s ‘confirmed’
victory, 68
seats were in Amhara region (in towns and rural areas), 1 seat in
Benishangul (urban area), 2 in Dire Dawa city, 1 in Harar city, 20 in
Oromia (mainly in towns), and 25 seats in the SNNP (mainly in Gurage
zone and in other towns) and 23 in Addis Ababa. Secondly, from the
total of 139 electoral districts seats in which, CUD filed for
irregularities, 53 are in Amhara region (in towns and rural areas), 33
in Oromia (mainly in towns), 43 in the SNNP (mainly in towns), 8 in
Afar and 2 in Harar.

Thus, from the total of 279 electoral seats in which CUD would have won
(which could have made it a winning party at the federal government
level, but not necessarily in most of the regional states’
governments
level) 121 seats would be from Amhara region (which was 87 percent of
the regional state’s seats for the national parliament), 53 in Oromia
(which was only 19 percent of the region’s seats for the national
parliament), and 78 seats in the SNNP (which was 60 percent of the
region’s seat in the national parliament). This could have made CUD a
ruling party in the federal government, Addis Ababa administration,
Amhara regional states and Gurage zone in the SNNP region, but very
tiny minority party in the Oromia region and other regional states as
well. Thus, it would have been indispensable to seek an effective
participation of the larger regional state like Oromia to create a
stable and effective governance system in Ethiopia following the May
2005 Election.

An effective alliance between the Oromiffa speaking and Amharic
speaking people is a crucial condition, either to establish a
democratic governance arrangement in Ethiopia or to accelerate the
struggle against the tyranny of the minority TPLF rule. It is an
essential task to aim in producing a just and viable political order
that will protect individual and group rights, which are anchored on
principles of human rights and democracy within the context of an
integrated Ethiopia. It is essential to nurture a united Ethiopia that
aims to suppress hubris and uphold humility, promote respect and trust
while dissuading vengeances and pomposity, to produce a more accurate,
sensitive and all-encompassing national history. Neither a tiny
minority rule, a return to the past, secession, nor closed ethnic
homelands would be alternative arrangements for Ethiopia.