Ethiopia’s highest court, the Court of Cassation, this week passed a
ruling against Medrek’s legal bid for a re-run of the election in
unyielding words: “No substantial case for a re-run has been
presented.” The ruling put an end to Medrek’s 80-page petition, concurring in
almost exact words with an earlier ruling by the Supreme Court. This
being the end of the legal recourse (but not the constitutional and
political recourse), Medrek, rather to the surprise of its supporters,
did not even feign an outrage, but in line with its abruptly subdued
tone after the election, simply relayed the news to select
journalists.
Both the public and the international community received the news with
a prolonged yawn. No one expected a fair hearing. EPRDF, and more
specifically its principal extremist, Bereket Simon, whose mere
presence, let alone prolonged engagement, is a kiss of death on
democratic values (he headed a judges oversight body), has damaged the
integrity of the judiciary to such an extent that, according to a
study commissioned by the ECA (The African Governance Report 2—2009),
the UN offshoot in Addis, experts deem it more corrupt than the
Nigerian judiciary.
Eighty percent of judges, according to Western
diplomats in Addis, hail from the nation’s least prestigious law
school, that of the highly politicized Civil Service College.
Ultimately, the legal scuffle only served to reinforce a long
embedded — both locally and internationally — conviction about a judiciary
trusted only by the EPRDF.
There is no question now, two months after the farcical election
“results” were announced, that the opposition had faltered in its
response to a looming threat against its existence. A public outraged
by the election “result” had intuitively looked to it for leadership;
but in a moment of irksome hesitation, it failed to respond in the
prompt manner the situation had warranted. But hopefully, the final
decision by the Court of Cassation would now compel it to a new
beginning. The situation is redeemable; the people, though
disappointed, could be swayed — of course, all stringently within the
constitutional and peaceful enclosure.
But as the beleaguered opposition ventures to a future that is
tentative at best, it needs to ponder on two issues deeply: What
caused the moment of — still lingering — hesitation when its very
existence was under threat? And what could be learned from Lidetu
Ayalew’s political oblivion, a fate from which the EPRDF (its
Machiavellian benefactor) was unwilling — and unable — to save him
from?
The danger of political vacillation is exemplified no better than in a
recent event in the EPRDF. It is a narrative of how Meles Zenawi
triumphed over his rivals in the TPLF in the early 2000s. He was
virtually ousted from power after losing an internal debate over the
Technical Arrangement, a blueprint for ceasefire drawn by the
international community that ignored a fundamental Ethiopian demand:
restore status-quo-ante before engaging in formal negotiation with the
Eritrean government. At a low point for him, a group of African
leaders, who were in Addis for an annual AU heads of state gathering
openly queried “if a coup-detat had taken place in Ethiopia.” But even
his ardent rivals, who were by then convinced that he should be
removed, inauspiciously hesitated, calculating (wrongly, as we now
know) that they could remove him with no less ease after the war had
been fought and won. But the right moment to remove him elapsed, never
to return again, even though the war he was against had gone
Ethiopia’s way. A rare chance had been allowed to slip fortuitously.
(But in fairness, he too had a share in the victory. But that is another
story.) Having learned from his rivals’ mistake, Meles went on to
demolish them at the first opportunity.
Meles’ rivals are now valuable part of the opposition. Their
experience is instructive: in politics opportunity knocks only rarely.
It should be exploited at the first opening. This is why if the new
opportunity created by the ruling of the Court of Cassation is wasted,
a long dry spell would be inevitable — one that would threaten the
existence of the legal opposition.
The opposition has an exciting assortment of leaders. They are
educated, have experience, are well intentioned, and crucially, are
trusted by the people. The post-election paralysis could not
reasonably be attributed to the quality of leadership. The shortcoming
is rather in the lack of strategy. No one was prepared for 99.6% “win” by
the EPRDF. Its announcement triggered a confusion in which no one knew
where the opposition was going, what objectives were suddenly
reprioritized. It was a predictable reaction to a profound surprise.
Considered from this perspective, the opposition’s moment of
hesitation after the election “results” were announced is fathomable.
But two very long months have since passed. A new situation has
cropped up in the meantime, and its time to craft a new strategy that
will soberly define what the opposition’s response will be to the
outrage of the election “result.” On this strategy hangs the fate of
the legal opposition. This is an undertaking that will test the smarts
of the very best the opposition has; and all things considered, the
odds are in their favor to articulate a sagacious roadmap. But in
these difficult times, the deeply entrenched blame culture in
Ethiopian politics poses a particularly menacing threat to them. This
is a time when the focus should be on opportunities and not on
problems. Which way the opposition goes will be a reflection of the
strength of leadership. It must establish the potency to fight and
defeat the blame culture that has recurrently damaged the cohesion of
the opposition.
The Ethiopian public abhors weakness more than injustice. In this
respect, it is in tandem with a global trait; one that binds all
cultures. This is why so many people express preference for the EPRDF
over Lidetu Ayalew. Despite the cynical effort by Lidetu to spin his
apparent cowardice in 2005 i to a chronicle of an ideological rift
between an extremist and moderate leadership, his cowardly retreat
from an epic confrontation ensued in the full glare of the public and
has relegated him to political oblivion. Not only will this episode
haunt his future political career (to his credit, he still hasn’t
given up), but it will also dominate his legacy. The failure of the
EPRDF to prop him at a crucial juncture goes to show, in part, how
contemptuous it is of weakness and cowardice. ( But it hasn’t
abandoned him altogether. They expect him to be handy if the
opposition re-emerges strengthened.) EPRDF hates all things that is
not part of it, but its David and Goliath story when it fought the
Derg predisposes it to at least respect those who have the vigor to
stand up for their beliefs.
There is a fine line between recklessness and cowardice. It is not
beyond the power of opposition leaders to position the optimum balance
between the two poles. By finding that point, the ruling by the Court
of Cassation gives them an opportunity to lead from the center. They
should seize it.
