In his article, Dr. Messay asserts that the injustice of economic
exploitation and political oppression hardly explains the rise of this
revolutionary spirit. Instead, he attributes it to the therapeutic role
of
the ideals of the revolution in alleviating the mental anguish and the
pangs
of guilt experienced by Western educated Ethiopians. The feeling of
guilt is
again attributed to the mental conflict arising from the dual loyalty
of the
intellectuals to the traditional Ethiopian legacy on the one hand and
to
westernization on the other.
He arrives at this conclusion based on the highly subjective premise
that
reform and not a revolution resolves the deep contradictions of “a
society
that lies in ruins.” If, as Dr. Messay contends, the Ethiopian
“objective
conditions invited reforms rather than revolution”, one wonders then
what
objective conditions would call for a revolution. He fails to see that
the
opposite could also be the case. That is to say, extreme situations
could
also necessitate extreme measures for their resolution. For instance, a
malignant form of cancer requires the most toxic form of treatment and
not
the kind of softly-softly. Even if we assume the above assertion to be
valid
just for the sake of pursuing the argument, it does not follow from
this
that the process of westernization through the introduction of modern
education resulted in educated Ethiopians hating themselves for hating
their
traditional values. It is beyond the concern of this article to exhaust
all
the issues and shortcomings that come to my attention reading Dr.
Messay’s
article; and I, therefore, confine myself to a few points.
In the first place, the writer fails to present sufficient factual
information to prove that Ethiopians exposed to modern western
education
were scornful of their native values and beliefs to the extent that
they had
to suffer from a mental anguish which found relief in the act of
conversion
to Marxism. Instead of providing evidence, he resorts to extreme
generalizations like this one: “In short, the more modern Ethiopians
became
the higher the scorn for their own legacy soared.” On the contrary,
many
prominent scholars, artists and literary figures like the
multi-talented
Maitre Artiste Afework Tekle and the Honorable Haddis Alemayehu exalted
their tradition and culture in their works. The more they produced
works
anchored on Ethiopian traditional values, the higher their reputation
soared. The illustrious Lauret Tsegaye Gebre Medhin produces numerous
literary pieces that portray Ethiopianess impressively without at the
same
time being guilt-ridden for translating Othello and Romeo and Juliet
into
Amharic. Nor does he have any regrets for being a staunch literary
admirer
of Shakespeare. In addition, both revolutionary and reform-oriented
Ethiopians thought highly of traditional national heroes like Tewodros,
Belai Zelleke, and Takele Woldehawariat. It is obvious that cultural
conflict is inevitable in the encounter between the new and the old,
and the
modern and the traditional. One can imagine westernized Ethiopians
entertaining iconoclastic attitudes toward harmful customs and
traditional
values on the way of equality and progress without having to experience
a
sense of betrayal. In the absence of supporting facts, to reason that
going
through western education leads to a divided loyalty, then to guilty
conscience and eventually to the sudden appearance of revolutionaries
seems
rather far-fetched, to say the least.
Secondly, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, which Dr. Messay regards as
the
“most vulnerable in the process of acculturation” did not offer any
firm
resistance to modernization. In fact, the expansion of modern education
in
Ethiopia was carried out by the emperor in a period when the
relationship
between church and state was at its best. Furthermore, many radical
students
of the time had their preschool years in church schools. In
contradistinction to its Soviet Orthodox counterpart, the Ethiopian
Orthodox
Church has never been involved in any religious or ethnic pogroms and
nor
did it possess its own Rasputin, unless Abba Hanna could be considered
one.
Besides, apart from a few privileged clergymen in the capital city, the
majority of the clergy belonged to the working class population and
thus was
not viewed as a bastion of reaction. Considering all this, it is hard
to
imagine the intellectuals turning against the church and having their
faith
profoundly shaken, thereby leaving a vacuum ready to be filled by the
ideology Marxism-Leninism. The idea of equating communism with religion
is a
supposition cited so often that it has become a cliché – an old cliché
used
to shed a new light on Ethiopia’s past. The Marxist dictum that
“religion is
an opium of the people” is also mentioned to advance the point of view
of
the writer. Obviously, the dictum does not specifically apply to the
Ethiopian Orthodox Church or even to Christianity as such. According to
its
actual context, it is not Marxism that is supposed to substitute
religion,
but religion that soothingly substitutes the misery of destitution.
Pursuant to Dr. Messay’s example, I would like to make a similar
digression
concerning “those groups and individuals who became revolutionary
because of
their hatred to Ethiopia”. Although the reference is not explicit, one
can
guess who those anti-Ethiopian groups could be. In any case, they are
rightly excluded from Dr. Messay’s subject of analysis for their agenda
was
unlikely to be compatible with the genuine search to find a remedy for
Ethiopia’s ills. No wonder he finds them hard to fit into the main
theme of
his article, hence the misnomer revolutionaries. Such groups could
better be
described not as revolutionaries, but as camouflaged
pseudo-revolutionary
imposters. As far as the idea of good intentions is concerned, a
revolutionary entertaining hatred towards Ethiopia is a contradiction
in
terms. In this connection, Dr. Messay’s claim that ethnicity in
Ethiopian
politics is a “direct upshot of the revolutionary spirit” is another
example
of a gross generalization, which in this case is tantamount to
dignifying
ethnicists with the mantle of a grand cause. Is the current
‘ethnicization’
of the politics of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe also a
direct
upshot of a revolutionary spirit or was it an upshot of the
counter-revolutionary reform movement? Like that of the revolutionary
spirit, the genesis of ethnicity can be traced back to the misdeeds of
pseudo-revolutionaries and to external intervention by forces hostile
to
Ethiopia.
To go back to the issue in hand, in theory, a deep ambivalence towards
one’s
own identity and cultural values as well as the loss of faith in one’s
religious beliefs could set off a mental derangement or an urge to find
a
substitute set of beliefs. But, the point is, there are no compelling
facts
to show that, that was really the case in the Ethiopian context.
Among the contending theories to this effect is to be found in the
sociological construct of “rising expectations.” According to this
theory,
the desire of the underprivileged to be masters of their own destiny
increases as their standard of living gradually improves. It is not the
actual oppression or the awareness of being oppressed, but the
realization
of the unjust nature of the social order and the sanguinity of the
disadvantaged to break their chains that constitutes the basis of a
revolution. Once unshackled with the help and vanguard role of the
intellectuals, the people take their destiny into their own hands and
the
revolution owes its vigor to them.
In Ethiopia, the reforms introduced by Emperor Haile Selassie became
the
mainspring of a progress by way of the establishment of modern
bureaucracy,
education, health, infrastructure and a general improvement in standard
of
living. The more Ethiopia opened its doors to westernization, the more
became the cry for reform. These events attest to the relevance of the
theory of ‘rising expectations’ to the concrete situation in Ethiopia.
Considering the modest degree of progress achieved in the ’40 and ‘50s,
the
stagnation in the ‘60s and early ‘70s could not have been sufficient
enough
to be a motivation for a revolution. This is because it is relative
deprivation or the sense of having less than others and not absolute
deprivation that bears the potential for social transformation. With
urbanization and more contact with the outside world, new ideas and a
new
consciousness began to lay bare the contradictions in the Ethiopian
society
including the anachronism of the monarchy itself. The improvement in
absolute standards of living and Ethiopia’s status as the seat of the
OAU
contributed to the sense of relative deprivation instead of to a
relative
contentment. The position of Ethiopia in contrast to the emergent newly
independent African states in the 1960s brought more resentment and
more
craving for a democratic republic.
It is undeniable that the unconsummated revolution of 1974 was a
popular
movement initiated and spearheaded by students and other intellectuals
up to
a point. Contrary to Dr. Messay’s contention, westernization did not
trigger
feelings of guilt but feelings of indignation at the discrepancy of
living
conditions between that of the haves and the have-nots. Imbued with a
desire
and a mission to improve the living conditions of all Ethiopians, the
educated section of the population sought and found a means to action
in the
theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism. The realization of finding
oneself
being more deprived than others was accompanied by the vision and hope
of a
better life to come. The awareness of the injustice of the wretched
life of
the urban poor, the peasantry and serfs coupled with the prospect of
living
in luxury like the urban rich and the absentee landlords were both
inculcated into the minds of the people through the efforts of the
students
and intellectuals. The people were assured that the socialist system
would
guarantee them the fulfillment of their aspiration for equality and
prosperity. Once this expectation took hold of the masses through
political
contagion, the prognosis was for a revolution to take place unhindered.
The radicalism of Ethiopian intellectuals was not a mere domestic
phenomenon. The Ethiopian student movement was influenced by
international
events of the time. The whole period was characterized by political,
social,
and cultural movements in all their manifestations. It was during this
period that the student revolt of 1968 nearly brought about regime
change in
France. In short, one can conclude that the genesis of the
revolutionary
spirit in Ethiopia and the enthusiasm and fascination of Ethiopia’s
intellectuals and students with the ideology of communism can partially
find
its explanation in the international revolutionary spirit and the wind
of
change outside the country’s boundaries. The rising expectations of a
promise of a bright future for the have-nots was also reinforced by the
bombardment of a mixture of propaganda and truth concerning the
economic
achievements of once backward nations like socialist China and Cuba.
To conclude, Dr. Messay Kebede seems to assign great significance to
his
concept of “guilt and atonement” perhaps merely for its novelty. During
the
period in question, the only sense of guilt of that generation
generated
from the feeling of inadequacy in making even more daring sacrifices.
Now,
this same generation suffers from guilt if not remorse for having gone
to
excesses in its past sacrifices. Still many members of that generation
are
conscience-stricken for having survived and making it until today while
thousands perished. There is no one single factor to account for the
origin
or genesis of revolutions in general or the revolutionary spirit in
Ethiopia
in particular. An eclectic approach is the best choice here. I know
this
wouldn’t slip Dr. Messay’s mind if he had not chosen to stick to a
single
approach due to space constraints. Be that as it may, I genuinely
appreciate
Dr. Messay’s willingness and effort to address the issue of dealing
with our
past. I also applaud his endeavour to break the stoic political
insouciance
on the part of many Ethiopian intellectuals and his nationwide call to
bring
an end to the supercilious elitism exhibited by those currently engaged
in politics.
