Meles Zenawi was elected from a district from which he has never lived
for the last 30 years. It is clear that he has no legitimacy even from
his own electoral district. However, the 1995 constitution in Ethiopia
has made him a vicious emperor whose brutality has been ubiquitous, not
only throughout the nation, but also expanding to the neighbouring
countries. The constitution was drafted and ratified by a total control
of Meles zenawi’s party. Thus, it makes the power of the prime
minister
unrestrained or unchecked by the executive, legislative, judiciary and
other federal or regional institutions in Ethiopia.

According to the 1995 constitution, the power of the prime minister is
unprecedented: he controls the armed force; the executive is totally
accountable to him; he is a head of a party that has a majority in the
legislative (90 percent majority from 1991 to 2005 and two-third
majority since May 2005). The constitution (Article 74) gives him a
full power to select and recommend the appointment of commissioners,
the president and vice-president of the federal supreme court and the
auditor general. He has a significant power in influencing the
judiciary and other important institutions that should be vital for
checks and balances in the federal systems. Moreover, since the
president and vice-president of the federal supreme court are serving
as a president and vice-president respectively in the council of
constitutional inquiry that have powers to investigate constitutional
disputes. Thus, the prime minister has also a greater influence to
affect the functions of constitutional inquiry. The president of the
supreme court serves also as a chairperson of the national electoral
commission.

The court system is structured in a very susceptible manner to the
interference of the executive branch as the prime minister and his
majority party in the parliament is responsible for the appointments of
judges. All the powers allocated to the parliament are indirectly
allocated to the prime minister, as the prime minister is the head of
the majority party in the parliament. Thus, the parliament (the
legislative) is simply a rubber-stump to the executive body.
Constitutionally, a majority party in the parliament always belongs to
the prime minister and therefore it is expected to endorse the prime
minister’s selections of key public offices.

Although the constitution declares that judges should exercise their
functions in full independence and should be directed solely by the
law, the Judicial Administration Council, which has a power to remove
judges due to violation of disciplinary rules or on grounds of gross
incompetence or inefficiency, is accountable to the ruling party as its
decision to remove a judge should be approved by a majority vote in the
parliament that is dominated by the ruling party (Article 79).

The prime minister also has a tremendous influence in the operation of
the Judicial Administration Council, because the Council is operating
within the federal government’s executive structure. The Council has
responsibilities to assess and determine code of professional conduct
and discipline as well as transfer of judges of any court. Besides,
concerning appointment of other federal judges, the federal Judicial
Administrative Council has a responsibility to select candidates that
should be acceptable to the prime minister (Article 81). Hence,
cumulatively, all key judicial powers in the country are at the mercy
of the prime minister.

More critically, the Ethiopian federal project suffers from the absence
of an independent constitutional interpretation procedure. The
constitution states that the house of federation (HF) has the power to
interpret the Constitution (Article 62, 1), but the HF is a political
institution as its members are elected or appointed from elected party
members, besides its members are strongly connected to and influenced
by the winner party in the government. As a result, the power to
interpret the constitution can certainly fall down into the ruling
party.

In addition, the Council of Constitutional Inquiry that was given
powers to investigate constitutional disputes would be organized by the
HF and also expected to submit its recommendations to the HF. Making
the matter worse the president and the vice-president of the federal
supreme court would become a president and vice-president of the
Council respectively. As argued above, the prime minister has a
tremendous power in the appointment of the presidents of the federal
supreme court, thus he can get a direct influence in the operation of
the Council of Constitutional Inquiry that could undermine its
independence and impartiality.

The constitution does not put limit on the term of the prime minister,
who has much power, but a term limit was placed on the post of a
president, who has only a ceremonial power (Article 70). This is a very
intriguing and deceptive constitutionally decree; in principle a term
limit should be made on the tenure of the executive in order to
discourage a tendency of autocracy and power abuse by the power holder
due to a longer tenure in power. But in the Ethiopia case the tenure of
the executive (the great power holder) has been made infinite whereas
the term limit was made on the non-executive, non-powerful and very
ceremonial president. It should have been the other way round, if the
purpose is it to limit abuse of power by the power holder. That it the
essence of introducing term limit in political office.

Although democratic and human rights are unconditionally promised in
the constitution, there is little tolerance for alternative views and
dissents. The constitution declares that courts shall be independent
and judges shall ‘exercise their function in full independence’ and
protected from unduly removal, but there are abundant cases that judges
were removed for political reasons. It is one thing to put provisions
in the constitution and another to genuinely pursue them. The
constitutional provisions are simply an attempt to secure political
hegemony of the TPLF through a veneer of democracy. As Harbeson (1998)
indicates that since 1991 Ethiopia has acquired virtually all the forms
of democracy but little of its substance.

The constitutional defect was inherited from the defect of the
transitional charter which was exclusively authored by TPLF/EPRDF
without a genuine and free participation of the Ethiopian people. It
was produced in greatly flaw process, but became a code of conduct for
drafting of the constitution. The 1995 constitution was ratified by the
constitutional assembly, which was composed of undemocratically
selected individuals, in which TPLF/EPRDF controlled almost 95 % of the
members. The oppositions and all major civil society organisations
boycotted the election. The overall process, starting from assigning
the constitutional commission to electing the constitutional assembly
and ratifying the constitution was absolutely dominated by the ruling
party.

Thus, the 1995 constitution in Ethiopia has become the document of the
ruling party and its affiliated associations. It was an imposed
‘federal covenant’ on the Ethiopian people without their genuine
participation and consent. It only reflects the ideology and wishes of
the TPLF-led EPRDF. It was implemented in a manner completely dominated
by a power at the center in collaboration with the co-opted elites at
central, regional as well as local levels. The 1995 constitution shows
either mere intentions or a cover for deception. It is purely a façade
that masked an authoritarian regime. It is simply a caricature for
misinformation and perversion.

To conclude, I will cite from John Young, a close examiner of Ethiopian
politics and, perhaps, initially sympathetic to the TPLF, who states:
‘Constitutional making under the EPRDF has little in common with the
bargaining, trade-offs, and compromises that usually typify such
process; rather it reflects the weakness of the country’s democratic
institutions, the political objectives of the governing party, and its
position of dominance with a state where serious opposition had been
crushed or marginalized (Young 1998).

So, what is a crime in opposing a constitution that makes a prime
minister a monster and his rule a brutal autocracy?

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