Only the next day, a Saturday, did people take time to reflect on the
people who had succeeded him.
Public opinion immediately diverged sharply on whether Egypt’s new
rulers bode well for the nation’s democratic aspiration. And no where
were these differences more pointed than in Tahrir Square, where tens
of thousands of youthful protesters had camped for eighteen days to
bring democracy to their country.
“Time to go home,” thousands chanted passionately in compliance with
the new regime’s appeal for protesters to decamp from the square in a
symbolic gesture to a return to normalcy.
“No! The revolution has only begun,” roared back thousands of others.
There is more to our cause than the departure of Mubarak, they argued.
To understand their wariness, meet Egypt’s new rulers: Field Marshal
Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, the defense Minister; Lt. General Sami Hafez
Enan, the military chief of staff; Vice Admiral Mohab Mamish,
Commander of the navy; Air Marshal Rada Mahomed Hafez Mohame,
Commander of the Air force; and Lt. General Abd El Aziziz Seif-Eideen,
Commander of the Air Defense.
As Chairperson of the council, Field Marshal Tantawi is now head of
state. Trained by the Soviets when Gamal Abdul Nasser was in power in
the mid-’50s, Tantawi was commissioned as an officer in 1956, the year
in which Egypt and Israel waged the second of the four wars they
fought between the late ’40s and early ’70s.
Neither his role as a sub-lieutenant in this war, nor in the next two,
in 1967 and 1973, have earned him the particular respect of peers. And
that most probably is what had made him an ideal Defense Minister for
two-thirds of Mubarak’s 30 years’ reign.
A leaked Wikileaks 2008 US embassy cable described Tantawi as “focused
on regime stability and maintenance of the status-quo, who simply does
not have the energy, inclination (for change).”
Both Tantawi’s and the council’s establishment credentials were
evident in their first post-revolution statement in which they praised
Mubarak for “resigning in the interests of the nation.” ( In actual
fact, it took a revolution to dislodge him.)
Not exactly the sentiment of the young revolutionaries who had made
history in the streets of Egypt’s cities.
So does this mean that the celebrations were premature? Should we
conclude that people power has , after all, been subverted as it once
was in Ethiopia in the mid-70s? Or, perhaps, should we at least
suspect that the outcome of the Egyptian revolution is hanging in the
balance?
And most importantly, is the specter of a disingenuous military
government the most likely outcome of a successful people power
revolution in Ethiopia, as is privately, persistently and
disparagingly predicted by senior EPRDF officials?
But consider that the Egyptian military council has already dissolved
parliament, which is widely ridiculed as illegitimate; suspended the
Constitution, which broadly restricts Presidential candidates; and
promised to hold Egypt’s first real multi-party elections within six
months, despite, to put it somewhat mildly, its less than
revolutionary roots, and it becomes all to evident that the military
brass are not dictating the pace or course of change.
By contrast, Ethiopia’s military council, the Derg, which assumed
power in September 1974, had boldly outlawed all opposition to its
policies, deeming it a capital punishment offense, on the very day it
dethroned Haile-Sellasie.
Right or wrong, the Derg had moral clarity, a sense of mission. This
afforded it with the critical will to rule, even if only by brute
force.
Not so Egypt’s new military rulers. Unlike the Derg, they have to
contend with an assertive Council of Trustees, a broad coalition of
protest organizers, which has been entrusted with the defense of the
revolution. The moral clarity lies with the youthful Trustees not the
old men of the military. And with the absence of clarity of purpose,
any chance of the military emerging as a coherent political force is
at best minimal.
The Egyptian revolution is in no danger of being subverted, at least
not yet. The military will not pose real danger as long as it is
incapable of tendering a credible alternative to the broad tenets of
the people power revolution. This would have been possible in the
bipolar world of the past, but we now live in an age of diminished
ideological ambiguities, where, in light of recent events in the Arab
world, even Samuel Huntington’s well argued “clash of civilizations”
is losing relevance. Democracy, as it is generally understood in the
West, is really becoming the only way.
In the event that Ethiopian protests break out and eventuate in a
temporary military takeover, as has happened in Egypt, the Ethiopian
military will be in no different position than its Egyptian
counterpart.
Unlike the Derg, whose suicidal exclusion of senior officers mostly
explains its blunders and cataclysmic end, a new military government
in Ethiopia will most probably be led by its most senior officers.
This suggests that it will most probably be instinctively conservative
not wildly radical, less prone to impulsiveness, and thus more
predisposed to the sentiments and visions of the center.
Significantly, whether led by senior, middle or lower ranking
officers, it will be in no position to offer a compelling raison
d’être to explain a sustained presence in politics let alone a
monopoly. Absent this crucial world-view, it will be devoid of the
internal consensus and political momentum which had once made military
governments possible not only in Africa, Latin America and Asia, but
also in Europe — Spain, Portugal and Greece. It will really be a
transitional government.
No people power revolution has been possible without co-opting the
military. Only the confidence that its welfare will not be damaged
drastically will convince it to tip the balance of power in favor of
change. This has been the dominant experience in other countries so
far, and if things move in similar direction in Ethiopia, it is highly
unlikely that a new precedent will be set at the expense of the
military.
Nor is it desirable. In context of the dangerous neighborhood that the
horn of Africa is, the carry-over of the military with its command
structure largely intact is an imperative that the nation cannot do
without, even if only briefly. The experience of the late 70s
militates against it. And this time, the nation may not be able to
return from the abyss.
The interests of the military coincides more with the public than it
does with the EPRDF. Nothing, including the top brass’ thoroughly
EPRDF origins, precludes the presence of a pragmatic leadership
capable of recognizing where its real interests rest.
And this is exactly where hope for both the people and the military lie.
(END)
Memo to the Diaspora
Thanks to your relentless efforts social media is fast emerging as a
potent political medium in Ethiopia. Posting of articles on your
facebook pages is energizing thousands and demoralizing
authoritarians.
