Growing Muslim activism and the Ethiopian state: Accommodation or repression?

Various narratives are being presented to explain the
growing standoff between Muslim activists and the current Ethiopian regime. The
activists accuse the state of discrimination and meddling in the internal activities
of their faith by imposing an imported religious doctrine. The state blames the
conflicts on ‘radicalization’ and a covert agitation by foreign-based elements.
The regime is also accusing the opposition parties of exploiting religion for their
political gains. The opposition attributes the rising tension to the regime’s
use of religion as part of its divide and rule tactics.

Setting aside the question of which narrative is more
plausible, I think there is an even more important question;  what explains the growing political
consciousness and activism of Muslim society today—a  development that internal and external
political entrepreneurs are competing to frame for its use within their own
strategic objectives. 

There are four possible factors that can help us
understand this phenomenon. First, the Ethiopian Muslims have been experiencing
socioeconomic changes that necessitated increased participation and greater
political representation.  Second,
Islamic revivalism has been intensified in the last two decades.  Third, the state has made little or no
adjustment to its institutional composition and modus operandi to accommodate
these changes. Fourth, the policies and tactics of the current regime have
resulted in the weakening of the autonomy of Islamic institutions, and consequently
generating negative reactions from Muslim society towards the state.

The consequence of the interaction between these factors
is a widespread religious awakening and heightening of political consciousness.
I will briefly discuss each of these four factors.

Low participation and under-representation of Muslims in
Ethiopian politics

Historically, despite religious persecution and state-sanctioned
discrimination Islam was rarely used as an ideology or identity for political
mobilization. In other words, Muslims had minimal participation in the politics
of the Ethiopian state.  Today despite
making up half of the country’s population, Muslims are acutely
underrepresented within the Ethiopian political elite. There are three possible
explanations for this:

Starting in the 16th century, ethnicity replaced
religious identity as a center of mobilization and confrontation.  First, after the rise of the Oromo as one of the
three major players at the center of the Christian Kingdom—  at the end of the epic wars between the
Christian Kingdom and the Muslim Sultanates—conflicts were waged mostly across
ethnic lines. Second, having peacefully and slowly expanded into most areas of
the country, Islam was incorporated into the existing norms and institutions in
the process becoming a subset of the preexisting culture rather than displacing
it as a dominant identity.  Third, the
abandonment of forced conversion during the later stages of the Southern
conquest also meant that ethnic culture rather than religious identity was a
target of assimilation during Imperial consolidation. In response, resistance
against the state and the dominant society was conducted through ethnic rather
than religious mobilization.  While the
emperors utilized the church to unify their forces and legitimize their
objectives, the fact that Islam cuts across the conquered ethnic and/or
regional groups meant that they had to de-emphasize religious differences in
order to keep intra-ethnic solidarity and cohesion. Therefore, even grievances
born out of religion-specific discrimination were channeled through ethnic
mobilization reducing the possibility of faith-based activism.

The types of economic activities, particularly trade and
pastoralism that the majority of Muslims were engaged in did not cause them to
be in conflict with the state. In urban areas and in the North, Muslims were
generally engaged in trade. As trade was not a preferred occupation for the
politically privileged groups, Muslims did fairly well with less competition.
In other words, for Muslims, trade served as a less costly alternative for
upward mobility and removed the need to seek political affiliation from a state
traditionally identified with another religion.

Similarly, pastoralists led a mobile life far away from
the center of political power the emerging state lacked the  ability to directly control and extract their
resources, and thus chose to rely on ‘voluntary’ tribute by local leaders in
exchange for maintaining the leaders’ autonomy. This arrangement reduced the
possibility of friction and conflict with the dominant society that normally
extracted the resources directly for the state by settling among the conquered
people.  Generally, in imperial Ethiopia,
Muslim elites neither demanded nor were they welcomed for participation in the
political class. A lasting consequence of this predicament for the Muslim societies
is that the traders did not see the importance of education while pastoralists
lacked the opportunity for it.

c)  In the second
half of the 20th century, despite rising grievances and potentially favorable
external conditions, religious-based mobilization did not take hold due to the
progressive and nationalist politics that engulfed the country. The Leftist’s
endorsement of the demand and eventual success of separating religion and the
state removed what at the time was the main source of grievance for Muslims. That
is, by legitimizing their demand and standing with them in solidarity,
progressives minimized the need for a totally separate Muslim resistance. In a
similar fashion, nationalist movements (Oromo, Eritrea, Tigray) fighting on
behalf of constituencies, all of which contained adherents of multiple faiths,
actively worked to prevent the politicization of religion by promoting
interfaith tolerance and emphasizing ethnocultural similarities.  In other words, by choosing to accommodate
rather than suppress religious identities, grievances and sentiments, the leftist
and nationalist movements allowed Muslims to frame their objectives within
secular political movements.

Generally, the displacement of Islam by ethnicity  and the containment of Muslim grievances by
progressivism and nationalism resulted in less mobilization of the Muslim
society in terms of religious identity. 
However, while ‘containment’ allowed for their grievances to be
incrementally, indirectly and less contentiously addressed, it also resulted in
lower participation and exclusion from political life.  

II.  Transformation
of the Muslim society

The social, political, and economic changes that have taken
place in the last few decades have been gradually transforming the Muslim
society. Some of these changes include:

Today, trade is no longer a Muslim domain. Following land
redistribution in 1975, previous landlords and aristocrats moved to trade
increasing competition. After the downfall of the military junta, tens of
thousands of Tigrean soldiers were demobilized, given start-up funding and sent
to do business, further crowding the market.  With the establishment of party-owned
oligarchies that have monopolized the most lucrative sectors, small and
mid-level businessmen, particularly in traditionally Muslim controlled
commodities such as coffee, are being squeezed out. Thus, trade is no longer a
promising career path for the new generation of Muslims.

Furthermore, climate change is making pastoralism an
increasingly difficult lifestyle.  As
chronic drought continues to wipe out their cattle, pastoralists are forced to
abandon their old occupation.  
Therefore, as the economic activities that sustained their parents are
fast depleting, the emerging Muslim generation has been forced to look for
alternative career paths towards upward mobility. In a country where some 80%
of the wage-earning jobs are provided by the state, the best available option
is to seek government employment. Since modernization has made education a
requirement for such jobs, Muslim parents are sending their children to school
as never before. As thousands of these youth graduate from training programs
and higher academic institutions, they expect and demand the government to
provide them with employment opportunities. The inability and/or unwillingness
of the government to fulfill these expectations and address the demands are one
of the key factors behind the increased Muslim activism we are observing.

In the last few decades Islam in Ethiopia, like
elsewhere, has been undergoing revivalism—growth of spiritual interest and
renewal of religious teachings. This revivalism has been intensified
particularly in the last two decades.  
After 17 years of anti-religious propaganda and centralized control of
society by the military junta, the partial democratization and decentralization
that took place since 1991 has increased both the demand for and supply of
religion. The relative relaxation of press freedom allowed for the translation,
publication and distribution of religious texts in various vernaculars. The
rapid improvement in literacy rate has catalyzed people to look for and absorb
these literatures. Development of transportation infrastructure, improvement in
telecommunications, the ever-growing rural-urban migration, availability of
cheaper and compact stereos, and most recently, social media, have all allowed
for greater availability and dissemination of information. The result has been
a widespread religious awakening.

 As religious revivalism often involves
struggle between traditionalists and modernists, there has been extensive
debate among Muslim religious leaders that at times split the faithful into
competing groups. It is quite impressive that, while incidents of isolated
confrontations were observed during earlier stages, with time, both sides have
matured and developed a more sophisticated campaign strategy and ensured the
peaceful progress of this revivalism.

This simultaneous evolution of the socioeconomic
transformation of the Muslim society and revivalism of their religion has
increased their social dynamism, leading some to misconceive or misrepresent
the two parallel evolutions as a single phenomenon and call it
‘radicalization’.

The Stagnant State

While the Muslim society has undergone these
transformational changes, the state has made little institutional adjustment to
accommodate them:

a)  Decentralization
and federalism have enabled the emerging ruling party affiliated elites of the
previously marginalized groups to benefit from state resources while
administering to their population. However, the absence of real power sharing
at the center has restricted their upward mobility and has ‘frozen’ them to
their regional, zonal and district positions. Beyond a few individuals holding
a symbolic ministerial portfolio, there is insignificant Muslim presence in the
central administrative apparatus and political structure. Thus, while the lower
level state structure has been directly affected and relatively responsive to
the ongoing changes of the Muslim society, the central government has been
largely insulated and made little adjustment to accommodate it.

b)  Furthermore, the unchanging state
identity is one of the remaining obstacles that keeps Muslims feeling as if
they are strangers in their own home. Despite symbolic equality and greater
government tolerance towards religious communities, the identity of the
Ethiopian state, both its symbols and composition, remains closely attached to
Christianity.  To see this one only needs
to visit the embassies and ministries. Such ‘exclusive’ state identity hinders
the incorporation of the emerging Muslim youth. These fruits of an educated,
ambitious and identity-conscious generation perceive such conditions uninviting
and unwelcoming; consequently, they often turn away. Having no alternative
means of survival like their parents, they are forced to come back and are
knocking on the door in order to change the circumstances.

IV Aggravating State Policies

a) When the current regime took over the state, the most
serious threat to its power was from Oromo nationalism. From its inception the
Oromo movement has accommodated, courted and secured support from religious
leaders, particularly Muslims and Evangelical Christians. Therefore in order to
weaken this grassroot support among Muslims, the regime exploited the
preexisting but salient difference between traditionalist and revivalist
religious leaders. The rivalry that was exacerbated by the state’s intervention
is one of the causes for the alleged ‘tension’, which it is supposedly now
trying to contain.

b) Just like it did with the Orthodox Church, the
Ethiopian regime took control of and used the Islamic institutions for its own
political purposes.  The consequence is
that some religious leaders came to act as state agents and institutions began
working as if they were extensions of the state. By so doing, they lost legitimacy
and credibility in the eyes of the faithful, allowing for alternative
leadership and informal institutions to emerge.

c) In the last decade the discourse of the Ethiopian
state has swung to the right. In response to international changes that brought
potential strategic gains and domestic developments that posed threats to its
power, the originally Marxist regime adopted a right wing narrative. Always
quick to make short-term political gain regardless of its long-term
consequences, Meles jumped on the band wagon of the “Global War on
Terror”.  To achieve this objective the
regime resuscitated the strategic narrative of its predecessors that presented
Ethiopia as a country surrounded by Islamic threat—a therefore easily
recognizable to and a naturally ally of the West.  This was followed by attempts to impose some
unnecessary restrictions (such as banning of hijab and prayer in schools),
harassment of men with long beards, and utterance of offensive terms by senior
government officials.  These actions and
narratives that targeted Muslims revived the suppressed painful memories of
religious persecution, creating greater consciousness among Muslims.  The invasion of Somalia under the false
pretext of ‘neutralizing the Islamic threat’, and the accompanying rhetoric was
deeply offensive to many. The regime’s harassment of Muslim activists, based on
unfounded allegations of being part of some faceless militant group, and also
attributing the widespread resistance against the imported sect to manipulation
by “international terrorists and foreign money”, stand to empower hardliners
while weakening moderates.

Similarly, following the resurrection of the Ethiopian
right during the 2005 election, the regime has been shifting further   in an
attempt to be the loudest to proclaim the mantra of Ethiopian nationalism. The
propaganda of ‘renaissance’ that was launched during the ‘millennium’
extravaganza has been stepped up with recent hysteria over Abbay Dam.
Therefore, the old slogan of transforming and building a new Ethiopia is
replaced with reviving and reclaiming the glorious past. Since the historically
marginalized segments of the population, including Muslims, have a less rosy
interpretation of that past, the narratives being pushed by the state are
hopelessly familiar in their message to them. At a time when recognition of
past injustice is needed, this reactionary move of ‘othering’ Muslims and securitizing their demands has exacerbated
the sense of exclusion felt by Muslims, and consequently catalyzed Muslim
activism.

Void in political leadership and intellectual guidance

The increased activism of religious communities—both
Islamic and Christian—is taking place while there is complete a lack of serious
discourse among political leaders and academics. As part of their strategy of
containing religious politicization, political leaders developed an attitude of
negligence or excessive sensitivity towards religious discourse. The consequence
is that politicians and scholars consider commentary and research on religion,
and particularly Islam, to be a politically risky business. The global events
that followed 9/11 have exacerbated this fear. As a result, we have Muslim
political elites with little connection with their community and few Muslim
scholars who follow up, research and write on the socioeconomic and political
developments of their community. Today, some people point to certain high
ranking government officials and ruling party leaders  who are Muslims. But few Muslim youth
recognize them as Muslim leaders because, having little connection with the
community, they neither understand nor show visible concern for the aspirations
and views of their community. This is not to suggest that these national
leaders should advocate sectarian interest. The point is that had they been rooted
in their community, they would be able to provide more accurate feedback to the
state and also have the legitimacy needed to more efficiently communicate government
policies to the public.

The situation is no better in the opposition camp.
Perhaps with the exception of the nationalist movements spearheading a
multi-religious constituency, Muslim participation and representation in
opposition politics is almost nonexistent. 
In the past to keep internal cohesion, and in the post 9/11 world to
avoid their organizations being labeled ‘terrorist’, nationalists desperately
try to avoid any mention of Islam. The almost complete absence of Muslims
within the leadership and opinion makers of the ‘centrist’ forces have made these
political parties vulnerable to ignorance and negligence of the grievances,
interest, perspectives and feelings of the Muslim community. Consequently they
are prone to using narratives that alienate and push away, rather than attract,
Muslim support and participation.

When political elites and organizations neglect to follow
and fail to understand the concerns, aspirations and grievances of  a particular religious communities, the
political class would not able to develop proper policy responses to crisis.
Then the leadership void will inevitably be filled by religious activists who
would double both as spiritual and political leaders—that is a serious threat
to secular politic, situation that a multi-faith society cannot afford.

The same applies to the intellectual class. In Ethiopian
studies, Islam and Muslim society has been so poorly studied. It is astonishing
that in the 20^th century only two books were published. After J.S
Trimingham’s “Islam in Ethiopia”, it took another half-a-century for another
major work to be produced. This second book was Hussein Ahmed’s “ Islam in
Nineteenth-century Wello” . Apart from these, there are only few other books,
plus  some articles and  chapters  that directly deal with the subject.  This is in part due to historical factors
mentioned above, the country produced very few Muslim scholars. Even among
those small numbers, with the exception of Hussein Ahmed (who sadly passed away
in 2009), few Muslim scholars have produced thorough, academic literature on
the affairs of Muslim society. Despite expanding educational opportunities, the
trend seems to be similar among the emerging academics that continue either the
path of avoidance or the focus only on theological aspects. In the absence of
serious scholarship, knowledge is being produced and disseminated by highly
passionate activists who publish uncritical and reactionary pamphlets that
agitate rather than educate the society. There is an urgent need for Muslim and
non-Muslim intellectuals to undertake rigorous research and engage the public.
Continued negligence could have grave consequences.

Misguided interference

Having failed to introduce structural changes to
accommodate the changing Muslim society, having used shortsighted tactics that
weakened the age-old Islamic institutions that facilitated coexistence, having
attempted to impose unnecessary restrictions that offended the Muslim
community, the regime is now trying to use another dangerous strategy that is
supposed to ‘moderate’ Islam. Granted religious moderation is a vital state
interest,  such moderation ought to be
engineered from within rather than being imposed externally. The regime,
however, has apparently imported a foreign religious sect to provide ‘training’
for Ethiopian imams on “moderation”.

There are several fundamental problems with this. First,
the state has no business choosing and imposing a particular  doctrine onto a given religious
community.  It is the most flagrant form
of violating the principle of separation of state and religion.  Second, such attempt at a top-down
re-indoctrination of a religious community is a poorly conceived strategic
blunder. Any society by nature is suspicious of external interference, and even
more so are religious communities that viciously guard themselves against
influence by outside doctrines. Thus, it should not be a surprise that the
Muslim community perceived state sponsorship of an alien sect to undertake such
coercive and blunt re-indoctrination, as an attempt at forced conversion.
Third, the government also relied on a wrong assumption that led it to adopt
this misguided strategy. Having successfully taken control of the Orthodox
Church by replacing or coopting the top leadership, the regime seems to think
it could do the same through Islamic Affairs Supreme Council.

Unlike Christianity, particularly Orthodox and
Catholicism, which have centralized institutions and hierarchical leadership
that exercises strong control over followers, Islam is a decentralized religion
in which every mosque and religious leader functions as an autonomous entity
and agency. Mosques are usually constructed by each community; imams are
members of the local population who volunteer their service and rarely draw
salary.  Muslim clerics are rarely
centrally ordained or appointed.  The
religious teachers (who might not necessarily be the same person as the imams)
attract students  based on their intellectual
fame, and their centers are sustained through local support. Therefore, there
is minimal networking among mosques, little outside and top-down control over
the content of what a religious scholar teaches, what an imam preaches or how a
specific mosque functions. There has not been much change to this nature of
Ethiopian Islam even after the institutionalization of the Supreme Council with
the aim of providing centralized representation and service. While the
revivalist movement has introduced some formalized training institutions that
have allowed improved standardization of teaching content and methodology, it
has not been able to bring about centralized and coordinated structure because
localities vehemently defend their autonomy.

Therefore Ethiopian Muslims are organized through highly
decentralized and autonomous structures that prevent changes to be effectively
introduced from the top.  That is why the
struggle between traditionalists and revivalists has been fought over control
of mosques rather than the central institutions. The government seems to have
missed this important fact in devising its strategy; consequently the ploy has
blown up in its face.

Conclusion: From Mispresentation to Accommodation

Islam and Muslim society in Ethiopia are experiencing
critical socioeconomic and spiritual transformations. Such transformation would
undoubtedly cause societal stress. Given the global climate today, such stress
would obviously cause nervousness and concern among internal and external  stakeholders –and rightly so. However, instead
of nervously rushing towards finding a short-term fix, long-range , constructive
and accommodative  response is needed.
The starting point in such an approach is to produce more accurate, detailed
and deeper knowledge about the socioeconomic and spiritual nature of the
Ethiopian Muslim society.

One thing that the Ethiopian state and political elites
must stop is deliberate mispresentation of  this Muslim activism.  As I have attempted to show in this article, while
the ongoing Islamic revivalism is part of and affected by global events, the
actors, motives and causes are domestic. As a recent, in depth research on
“Religious Change among Oromo Muslims in Bale” by Terje Østebø  has demonstrated, an unbiased and careful
observer can easily understand that the nature, content and direction of  this decades- old revivalism has been largely
caused, shaped and constrained by existing domestic conditions.  Similarly, while Ethiopian Muslims do show
solidarity with their global fellows on spiritual matters, their socioeconomic
grievances and political demands are directed towards the Ethiopian state.   Therefore, mispresenting these facts, for
short term tactical gains, will not only hinder the search for accommodative mechanisms,
but also exacerbate existing tension.

In the past, Muslim aspirations were for religious
equality and freedom. The present generation demands inclusion, representation
and full participation, and the ongoing nationwide resistance is against state
interference.  In general Ethiopian
Muslims want to see and struggle to achieve incorporation of their interest,
perspectives and aspiration in the  
policy formulations, narratives and symbols of the state. And these are
hardly typical demands of a religious movement; but rather that of a secular
and democratic social movement that exclusively relies on nonviolent
resistance. This Muslims activism is conducted within the country’s boarders,
directed at and expects response from the existing state.

Hysterical cries of alarm by acolytes of the regime and
high-pitched rhetoric by fringe elements in the Muslim community
notwithstanding, neither in the past nor now has there been a demand for the
establishment of an exclusive Islamic political entity, nor has there been
advocacy for the imposition of Islam on the rest. Previously, political
organizations that attempted such approach faced outright rejection by the
Muslims community, some forced to change their ideology   while others disappeared. Despite repeated
calls by regional and national militant organizations and provocative state
actions, the present Muslim activism has shown no temptation for militancy.

This leads me to conclude that what we are witnessing is
demand for a more genuinely democratic order where freedom, the rule of law,
and equality are not just declared ideals but a reality for all Ethiopians
regardless of their religious affiliation. 
As such the growing Muslim activism is a resistance against discriminatory,
unresponsive and intrusive political system. Therefore, it is  an integral part of the ongoing, albeit
fragmented, struggle for democratization. 
Contrary to the alarms raised by some, a move towards addressing these
demands will be tantamount to moving Ethiopia towards greater stability and
more equitable development.

Consulted Works

Abbink, Jon. “An Historical‐anthropological
Approach to Islam in Ethiopia: issues of identity and politics.” Journal
of African Cultural Studies 11.2 (1998).

Ahmed, Hussein.
“Coexistence and/or Confrontation?: Towards a Reappraisal of
Christian-Muslim Encounter in Contemporary Ethiopia.” Journal of
Religion in Africa 36 (2006).

—. Islam in nineteenth-century
Wallo, Ethiopia: Revival, Reform, and Reaction. Leiden, The Netherlands:
Brill, 2000.

Braukämper, Ulrich. Islamic
History and Culture in Southern Ethiopia: Collected Essays. Munster: Lit
Verlag, 2004.

ERLICH, HAGGAI. Saudi
Arabia and Ethiopia: Islam, Christianity and Politics Entwined. Boulder,
CO: Lynne Rienner, 2007.

GNAMO, Abbas HAJI.
“Islam, the Orthodox Church and Oromo Nationalism (Ethiopia).” Cahiers
d’Études Africaines 42 (2002).

Hassen, Mohammed. The
Oromo of Ethiopia: A History, 1570-1860. Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Markakis, John. Ethiopia:The
Last Two Frontiers. Rochester, New York: James Currey, 2011.

Østebø, Terje. Localising
Salafism: Religious Change Among Oromo Muslims in Bale,Ethiopia. Leiden,
The Nethelands: Brill, 2012.

Trimingham, J. S. Islam
ub Ethiopia. New York: Routlege, 1952.