Here is the election from hell for the modern western pundit,
journalist, commentator, politician and voter: an election without
pre-election polling. Almost always halfheartedly dismissed by
politicians, religiously studied by pundits and cited much too often by
journalists, pre election polls gauge how voters are reacting to
political parties and candidates in campaigns and what issues are
important to them. Ever since the 1945 British elections, when
the newly established subsidiary of Gallup accurately predicted a
surprise Labor win over war-hero Winston Churchill, they have been
generally accurate and indispensable .In short, no modern election
should be without them. They are a legitimate and important source of
information to voters, politicians, pundits and journalists alike.
But unlike the exhilarating 2005 elections, when the free press
experimented with ingenuous polling, this year’s election, in
perfect sync with its impassive tone (thanks to the election code of
conduct, state media tells us) has yet to see its first poll. One
reason is of course the absence of firms that are capable of conducting neutral
scientific polls, but a second, much more important– and menacing —
threat has more to do with its total absence: the recognition by the
EPRDF that polls conducted as an election proceeds work in favor of
the party in lead, generating momentum and jolting the vote of its
supporters to a new level of consequence. This is no mere paranoia.
Polls had boosted the moral of the opposition in 2005; and in a first
for the EPRDF (the TPLF in particular), had badly demoralized
its supporters.
Though we do not have polls to show us the preferences, leanings,
differences and concerns of the Ethiopian voter, that does not
necessarily preclude the mapping of voting patterns based on
precedent, gender, ethnicity, income, etc., which are more often than
not accurate.
The average Ethiopian voter is young; around 50 % of the
electorate is under 30. The 18 to 24 age group by itself is more than
10 % of the voting public; but this is hardly surprising for a country
whose median age is 17 barely years. It is the under-30 age group, conspicuously those
between 15 and 25, that protested the election results in the streets
in late 2005; and if there are to be street protests again this year,
which is unlikely but not impossible, it will be this group again that
will battle against the security forces. It is also the group that the
EPRDF has invested most heavily on for the past four years; by and
large through training schemes and public works programs. In addition
to a newly constituted youth wing of the EPRDF, a youth organization funded by
Ethio-Saudi billionaire Al-Amoudi, has been created to stir this group away
from the opposition after the post-election riots, though its efforts have been
hopelessly compromised by a series of debilitating scandals. Fortunately for
the EPRDF, however, unlike 2005, when the urban youth openly identified itself
with the CUD, that enthusiasm for party affiliation is visibly absent
this year, the lack of patience for deciphering the complexities that
led to the fallout between CUD leaders even more pronounced. But this is a volatile
group; there is no certainty with it, and EPRDF has organized an
elite strike force tasked to make sure, in the event of protests, that
its control of the streets will be shorter than it was in 2005.
The great hyped hope of the EPRDF in Addis Ababa, which will
inevitably be closely monitored by international observers, is the
women vote this year.
Kebele cadres have been instructed to do everything to sway them, and
many of them are opting for a career boost by delivering them.. Women
are supposedly not paying much attention to the campaign, are less
disenchanted than men, and are most likely undecided about whom to
vote for. They are in effect the swing vote. It is also counting on
between a fourth and a third of the city’s vote (calculating on the
basis of the 2000 and 2005 election results), who will predictably
come out in full force to vote come election day. This is the only
section of the voting public that is thrilled about the election
(EPRDF’s win is after all assured at the national level), is confident
of its choice and is decidedly motivated by the opposition’s disarray.
EPRDF’s calculation is that with a split opposition, some of the women
vote that went to the opposition in 2005, and a third of the vote that
could be counted on, it will be viable in Addis.
But in all likelihood, the EPRDF is posed to lose the women vote in Addis
because of what could be called “the Birtukan factor”. Many women
speak sympathetically about the plight of Bitukan Medeksa, the
imprisoned leader of UDJ, and most pundits are convinced that many
more (men as well as women) will vote for her party as a gesture of
empathy and solidarity. Neither have empirical researches shown that
women voters are any more politically ignorant than their male
counterparts. Ignorance of detailed political issues is a feature of the electorate in
general, with no great gender bias. The bulk of the Ethiopian public
usually benignly abstains from closely tracking political issues, and
is content to respond to cues issued by political activists. (And I
fear that this is true of the Diaspora, too)
The fancy strategies of the EPRDF notwithstanding, Addis Ababa
will not vote for the EPRDF; however uninspired voters may end up
being by the opposition. (The opposition may yet inspire, by the way.
Two and a half months are a long, long time in politics.) Merkato, the
city’s business hub, in particular, is more, not less, anti-EPRDF,
than it was in 2005.This is the section of the city that was brutally
suppressed during the street protests in 2005, and the pain and
bitterness still lingers.
EPRDF remains unpopular in the other major urban areas, too; the
sympathy for Birtukan no less. But the EPRDF is not expected to
concede all of them to the opposition as it did in 2005. Expect them to
be the epicenters of controversy in the post-election period.
An astounding 85 % of the Ethiopian voter is rural based. This means
roughly 25 million people this year, spread out over 1, 000, 000 sq. km;
where every 50 households are now being monitored by new sub-level party
and government structures set up after the 2005 election.
(In an American or European context, this is equivalent to installing
security cameras at every corner in the neighborhood for political
surveillance.) Opposition presence had always been weak in the
countryside, but their almost total absence so far, less than 90 days
before election day, is truly disquieting.
Given the choice, rural voters will overwhelmingly turn against the
EPRDF; who, from the perspective of the average farmer, has
accomplished what everyone thought impossible: to be more intrusive in
a farmer’s life than even the Derg.
Who then, entangled in such a life, would not crave his freedom?
