ADDIS ABABA – The Ethiopian government has the legal right to revoke the “Algiers Agreement” which has become invalid because of Eritrea’s violation of the security zone, and the government
should demand for the international recognition of Ethiopia’s right of access to the sea, a former air force general has said in an interview.
Former Major-General Abebe Tekle Haimanot, who was commander of the Ethiopian Air Force during the 1998-2000 Ethiopia-Eritrea War told Dehai, a Tigrinya-langauge publication, that there were ample opportunities – from legal perspectives – for the government to address the vital issue of respecting Ethiopia’s right of access to the sea.
A law instructor at Addis Ababa University, Abebe said the Algiers Agreement was a slap in the face that it treated the aggressor and the aggressed on equal footing. But more than everthing else, he added, the Algiers Agreement was an accord that handed over Ethiopia’s victory to the enemy.
Asked what he expected after the war, Abebe said the agreement should have forced the Eritrean regime to acknowledge that it a) has invaded a sovereign country b) would never try to attack again c) would only have a small army, pay war compensation, and of course recognize Ethiopia’s right of access to the sea.
Abebe, who studied intenational law at Georgia University in the United States, said the last straw that broke the camel’s back was basing the the Algiers Agreement on colonial treaties that Italy had violated and become defunct several decades ago.
The following are excerpts from a very long interview in Tigrinya:
Why was the Algiers Agreement signed then?
I wouldn’t say the government signed the agreement to help Eritrea. But rather I’d say the Algiers Agreement was the product of our ignorance and arrogance. ‘Ignorance’ because we didn’t examine existing international laws; ‘arrogance’ because we dehumanized Ethiopian scholars as “chauvinists, Assab-seeking war mongers,” and kept them at bay.
Though some intellectuals were provocative than trying to engage us, I’d say mainly it was our own problem. If one is ignorant but has the desire to learn, one can make progress. But if one is both ignorant and arrogant, that is hopeless.
Abebe said the knowledge of TPLF central committee members was limited that they were raising hands for approval whatever the politburo passed down as laws or directives. There may be a few individuals who had read well but that was insignificant to effect change across the TPLF board, he said.
I, for one, like most others, had concluded Assab as Eritrea’s. But when I went to school, and studied law, particulary international law, I found the whole story completely different. I’m now convinced – and this is not to settle a political score but from a pure international law perspective – that Ethiopia has a legal right of access to the sea.
When the United Nations federated Eritrea with Ethiopia in 1952, three of the most outstanding criteria were first the decision was based on the interest of the Eritrean people, second it was based on Ethiopia’s right of access to the sea, third it was meant to ensure lasting peace in the region.
After the end of the Second War War, there were occasions when the Allied Forces wanted to divide Eritrea in two or three regions. But all had one thing in common: they ensured Ethiopia’s right of access to the sea. Therefore, if Eritrea had to break away from Ethiopia, it should have been carried out while considering Ethiopia’s right of access to the sea. Here comes the reason to revoke the Algiers Agreement.
Back to the war. How was the role of the Ethiopian Air Force (1998-2000)?
The war came abrupt. We were taken by surprise because we never thought Eritrea would attack us. For that matter, Eritrea had no potential to invade such a big country like ours. But above everything else, we never expected invasion from post-independent Eritrea. We were expecting cordial relations. We had military agreement as well. Once war broke out, however, there were two things that helped those of us in the Air Force: that we’ve been training people, and that we were able to recall experienced veterans of the Air Force to duty.
I’d say members of the Air Force – both former members as well those from the ranks of the EPRDF, defended their country heroically. Both shed blood in defense of their country. Therefore, after the war, we abandoned profiling members as “former members” and “rebels” (tegayoch). The war provided us with many lessons. During the war, it was not an issue of what is useful or what was not. We were invaded, and everyone was determined to win the war, and the war was won.
Even today, given the geopolitics of the region, including the geopolitics of the Nile, I’m of the conviction that Ethiopia should have a powerful defense force. But what does this mean? An Ethiopia that doesn’t have a strong economy cannot have a strong military. We have to balance our economy and military buildup. In the case of the war with Eritrea, for instance, we had taken the economic issue to the extreme – to the point of ignoring the army – because we thought if we build a powerful economy, we can manage to build a powerful defense later on. Though it is correct in principle, but building an economy at the expense of the military had also unwanted consequences.
Again about the war with Eritrea. Ethiopia had an uppherhand in the war. Given that you were a ranking member of the defense forces, what was your position as far as finishing the war with Eritrea was concerned?
Our stand was the stand of the Central Command. The decision was to destroy the Eritrean army completely. Here there was no ambiguity over Eritrea’s sovereignty. Eritrea is an independent nation, but the stand of the Central Command was that Eritrea should be stopped being a threat to Ethiopia. To ensure this, most Central Command members agreed the Ethiopian Defense Forces should destroy the Eritrean army as much as they can.
The outcome was not as we had expected. We had to continue the war to the finish, and we had the potential, the means to carry on the war to the end.
“Why did it stop?”
History will answer that, though it was very clear we had the power to finish it.
You had a good name in the Air Force. And what were your goals for the Air Force?
Thank you for the compliment, but I used to think that all pilots should be encouraged to be trained as flight engineers. Accordingly, we prepared a curriculum to help train the pilots. I was also in the process of training the technicians, particularly senior technicians, to be trained as engineers. We had other goals as well but were disrupted because I was out.
How did you learn that you had lost your job?
From the national radio. I was at home with [former chief of staff] Tsadkan [Gebretensae]. We were waiting to go to the review session known as gimgema.That was about the war with Eritrea. In the meantime, we were listening to the news on the radio. We heard the news that we’ve been removed. After half an hour, I received a letter that I’ve been purged.
How did you feel?
We were aware that at one time we had to step aside. We [Tsadkan and I] said let’s slow down because the country is in danger [due to the conflict among TPLF leaders]. We were saying let the country first stabilize, and then we will go about our plans. When the order came suddenly, we were a little surprised. When I requested resignation earlier, my request was that the TPLF dissidents should not be mishandled; they deserve proper treatment. Later on, the trust was being eroded fast, and our resignation would have been inevitable. We were waiting for mass review (gimgema), and it was about Eritrea. We had finished another review session (gimgema). We were waiting for the gimgema over Eritrea. Suddenly the radio broke the news that we have been expelled, and the letter (that we’ve been removed) also arrived within a difference of half an hour.
Were you expecting that type of dismissal?
It was becoming clear there was no trust between us the army and the commander in chief [i.e. Meles]. If there was no trust, we had to resign. But the conditions in the country were volatile. We thought it was wrong to leave the country and army in that precarious situation. Otherwise, our resignation was a matter of time because of the differences we had with the PM. It shouldn’t have been the way they did it though.
Have you ever tried to talk to them in person?
We have been fighting together for a long time [i.e. pre-1991 rebel days]. But later on, it was clear we had become friends and enemies. Our political culture became nasty even our social ties were destroyed to the point you seeing each other as enemies. I’m blaming both sides [therefore, there was no need for talk].
Question: The politics of TPLF has become dangerous that it judges you either as a friend or enemy. The current situation reflects this serious trend. But here we are young folks; we want to learn lessons from our seniors like you. What can we expect from the older generation? How is it possible to change what you described us a “nasty political culture?”
Members of the young generation shouldn’t wait for instructions from us. For instance on campus, I see young students have a culture of tolerating differing views. This is a positive development indeed. It is unlike my generation on campus. Ours was kind of monolithic thinking, saying I’m right and those having different views are wrong.
What is gratifying is the young generation is well educated, and has better technological help (like the Internet for research etc). Young Tigrians should join their fellow Ethiopian compatriots, form groups, and conduct debates. TPLF was formed to conduct a guerrila war, not to run a country. When TPLF split in 2001, the reason is because the organization was stagnant; it couldn’t move forward. It had finished its lifespan. It was suspicious of outsiders, and for that reason, never invited intellectuals to change itself for the better. The time now is for the young generation to assume new responsibilities for a better tomorrow.
The young generation should discard the scare tactic that Tigrai is sandwitched between Eritrea and hostile chauvinists in Addis. This is very highly dangerous. This doesn’t mean there are no exremist, hateful individuals. There are. But look at the big picture: the majority of the Amhara, Oromo and other Ethiopian people. The young generation should discard the dangerous notion of saying Tigrai would be wiped out if Meles resigns. This is like telling you Tigrai was created after TPLF.
—
Editor’s note: We found Major-General Abebe Tekle-Haimanot’s interview very enlightening. We’d be grateful if Tigrian friends translate the interview into Amharic.(Photo: Courtesy of Dehai)
