I would like to thank
the organizers of this centenary celebration for making the celebration
possible and for giving me the honor and the opportunity to be here among you
to share the pride we derive from the world-famous victory of Adwa.
The right place to
celebrate the Adwa centenary is of course Ethiopia. But Ethiopia is off limit for Ethiopians. You may ask, how so;
since many of you might have visited or could visit that region any time you
wanted. My answer is simple: I do not want to go there as a tourist. When I go
to Ethiopia, I want to feel that I go home because Ethiopia, where Illubabor
is, where Gondar is, where Gojjam is, where Kefa is, where Harer is, where Shoa
is, where Bale is, where Tigray is, where Wollegga is, where Arsi is, where
Gamo Gofa is, where Eritrea is, where Sidamo is, is home. For the TPLF,
however, my home is not Ethiopia but my so-called ethnic homeland.
But I
honestly do not know of any ethnic group to which I should belong. So, to which
of the eight or so ethnic homelands, to which Bantustan, or Reservation, or Killil, would I go? I am sure that the
TPLF, after a superficial interview would assign me a homeland and issue me a
pass to go there. This is not an exaggeration or a theory that I need to prove
by going there and to see how they classify me. This is already happening to as
many people as the government can handle at a time. Teachers are asked to look
for their native homeland and go there to apply for teaching jobs. New college
graduates are asked to do the same.
Are there Ethiopians
in Addis Ababa who are not asked to pack up and go home? Yes, there are: one of
them is Ato Meles Zenawi, the architect of the Ethiopian Bantustan. He is there
as head of the traffic police and hit squad (the TPLF) which, with their
bayonets, show the evacuees the way to their homelands. The others who have not
yet been asked to go home will soon have their turn. These people either know
the truth and are resigned to the fact that they can do nothing, or believe
that the worst is over, that it was a close call when their neighbors were
asked to get lost. The truth is they are needed only until substitutes are
semi-trained. They, we, as well as whoever cares, have already seen how members
of the so-called Council of Representatives of the so-called Transitional
Government of Ethiopia were used and thrown out in the rain, how the officials
of the Telecommunications were used and then put in jail as a prelude to their
dismissal, how the president of Addis Ababa University was used to destroy the
lives of his longtime colleagues (his colleagues since the foundation of the
University in the early 1960’s) and was finally told that he was no
longer needed once the mission entrusted to him was successfully accomplished.
Nevertheless, we do
not despair. As Atse Zer’a
Ya’iqob (1434-1468) once said, despair is the worst enemy of mankind. Ethiopia
is land and people. Wherever we go, we take Ethiopia with us. No one, not even
someone with the mightiest power on earth at his disposal, can take Ethiopia
out of us. Zeray Deres took it with him to Italy and fought for it in the
middle of Rome. Ethiopia was with Abdissa Aga in the jungles of Italy and
Yugoslavia when he fought against the Italians with Marshal Tito. Each of us in
the diaspora here and elsewhere has taken it to his or her new country. We are
now at this moment with Ethiopia, for we hear her say, to borrow from the
Bible, “For where two or three are gathered together in my name there am
I in the midst of them.”
No, today is not the
day for despair. Let me tell you what I firmly believe: No one can kill Ethiopia.
The only way Ethiopia can die is by committing suicide. Will that happen? You
and I have to answer this question, for Ethiopia’s suicide will come only
through us, her children, if we fight each other. I hope and pray that we will
not go on doing that. We have stable and solid communities.
We are the products
of a long history and culture that bind us together. The rains may fall, the
floods may come and the winds may blow and push that nation, as they have done
in the past. In the end, the country — nation, people and land — will survive.
Most of you may have
heard or read about how Eritrea was a colony of Ethiopia. The latest advocate
of this fairy tale is none other than the present Prime Minister of Ethiopia.
But his work is only the tip of the iceberg; be prepared to hear more. In this
month’s (March 1996) issue of the Ethiopian Register (EtR), Professor
Sven Rubenson writes of the appearance of some new Tigrinya-speaking scholars
who claim that the battle of Adwa was exclusively an Italo-Tigrean affair, that
the Italian army moved south from Eritrea and occupied Mekele to unite the
Tigrinya speakers under its rule, and never intended to move south beyond
Tigray which, at that time, was supposedly an autonomous state. Why then did
the Ethiopian army, first led by Ras Mekonnen
and Fitawrari Gebeyyehu and later by Atse Menelik himself, come to the front
line? The answer for these revisionists is the force from the south was not
the Ethiopian army, which included Tigray. Rather, that army was the army of a
neighboring state — “Shoa headed by Nigus Menelik.” Atse
Menelik and his “Shoan army” supposedly marched north to help
Tigray and its ruler, Ras Mengesha.
When Mengesha won the war, “Nigus Menelik
and his Shoan army” went back to Shoa. In short, the 1896 war at Adwa was
between Tigray and Italy of Eritrea, and the victory was Tigray’s.
According to this fairy tale, the victory of Adwa should, therefore, be
celebrated at Adwa, in Tigray, by the Tigreans, with guests from other
countries, including the other killils or
Bantustans of Ethiopia, invited to watch and to applaud as the present-day
Tigreans make shillela and qererto for their ancestors’
victory. For this celebration countless historical artifacts, that is to say
the national heritage preserved in the museums and monasteries of the country,
have been carried away to Tigray.
In the nineteenth
century, European powers were out to grab and colonize any country in their
reach. The strength as well as the weakness of their race to colonize was, of
course, the competition among them. Though they frequently collaborated in
their efforts, as they raced against one another, they were contained by the
other. In the countries they did colonize, each worked to make the natives feel
inferior by presenting themselves as superior creatures. They valued “the
white man’s prestige,” to be guarded at all costs. Sir Winston
Churchill’s comment on the victory of Adwa is an example: “On the
1st of March, 1896, the Battle of Adwa was fought and Italy, at the hands of
Abyssinia, sustained a crushing defeat. Two results followed which affected
other nations. First, a great blow had been struck at European prestige in
North Africa. Second, the value of Italy as a factor in European politics was
depreciated.”
Only a nation with
pride, a high degree of solidarity among its citizens, and blessed with leaders
which used the colonialists’ competition against them could hope to
resist colonialization. In all of Africa, only one nation, Ethiopia, led by one
rare leader, Menelik, was able to remain independent. About Menelik, enough
cannot be said. In the years leading to Adwa, Ethiopia had been blessed with
brave and religious leaders, such as Tewodros (1855-1868) and Yohannes
(1872-1889), but only with one brave, religious and astute politician: Menelik
(1889-1913). Swimming in a sea infested with sharks, he came out unscathed and
Ethiopia bitten, but not swallowed.
A brief background of
events that led to the battle of Adwa is as follows: Italy was able to take
Massawa in 1885, and plant herself in the Mereb Millash highlands shortly
thereafter, because at that time the central administration lacked adequate
intelligence about Egypt and Italy. Without such vital information, the bravery
and political wisdom of Yohannes could not stand up to the treachery of Great
Britain, the deep desire of Italy to occupy the Red Sea coast, and the problems
created by his struggle for power with Menelik of Shoa and Gobeze of Amhara.
Furthermore, one cannot underestimate the extent to which the Napier Expedition
(1868) left the impression in the regions it traveled that Europeans were
invincible. The sound of Napier’s cannons, the size of his shells and the
distance they covered were simply too much for Ethiopian society of that time.
Indeed, an Ethiopian chronicler explained his wonder at the size of the shells
by noting how the women in the village used them as water jars. In taking
Massawa at a time, Italy certainly benefited from that impression.
According to Portal
(the British envoy to the court of Yohannes in 1887), when, in 1880’s Atse Yohannes complained to Queen
Victoria about the Egyptian occupation of Massawa, poor Egypt had no army
worthy of the name, no officers deserving of confidence, no money, no credit
and no men.” Had Yohannes known then how weak the colonialists actually
were, Ethiopia would not have bothered to complain to a foreign power when the
region, including the port, was hers to liberate. In fact, the Italians managed
to conquer Massawa with a small contingent because the Egyptians had already
abandoned it; they had “no men” there at that time. Let us not
forget that Harer, too, was abandoned by Egypt at about the same time.
The tragic story of
British treachery is probably well known to most of you. When “poor Egypt
had no army worthy of the name, no officers deserving of confidence, no money,
no credit and no men,” its “protectors”, the British, turned
to Ethiopia, who had everything Egypt lacked, and used her. Signing a treaty at
Adwa in 1884, they asked the Atse to
use his army to facilitate the withdrawal through Ethiopia of the Egyptian
colonialist troops besieged by the Sudanese. In return, Ethiopia was promised
by the treaty the return of the territories annexed to Sudan and access to the
port of Massawa.
Understandably, the
Sudanese did not like the deal. They wanted to capture their enemies and
confiscate their arms. How was Ethiopia expected to comply with the Adwa
Treaty? Eager to have his lost territories back and access to his own port, the Atse sent troops which fought the
Sudanese and rescued the Egyptian troops. We defeated the Sudanese and
stationed the Egyptian colonial soldiers at Massawa. The most painful part of
the story is that more Ethiopians died in the fight than the Egyptians we
rescued did. The Egyptians did not bother to fight or even to carry their own
baggage. And only a year later, Massawa fell in the hands of the Italians who
refused to honor the Adwa Treaty and denied Ethiopia access to the port. All we
achieved from the endeavor was Sudanese enmity.
Had the Atse at least not failed to station an
Ethiopian garrison in Metemma (Qallabat) at the time, he would have not died
there in 1889. When Massawa became “no king’s land” —
because the Egyptian troops which the Atse
placed there were forced to return to Egypt because they had no supplies in
Massawa — Italy moved in, with a handful of soldiers, in February of 1885. The Atse, having allowed the opportunity
to slip from him, complained again to Queen Victoria, this time for encouraging
the Italians (instead of him) to take the abandoned Massawa.
Once the Italians
took the port, they started inching into the hinterland. This angered Ras Alula, the governor of the region;
so he destroyed all who came as far as Dogali (Jan. 1887). But the Atse, who believed that the Italians
would leave his country through peaceful negotiations, reprimanded Ras Alula.
I assume you know who Ras Alula was.
If there is anyone here who does not know of this awe-inspiring general, I
recommend that he/she read his obituary in the February 27,1897 issue of The New York Times, or the report by
Portal, British Consul-General at Zanzibar, who wrote that Alula, “the
owner of that powerful, cruel, and intelligent face would be bound to make his
name known in any country, either as a leader or as a destroyer of men.”
The Consul General tells us that he “had seen such eyes in the head of a
tiger — and of a leopard, but
never in that of human being.
The Dogali incident
was followed by the infamous battle of Sahati (March 1887). Sahati could have
been used to secure Ethiopia a place in the arena of world powers, had her
leaders considered the weather of the lowlands when preparing for the battle.
Adwa (1896) and Maichew (1936) would never have taken place. What happened at
Sahati, instead, was this:
As soon as the
Italians realized they could proceed into the hinterland unchallenged (after
Alula’s reprimand), they moved inland to Sahati with a force of 20,000
men and built there a fortification impregnable by Ethiopian weaponry. The Atse, with about 200,000 men, moved to
deal with the invaders. He brought his army as far as Sahati.
One of the
contingents mustered against Ethiopia, siding with the Italians, was that of Dejjazmach Debbeb, a cousin of Atse Yohannes. According to Dejjazmach Dr. Zewde Gabre-Sellassie,
the great great grandson of Atse
Yohannes, Dejjazmach Debbeb quickly
abandoned the Italian cause, calculating “that the balance of power was
shifting to the Ethiopians.” In his political biography of Atse Yohannes (Oxford 1975), Dr. Zewde
continues: “Debbeb’s defection at this time was unfortunate for the
Italians, not only because of his strong, well-armed force, but also because he
possessed knowledge of the numbers, positions, and plans of the Italian forces
and fortifications. Furthermore, if Yohannes chose not to attack, the Italians
would be forced by the heat to withdraw within six weeks.”
Upon reaching Sahati,
what did this massive Ethiopian force do? Seeing that the Italians were well
fortified, the Atse wrote them a
letter “demanding that (they) should return to Massawa… with Lij Wossen as a messenger.” When
they ignored him, he “sent a second letter, asking for an answer to his
demand, and thanking (the commander of the invading force) for the warm reception
he had accorded his envoy Lij Wossen.”
When the Italians
ignored him again, he withdrew with his 200,000 men “feeling
secure,” according to Dejjazmach Dr.
Zewde, “that there was no serious or immediate threat from the
Italians.” Well, there was a “serious” and “immediate
threat” of lasting consequences: the Italians occupied Asmara and
positioned themselves to sustain any attack as soon as the Atse — because of the bad weather and a shortage of supplies — withdrew
and marched to Metemma where the “enemies” were fellow Africans.
This is the central story of the loss of northern Ethiopia to the Italians, and
the event which led the colonialists to believe they could colonize all of
Ethiopia.
Well, on to Adwa, I
will leave the details of the battle and victory itself to the other speakers.
I will only add a paragraph or two to indicate how vulnerable northern Ethiopia
was when Atse Yohannes fell at
Metemma in 1889. It is reported in some sources that as Atse Yohannes had no heirs — his only child, Prince Araya, having
died earlier — he, as Atse of
Ethiopia, and Menelik, as his vassal in Shoa, had agreed that in the event of
Yohannes’ death, Menelik would succeed him to the throne.
But when Atse Yohannes fell at the battle of
Metemma in 1889, he declared that Mengesha, was his son and his heir to the
throne. Until then it was not officially known that the Atse had a son (other
than the deceased Araya), much less one that he would make his heir. Moreover,
any objective assessment of the political situation at that time makes clear
that the Atse had loaded Mengesha
with a burden which he could never carry. Because the Atse’s army had disintegrated at Metemma, in the far west,
while Menelik’s massive and well-equipped army was intact, and in the
center of the country. And while such internal power struggles ran their
course, Italian occupation of the far north became a reality.
One other point about
Adwa, the question whether Atse
Menelik could have marched into Asmara after the victory of Adwa to throw the
Italians into the sea is frequently asked? Harold Marcus and Tsegaye Tegenu, in
the March (1996) issue of EtR, and Shumet Sishagne, in the
April (1996) issue of the same news magazine, address the question at length. I
agree with these authors that Menelik simply did not have the resources to do
so. However, it is not clear to me why Atse
Menelik did not at least insist on greater revisions to the Treaty of Wichale
(May 1889) at the Addis Ababa (October 1896) convention. Ethiopia won a
resounding victory at Adwa, but for reasons unknown, Atse Menelik agreed to abide by the additional convention which Dejjazmach Mekonnen signed at the
ratification ceremony of the original treaty. This convention expanded the
colony’s border miles into northern Ethiopia.
What do we learn from
the victory of Adwa? Many things, if we have the humility to learn from history
and if we focus our eyes on the prize: the liberation of Ethiopia from
dictatorship and the restoration of our nation’s dignity. I do not list
some of these many things because you do not know them, but to underscore their
importance.
(1) Our solidarity
must be tough. The Ethiopians’ high level of unity was crucial to the
Adwa victory. That same level of unity guaranteed victory in 1941. The old
national anthem does not fail to recognize this: “For your patriots (0
Ethiopia) have become of one mind” (tebabrewallinna
arbenyochisch). It is not in our tradition to abandon our brothers and
sisters at the front line for any reason. Wherever there is struggle, we have
to be of one mind and of one united front. Now is not the time for struggle
between parties, especially when the struggle takes place in cities which are
not our political fields. Let us today celebrate together Adwa’s
centenary and the coordination of party activities until we win the field for
separate activities.
I mentioned at the
outset that Ethiopia would die only by suicide. What I call suicidal is party
feuds in the wrong place and at the wrong time. The instant gratification which
we derive from “I gave them a piece of my mind,” or likk likkachewin neggerkuwachew, must
stop. Who are we fighting, each other or the TPLF/EPLF? What are we fighting
for, to bring democracy to our nation or to be the next dictators? I want you
to declare truce and pledge and swear in the name of Ethiopia that you struggle
for democracy and for Ethiopia’s territorial integrity, and that
principle will guide your every action. Temporary suspension of separate party
activities is not a dissolution of political activity but a coordination and
strengthening of such activities.
The foundation for
solidarity is acceptance as part of the united front everyone who accepts the
group’s rules, regardless of their background. Shoa, home to Menelik, is
home to many ethnic groups. Atse
Menelik was born to a woman of unknown origin. His grandfather, Ras Sahle Sillase, came from Amhara and
Oromo ancestors. For the Atse, his
people’s background was of absolutely no importance.
The following remark
by the historian Aleqa Atsme may be
of interest to you: “On the day of his coronation, his Majesty gave to
the soldiers titles, titles which were instituted (and recorded) in the history
of King Suseneyos. For Atse
Suseneyos/Siltan Segged had instituted 35 titles detailing the function and regional
administration (for each). Atse
Yohannes, too, had given titles according to this tradition but only to the
people of his homeland Tigray. The Atse
(Menelik) on the other hand, bestowed these titles of honor to people who came
from other homelands; he did not bestow them on too many people from
Shoa.”
Menelik’s
actions seem remarkable only today. But for Menelik and his court, ethnicity
was not a thing that wanted much attention. Perhaps that is why so many of us
who come from that region — Amhara, Oromo, Gurage, etc. — do not understand
the concept of ethnic-based struggles. Class struggles, yes. Gender struggles,
yes. Ideological struggles, yes. But ethnicity-based struggles, no.
The idea of
self-determination in the sense it is understood in Ethiopian politics (based
on ethnicity and leading to secession) and used by the TPLF/EPLF does not mix
with solidarity and territorial integrity. In theory, and on paper secession
could be groups’ democratic right, but its implementation can come only
by force, which is a violation of groups’ and individuals’ rights.
We are witnessing how the enemy is making it a recipe for national
disintegration. That is one of the major reasons why we oppose the TPLF regime.
I urge us all, for the sake of solidarity, at least to make a moratorium on its
use until we achieve democracy. That is the only way we can assure Ethiopia
that we are no TPLF. Why do ethnic groups which do not want Ethiopia’s
destruction need a concept that is being used to destroy their Ethiopia? Is it
not wise to avoid an unnecessary risk? Here is a lesson we should learn from Etege Tayitu. When the Ethiopian
politicians at Menelik’s palace discovered that article 17 of the Treaty
of Wichale had a serious problem, endless amendments were proposed by the
signatories to improve it. Etege Tayitu’s
proposal was that since the entire treaty was about commerce and friendship,
and since the deletion of this risky article would not affect that purpose, the
article should simply be deleted. Of course, Etege’s proposal outraged the Italian representative. Why?
Because he had an ulterior motive in wanting to retain it, just as the
TPLF/EPLF have one with respect to the principles of self-determination. Ethnic
groups which want to use it as safety net or deterrent against the domination
of the major ethnic groups should not be used by those who do not wish Ethiopia
well. Let us together seek a device that will give every ethnic group the
safety it needs but guarantees at the same time against the nation’s
disintegration.
(2) The opposition
needs astute leadership. Atse
Menelik inherited a nation in which Atse
Tewodros had sown the seed of unity but never reaped its fruit, even though he
tried ceaselessly for over ten years. Atse Yohannes, with his religious attitude, was not one who could unite
Ethiopia. Atse Menelik was able to
achieve an unprecedented solidarity — using a forceful combination of (more)
carrot and (less) stick — within a
very short time. He took power of this ethnically diversified nation in 1889
and the Battle of Adwa, at which Ethiopians solidarity was at its best, took
place only seven years later.
How did he do it? His
biggest assets were foresight and magnanimity. He dared to escape from the
Fortress of Meqdela, knowing too well that he could be hurled down the
precipice if he were caught; he sought and received help from Queen Worqitu of
Wello, knowing that she would risk her son’s life (who was in detention
in Meqdela) if she let him proceed to Shoa. He came to Shoa with a few escorts
knowing that the principality was in the hand of Ato Bezzabbih and his army.
His general, Ras Gobena Dache, who
won the south for the Atse (read
“Ethiopia”), was originally his rival. Atse Tewodros, who took Abeto Menelik captive and kept him under house arrest, knew his remarkable
qualities and gave him his daughter in marriage. Atse Tewodros’ regret when he heard of Abeto Menelik’s escape was that Menelik did not take his wife
with him. Menelik conducted the battle of Adwa from a relatively safe place
since his life and death was the life and death of Ethiopia at that time. A
disaster worse than that of Metemma would certainly have befallen the country
if he had fallen in Adwa. He was a survivor; he knew when and how to fight.
That was why he submitted to Atse
Yohannes’ authority and gave up his title of niguse negest until he was crowned as such after the death of the Niguse Negest in 1889.
Atse Menelik was a revolutionary with a kind heart. Rancor,
revenge, cruelty were not part of his vocabulary. He won over his enemies by
showing them forgiveness and what seemed sincere love. If he had had the
temperament of his predecessors, he would probably have executed King Tekle
Haymanot of Gojjam, who abused him publicly and fought him at Imbabo (1882). Atse Menelik understood that harsh
treatment generates hatred among people and that hatred is the enemy of unity
and peace. Everyone at his court thought that when he heard of the abuse of one
of his vassals suffered in Tigray, he would have the offenders severely punished.
But his response was, “A country is governed with sensitivity and shrewd
tactics, not cruelty.” He is the first Ethiopian ruler who stopped the neftenya or militia from exploiting the
peasantry. He was the first ruler in Ethiopian modern history who insisted on
religious tolerance.
Was his army cruel in
war? This is a silly question; war is cruel. Was the Atse unscrupulous? This is another silly question. When it comes to
their interests, politicians are, as a rule, unscrupulous. Each of the three
contenders for Atse Tewodros’
throne tried to outsmart the other and to use foreign powers to this end. Dejjazmach Kasa/Yohannes helped the
British expedition to Meqdela; (Atse)
Tekle Giyorgis/Gobeze did not help only because he was asked by the leader of
the expedition to stay away; Nigus Menelik
sent a congratulatory letter to Queen Victoria for the success of the
expedition. What mattered to them was not how they took power but what they did
with it. Did they help each other? Only so long as cooperation served their
interests. Each felt a duty to defend his own realm — the kings their
principalities and the Atses their
empire.
If we are unable to
forgive in order to solidify our unity afresh, we do not deserve to enjoy the
glory of the victory of Adwa, and certainly are not worthy to serve our
country. We all have suffered in the past; that is why we are here now in
beautiful America, away from the real home. But the time to free ourselves, for
the sake of Ethiopia, from the anger against those who have harmed is long overdue.
I want to tell you this: I have no personal enemy anywhere in the world, even
in Zimbabwe. But Ethiopia has enemies at the palaces in Asmara and Addis Ababa.
That is what concerns me. My enemies are Ethiopia’s enemies. I cannot understand
those who feel differently on this matter.
How shall we find an
astute leader? This question, which has been raised many times, brings me to
another question. Why do we need that kind of a leader? Your answer may be
“to be led by him or her.” But I am not certain that this is your
sincere answer. Maybe we want a leader who will give us an Adwa type of
victory, a victory won by our people so that we may bask in its glory. But how
about a victory that we ourselves fight and win? How about reaping the fruit of
our own labor — I mean a victory of struggle in which you and I participate?
How long are we going to wait until something happens? If 90 percent of us are
waiters, as we seem to be, who will cause that something to happen? I want you
to ask yourselves: what is your personal role in liberating Ethiopia? Many of
us are not only sitting idle, but are criticizing others for organizing
themselves and trying to do something. It is a shame to try to cover up our
shameful negligence of our responsibility towards our country by criticizing
others. We think we are on top of things by despising others’ efforts. It
does not work. Let us do something or help others who try to do something. Let
us encourage them, or shut up. Discouraging others is a crime against Ethiopia.
(3) Respect is to
be earned. The letters that Atse
Yohannes wrote to world powers asking for help and justice did not earn respect
for him or for Ethiopia. The contempt General Gordon and Warner Munzinger had
for this great nationalist sends chills through the spine of everyone who
recognizes him, as we all do, as his or her leader. Atse Menelik did not know how to write beggary. To the contrary, he
regularly informed the world powers of his obligation to defend his ancestral
land — which was a warning that he
would not sit idle while they meddled in Africa’s affairs. He bluffed and
when it was inevitable he went to war and won.
The respect Atse Menelik earned went beyond Ethiopia
and became the pride of Africa and of black people throughout the world. The
British inquired if the Atse would
grant an audience for their high-powered delegation to his palace. They sent
the delegation with elaborate gifts when he consented. When the delegation
arrived in Addis Ababa, it was asked to camp at its outskirts until the monarch
was ready to receive it.
The message the
British delegation brought included a phonographic greeting of Queen Victoria
to Etege Tayitu. The
delegation’s mission was to convey a request that Ethiopia [i.e. the Atse] prohibit the transit of arms to
the Sudan. What business had the British in the Sudan? And how dare a
colonialist power ask an African leader to cooperate with them to colonize an
African country, a neighbor at that? Well, that is not what the Atse asked them. To the contrary, he
assured them that he would cooperate with them, explaining that the Sudanese
were his enemies as well. What the British did not know was that the Atse had long ago established a friendly
relationship with his neighbors. In fact, a Sudanese delegation was in his
palace, sitting behind curtains, while the negotiation with the British
delegation was underway. The British were shocked and embarrassed when the Atse hinted to them that he knew how
they had helped Italy occupy Massawa in 1885. They did not know what to say,
nor understand why Menelik mentioned it to them at that particular moment. The Atse’s intent, of course, was to
let them know that he would give them a taste of their own medicine in his
diplomatic relations with them. He felt no obligation to keep his word when it
was given to treacherous politicians.
The respect he earned
and how are obvious. But did all black people share in this glory? You would
rightly say “yes.” But white racists did not want this to be a
black man’s victory over white man. The West could not tolerate the
notion that “the inferior black race of Africa” had defeated
“the superior white race of Europe.” So how did they deal with the
victory of Adwa? Some blamed it on Baratieri, the Italian general who led the
war. Others accused the Eritrean bandas who
abandoned their Italian masters or came over to the side of Ethiopia. Others
blamed their spies, Awalom and his brother, who chose to earn more birr than a
few lire; others started to play the numbers game — so many Shoans against so
few Italians, as if they did not know this before the battle started. Still
others blamed it on the rugged terrain which “favored the
Abyssinians,” as if the mountains had sprung up unexpectedly overnight
and as if they were not more familiar to their cartographers and native allies
more than to the Ethiopian army, most of which came from the far south and the
west. The bravery of black Ethiopians, their impeccable patriotism, and the
great sacrifice they made to defend Ethiopia were things the West refused to
acknowledge.
The most interesting
explanation, and one that did lasting damage to Ethiopians’ relation with
non-Ethiopian blacks is what I read in the April 19, 1896 issue of The New York Times. It was titled,
‘The Most Gifted of Africans.” Unfortunately, the title, which is
dangerous in itself, is mild when compared to the content of the article. Here
is an excerpt:
The
experience of the Italians during the past few years with the Abyssinians has
shown beyond doubt that these mountaineers of “the Switzerland of
Africa” are decidedly a superior race to the other people of the Dark
Continent with whom the Europeans have come in contact in their colonization
and partition schemes. To a great extent this superiority is the result of their
origin and pedigree. Although (they are) the modern representatives of the
Ethiopians of myth and history, they are in reality not Ethiopians at all. They
are not black, but are of Caucasian descent as pure as the Anglo-Saxon or the
Celt. Language and physiology stamp them as members of the Semitic race, and,
consequently, as kindred peoples to the Babylonians, the Assyrians, the Arabs,
the Syrians, the Jews, and other history-making nations of antiquity. To call
them Ethiopians in the sense of blacks is a singular misnomer, originating
probably in the fact that, being the only African people except the Egyptians
known at an early date to the Greek-Latin literature, the term
“Ethiopian” gradually was used to designate all Africans, and is now
the national name for that very people who, almost alone on the entire
continent of Africa, do not belong to the Negro race.
In
truth, the Abyssinians are not originally an African race at all. Their
earliest traditions point to Southern Arabia as their original seat, and by a
singular piece of good fortune, the German traveler, Edward Glaser, who has
made four scientific journeys to Southern Arabia, hitherto never explored, has
found there the indubitable evidences of the existence of the Abyssinian people
in these districts before the days of Christ.
Edward Glaser had,
indeed, been to South Arabia and “had found there the indubitable
evidences of the existence of … Abyssinian people…È just as you and
I have found here where we are now, “indubitable evidence” of the
existence of Ethiopians in 1996. But that does not make this place the origin
of the Ethiopians! The point is, no matter what the West did, it was forced to
respect both Menelik and Ethiopia.
(4) Promote gender
equality, and rely on each other: Whenever the question of solving national
problems arises, we think, generally speaking, of the male population as the
source for answers. This is a mistake we must correct. For Atse Menelik, his consort Etege Tayitu was the major source of his wisdom and strength. Tayitu was, indeed,
a wise and courageous woman. But in giving her the credit she deserves, people
often forget that it was Atse
Menelik’s treatment of people that gave Tayitu the chance to be her name,
“a shining sun.” And his attitude served him well: According to the
chronicler, “Shoa’s good fortune came about since Tayitu Bitul.
Since then the kingdom of Abba Dagnew [Dagnew was Atse Menelik’s horse name] expanded by the day. The horse of
Abba Dagnew, having the horse of Gobena Daqe [= Dache] as its advance power,
refused to recognize borders.”
How did Atse Menelik develop this enlightened
attitude towards women? Perhaps from the relatively powerful position of the
women in his family as he was growing up. Ras Sahle Sillase, Atse
Menelik’s grandfather, used to stand as a servant in front of his mother (adegdegew), even after he became nigusof Shoa. And he never made any decision
which his wife WeyzeroBezzabish had
not approved.
Of course, as the
subject of this talk is Adwa, I use the example of Menelik and Tayitu, but
obviously, my point is not just that men should let their wives help them, but
that we must permit — and demand — that women in all walks of life play an
equal part in the political and social life of our nation. Such equality is in
the best interests of each of us and of Ethiopia, and the rightful place of
Ethiopian women.
(5) Lessons for
the TPLF. The TPLF can also learn a lesson from Adwa. History cannot be
distorted or erased. Distortion may serve as powerful propaganda for the day
but in the final analysis both distortions and propaganda become an unerasable disgrace for those who advocated them. Think
what the coming generations of Ethiopians will say whenever the TPLF/EPLF and
their leaders are mentioned.
Moreover, no matter
what one does, history cannot be undone. The Italians came to Ethiopia forty
years after Adwa, burnt its people with poisonous gas, and declared that they
had avenged their 1896 defeat and erased it from the pages of history. But had
they? Obviously not. Rather, Italy’s aggression and its crimes of 1936
are remembered as Italy’s second disgrace and Adwa is remembered annually
with pride and joy.
Perhaps there are
parts of Ethiopian history the TPLF does not like, such as the country’s
struggle to survive as a nation? Well, like it or not, that glorious history of
survival cannot be erased. The best the TPLF may do is to overshadow
Ethiopia’s past history by making its own stunning patriotic history.
What it is doing now at Adwa will be remembered always for what it is: a
disgrace.
(6) Lessons for TPLF supporters: Do the supporters of TPLF/EPLF have a lesson to learn
from the victory at Adwa? The answer is emphatically yes! It would have been
very difficult, if not impossible, to defeat the colonialists if General Baratieri’s local supporters had not come to the side
of their Ethiopia at that very critical moment in the history of their country.
When Bartieri’s Ethiopian supporters realized
that the issue was not the usual family feud but the survival of Ethiopia, they
sent the colonialists packing. Division after division of native Eritreans and
Tigreans on whom Baratieri had relied heavily for the success of his invasion
came to the side of Atse Menelik.
Following the divisions, the civilian population did what it could do, cutting
communication lines between Asmara and Baratieri’s
camp and harassing Baratieri’s army.
I challenge you, my
brothers and sisters from the north, to open your mind and allow your eyes to
see what I and all objective observers see. There is absolutely no reason why
you and I should be on different sides if we all have Ethiopia’s well
being in mind. I urge you not to side any more with Ethiopia’s enemies.
Give up your ideology of “Tigrenya speakers
first.” It is a cruel idea born from a selfish mind.
And if we do have
different visions for Ethiopia, let us each present our visions to the
Ethiopian people, first giving our word under oath that we will support
whatever the people choose. Let our struggle be for the Ethiopian nation to be
free to choose what it wants. Let our music be Ethiopians’ song of
“Free at last.”
7. Unity and the Orominya Speakers. Orominya
speakers are, as far as I know, at the forefront of the struggle to promote
unity among Ethiopians. They work with COEDF; one hears them at AAPO meetings.
We see them at political gatherings called to discuss unity, liberation and the
democratization of Ethiopia. This should not surprise non-Orominya
speakers. If the Oromo are not for a united Ethiopia, then who will be? Orominya speakers constitute one of the two largest ethnic
groups in Ethiopia. Moreover, since the sixteenth century, the Ethiopian polity
has been dominated and administered by the Oromo. Their demographics and their
political activity have largely shaped the country as well as the state.
Unfortunately, it
appears that many non-Orominya speakers believe that
the Oromo do not support a united Ethiopia. This erroneous impression is most
likely a result of the fact that, unlike the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the
Oromo who advocate Ethiopia’s territorial integrity are not organized
independent of other political organizations. While their choice not to be
organized along ethnic lines is highly commendable, the politically detrimental
repercussions of that choice are clear. It has allowed the OLF and other
non-unionist Oromo groups to claim that they represent all of the Oromos, including the unionists. It is time for the
unionist Oromos to make it clear that OLF’s
secessionist agenda is not their agenda. Oromos for a
united Ethiopia must be heard loud and clear. It is time for these Ethiopians
to invent a means by which they show the world their views about their country
Ethiopia.
The Oromos and other ethnic groups must realize that they are
subject to exploitation if they do not establish inter-group solidarity. I
believe that the aspiration of all ethnic groups of Ethiopia can be attained
within united Ethiopia if all Ethiopians lay the foundation for that unity.
(8) Zealous Patriots: I am not sure what
zealous patriots can learn from the victory of Adwa and Menelik’s
experience in leading a multi-ethnic nation. The Ethiopians I call zealous
patriots are those who, like myself, do not want to compromise the territorial
integrity of Ethiopia. For them the preservation of Ethiopia’s unity is
of paramount importance. How many such Ethiopians are there at this gathering?
Can you tell me what
would make you change your mind about Ethiopia’s unity? Nothing, right?
Good, but how about TPLF’s/EPLF’s policy of hatred? These two
enemies of Ethiopia use hatred as a system to keep linguistic groups apart. For
example, I presume you will agree that many Amharic speakers are zealous
patriots. It is no accident then, that Amharic speakers are targets of
TPLF’s/EPLF’s policy of hatred and persecution. Wives of such
zealots have been raped before the eyes of their children and husbands; young
girls have been taken away from their families to serve as concubines and
servants; men have been slaughtered with kitchen knives. Such atrocities, too
many to recount here, have all been committed with the goal of promoting
amongst other Amharic speaking zealots an attitude of “to hell with
Tigrinya speakers; to hell with Orominya speakers, to
hell with the Somalis”, etc. If the TPLF achieves its goal, as it seems
it has, at least in some corners, these zealous patriots have indeed changed
their minds regarding the question of Ethiopia’s territorial integrity. I
read an article recently which enjoyed a warm reception among zealous patriots,
primarily because the article called for the secession of Ethiopia from Tigray.
This is clearly a change of mind.
Can we wish that the
river Mereb remain a divide between Eritrea and the
rest of Ethiopia and at the same time consider ourselves zealous patriots or hagerweddadItyopiyawiyan? Can we wish that Tigray secede because
opportunist Tigrinya speakers are used by the TPLF/EPLF as catalysts to divide
and rule and at the same time consider ourselves zealous patriots? Will the
atrocities perpetrated on Amharic speakers by members of the Oromo Liberation
Front in Arsi, Chercher and other places make us wish
that the Oromo secede? If yes, then where is our uncompromising stand towards
the territorial integrity of Ethiopia? Are we for or against secession?
My suggestion is as
follows. We must deal with the contradiction in our reasoning either by
recognizing that we are not the advocates of one Ethiopia we imagine ourselves
to be, or, preferably, by establishing a new and sincere relationship between
members of the different ethnic groups that oppose the TPLF/EPLF but have
reservations about working with others to form a united Ethiopia. We should
start by asking ourselves this simple question: Why are some of us for
secession and some of us for the territorial integrity of the country? Let us
find the answer and deal with it up front. Could it be because the previous
systems have made some of us feel that the state is ours while it made others
feel the opposite? If so, it is time that we all agree on a system that can
make every Ethiopian feel that the country, and the state belongs to him or
her. If I reject a system it should be not only because it alienates me or
allows others to infringe on my rights but also because it alienates other
Ethiopians and allows me infringe on their rights. In short, I cannot support a
system that is not fair to all Ethiopians. We can and must create a system that
we all can support.
What the TPLF/EPLF
are doing to Ethiopia is a phenomenon for which one can hardly find a parallel
in the country’s history. Some people compare this national disgrace with
the ZemeneMesafint(1769-1872)
during which the warlords divided the country into, administratively speaking,
semi-independent principalities. There are, indeed, some similarities between
the two:
One of the
similarities is the fact that both periods were initiated by Tigrinya speakers,
that of the ZemeneMesafintby Mika’elSihul and his Tigrean army. But it is the differences which should
concern us.
First, during the ZemeneMesafint, none
of the chieftains or warlords ever thought that his realm was not part of
Ethiopia. None of them was so engrossed, like the killilpoliticians, in the affairs of his or her realm only. Ethiopia was
always their identity. You would be amazed to see the similarity among some of
the letters they wrote to foreign powers on affairs of national concern. Yes,
they fought among themselves, but primarily for the right to be the national
leader of Ethiopia, by gaining territory inch by inch or all at once.
Second, during the ZemeneMesafint, Ethiopians
lived wherever they wanted and intermarried freely, without being harassed by
anyone — ruler or common citizen — for their choices. Ethnicity did not then,
as it does how, put people asunder.
Third, the
principality administration (following the central administration), the
national commerce, the national education, and foreign relation had a de facto common language, a lingua franca. You may say that today
too we have the same language performing the same service. Yes, but the
TPLF/EPLF is bent on cutting the linguistic link that bands the nation. The Woyyane have already seen to it that its use outside the
so-called Amhara Bantustan is being curtailed. For the first time in the
nation’s history, the letterheads of Ethiopian embassies are void of
national language and script. Children of Amharic-speaking Ethiopians in
non-Amhara Bantustans are not allowed to receive education in the language
their ancestors taught them. The rationale of the TPLF and its killiIsurrogates is that since non-Amharic
speakers were forced to be educated in the national language under previous
governments, these children should be instructed in a language they do not
know. Ironically, those who maintain this position know, unlike those who
administered the previous governments, that what they are doing is terribly
wrong. It is ethnic revenge!
The Derg and the TPLF/EPLF are the last groups that one would
wish upon an enemy, let alone upon our Ethiopia. Ethiopians did not deserve the Derg, and they do not deserve the TPLF. A group whose
world is ethnicity is not qualified to speak in the name of a multi ethnic
nation. It is time for them to go. Let us pray and do what it takes to replace
them. It is not only Americans, who say, “no pain no gain.” Many
years ago the Ethiopian poet has put it succinctly and beautifully:
“Without the
cross and trial in struggle, No one is able to accomplish anything good”
I would like to
conclude by confessing that I realize that I may offend many people by my
opposition to the TPLF/EPLF and my uncompromising stand against ethnic policies
which are bent on changing or scrapping my identity. But I would like to assure
these people that I do not offend them as much as people who support the
TPLF/EPLF offend Ethiopia.
