The long term but furtive plan was the obstinate desire to control, for some years to come, state power in Ethiopia and Eritrea using Ethnicity and nationalism as legitimating ideologies. Eritreans felling into the clutches of the EPLF can only be explained by the promotion of a nation-state style nationalist ideology by the EPLF in which ordinary Eritreans are told how they are different if not unique from other peoples in the horn, especially from their former co-citizens, Ethiopians. TPLF in its turn legitimised its state control in Ethiopia by presenting itself as champions of the so called supressed ‘nation, nationalities and peoples’. It institutionalised what many commentators characterise as pseudo-federal state system by promoting ethno-nationalism through a process of encadrement in which elites of the various ethnic groups in the country (which are now nation, nationalities and peoples) are accorded access to state power and resources in as much as they are not subversive to the monopoly of power by ruling elites.
To the dismay of some of the leaders as well as the majority ardent followers of the two parties, after almost 20 years of Eritrean independency and control of state power in Ethiopia and Eritrea, there is still no friendly or plausible relationship between the two. There are a number of developments that demonstrates this. The bloody war that broke out in 1998-2000, despite the fact that when TPLF and EPLF came to power, they arrogated to themselves the wisdom of establishing peaceful political orders, is major evidence. Not only the war claimed the lives of many human beings from both sides but also there is still a continued and erratic military raid and other incidents that show no avail.
For a neutral and critical observer the leadership of the two parties avoid accountability by pointing finger on each other. The EPLF-led Eritrean leaders blame their TPLF-led Ethiopian counterparts for the latter failed to enforce the Algiers Agreement and the Boundary Commission ruling. The Ethiopian leaders in their part refused to allow this insisting that there should be further talks before any enforcement of the ruling of the Commission. Such dispute doesn’t deal with the very basis of the conflict in the first place. It rather eschews those structural questions that should have been dealt, from the very outset, by responsible and rational political leaders who have a vision of democracy and rule of law rather than controlling and justifying their control of state power.
One shouldn’t therefore wonder why after a long history of ethnic-based resistance movement and coalition, the TPLF and EPLF “liberators” failed to create a lasting peace and stability in the region? The real aim was in fact controlling state power and achieving their eccentric objectives. This objective had varied nature that could be personal and collective appealing to individual and group motives. In the mean time a number of unforeseen circumstances had in fact emerged and today’s situation needs a more wide analytical framework than stipulated here. Nevertheless, there is ample and clear indication that both TPLF and EPLF leadership had only pursued their respective interest against what is common to all Ethiopians or both Ethiopians and Eritreans.
Referring to the Eritrean situation, a recent BBC statement states that “The unresolved border issue compounds other pressing problems. These include Eritrea’s inability to provide enough food; two thirds of the population receives food aid. Moreover, economic progress is hampered by the proportion of Eritreans who are in the army rather than the workforce.” http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13349078. Such a statement clearly implies that the very fundamental question is whether Eritrea is a viable state to feed its citizens without any good and friendly political and economic relations with its immediate neighbour, Ethiopia.
On the other hand the TPLF-led Ethiopian government now seems to have the firm stand that the only solution regarding Eritrea is negotiations which I suspect set to redefine any lingering issues and possible nature of future political and economic relationship between the two. In its weekly publication A Week in the Horn, the Ministry of Ethiopian Foreign Affairs publish a briefing entitled “Talking, not shooting is the only choice for Eritrea” seems to imply this position by noting that “the Ethiopian Government still upholds its determination that the problems between Eritrea and Ethiopia can only be resolved through negotiations and dialogue”.
http://www.mfa.gov.et/Press_Section/Week_Horn_Africa_Mar_16_2012.htm#3
Whether the two leaderships will come to a table and began to sort out and discuss their issues to reach a rational and legal consensus regarding not only the border case, but also other vital matters that have greater implications to the lives of ordinary Ethiopians and Eritreans is not clear, at least to the near future. However, we now know for sure that the negotiation and dialogue, the TPLF-led EPRDF is now insisting should have been desired and pursued 20 years ago in good time and condition. Rather than rushing into the business of facilitating Eritrean independence and the control of state power, at least the TPLF-leadership, who claimed a self-proclaimed moral and legal authority of “liberating Ethiopian peoples”, could have addressed the following questions with EPLF.
First, was Hailsaelassie’s annexation of Eritrea in 1962 and the subsequent union with Ethiopia colonialism? What is the consensus or suggested points regarding this by the existing majority academics? Second, how can we legally and politically maintain the interest of the two peoples, in situation of session, in a way that doesn’t favour one at the expense of the other? Third, how can we incorporate the voices of the two peoples in such processes? Fourth, does EPRDF have a legitimacy of power to facilitate and officially recognise an independent Eritrea? Howe does that relate to the question of Ethiopian sovereignty? Neither TPLF nor EPLF had rational and scientifically supported explanations for such questions.
But we now know for sure that when they organised themselves based on ethnic or nationalist ideology and finally were able to succeed (because of in fact different factors) in removing the Derg-regime in the early 1990s, the TPLF and EPLF-leadership either didn’t have the competence or the will to consider the ramification of their agenda and practice on the various peoples of the region. In another language, had the elites of the two parties were visionary, competent, responsible and transparent, they could have raised and discussed these issues with the respective stake holders, from the very outset, and therefore possibly avoided the war and other un-desirable current situations. In fact we could have seen a different reality than what we are witnessing now. Generally, what we are witnessing now between Eritrea and Ethiopia is the unforeseen and embarrassing pitfalls of the elites of TPLF and EPLF leadership.
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The writer is a Research Fellow, University of Bergen, Norway and could be reached at [email protected]
