“Time to bring back Eritrea from the cold”

January 26, 2014

Ambassador Cohen’s article contains two central issues. His first point is that the sanction
against Eritrea must be lifted because there is no evidence which incriminates the country to be
“a state sponsor of terrorism”. As flabbergasting as it may sound, as Professor Jack Derrida
notes “a text is not a text unless it hides from the first comer, from the first glance, the law of its
composition and the rules of its game”. Derrida’s analogy is similar to the Eritrean-Ethiopian
q’ene, a form of philosophical enquiry commonly referred to as the wax and the gold.

The “free port” offer by Eritrea which is also echoed by Ambassadors Cohen and Shinn does not
adequately address Ethiopia’s economic, geopolitical and security interests. In other words the
interest of the United States and the interest of Ethiopia are not necessarily the same. Most
commentators on the issue consider the “free port” offer as one of the diplomatic gamesmanships
which were played in the 1991-1993 period. Visionary diplomats and scholars of substance must
be able to observe beyond what ordinary politicians see. The fact that the Government of
Ethiopia has not yet put the landlocked-ness issue on the table shows the policy error of the
government of the day, but cannot be construed that Ethiopia has permanently abandoned its
right over Assab. In this respect, Ambassador Cohen wrote the following;-

“To break the stalemate between Eritrea and Ethiopia over the implementation of the EEBC
decision, there needs to be a mutually face-saving solution. I propose that Ethiopia offer to
accept a symbolic initial takeover by Eritrea of territory awarded by the EEBC, followed by the
same day opening of dialogue with a totally open agenda”.

It is important to note that the EEBC was established based on the Algiers Agreement, and
Ambassador Cohen exonerates Ambassador Anthony Lake (National Security Advisor, 1993-
97), who was one of the architects of the Algiers Agreement. Ambassador Cohen wrote the
following:-

“They [EPLF and TPLF/EPRDF] maintained a common economic system that allowed
landlocked Ethiopia full access to the Eritrean Red Sea ports of Asab and Masawa, including
control of their own handling facilities for the transit of cargo…Under Algerian Government
mediation, a cease-fire was accomplished in 2000. In view of the border as the ostensible main
issue in contention, the Algerians established the Ethiopia-Eritrea Border Commission (EEBC)
to arbitrate the exact boundary line. While the EEBC was doing its work, the long border
remained heavily armed on both sides”.

II

To understand the issues better, it is important to take a step back and examine the foundations
on which the EEBC was created. It is also important to note that in practical-institutional terms
the Algiers Agreement has been rejected. For instance in a letter that was written on April 2,
2002 about 289 Ethiopian scholars and professionals sent petition to Ambassador Kofi Annan,
the Former Secretary General of the United Nations. Countless demonstrations and political
gatherings were held in the major cities of the world. It was and more than likely to remain an
election issue in Ethiopia. Scholars objected Article 4(1) and Article 15 of the Algiers
Agreement. The problematic articles in the Algiers Agreement read as follows:-

Article 4 (1):-

Consistent with the provisions of the Framework Agreement and the Agreement on Cessation of
Hostilities, the parties reaffirm the principle of respect for the borders existing at independence
as stated in resolution AHG/Res. 16(1) adopted by the OAU Summit in Cairo in 1964, and, in
this regard, that they shall be determined on the basis of pertinent colonial treaties and
applicable international law.

Article 15:-

The parties agree that the delimitation and demarcation determinations of the Commission shall
be final and binding. Each party shall respect the border so determined, as well as territorial
integrity and sovereignty of the other party.

Despite the absence of clarity in the latest statement of the Government of Ethiopia, there are a
number of justifications for nullifying the Algiers Agreement. First, as a sovereign country,
international agreements do not normally become law unless they are ratified by the national
parliament. Eritrea did not and still does not have a parliament that is worthy of its name. In
Ethiopia the situation is different. However defective it might be, there has been a parliament
that routinely ratifies international treaties. It is also interesting to note that the House of Peoples
Representatives did not formally ratify the Algiers Agreement. In fact what the House of Peoples
Representatives did is exactly the opposite. Though it accepted the EEBC’s decision “in
principle” perhaps a face saving mechanism, the house put five point peace-plan which
effectively killed the implementation of the EEBC’s decision. Hence, one does not need to be a
constitutional expert to observe that the Algiers Agreement is dead, and there is no way of
resuscitating it.

The political cost of Article 4(1) and Article 15 for the TPLF dominated government has been
incalculable. Soon after the petition by Ethiopian scholars, the TPLF had a major split, leading to
the eventual sacking of the Minister of Defense, the Governor of Tigray, the Chief of Staff of the
Army and the Commander of the Air Force. Fourteen years after the end of hostilities, the port
issue is simmering within TPLF/EPRDF file and the broader political landscape. In other words,
landlocked-ness is accepted only by the TPLF elite and its old guard. Sources within
TPLF/EPRDF indicate that what has not been agreed is how to “bring back” Assab/Eritrea and
not whether Ethiopia/Tigrai should continue to remain landlocked.

Figure 1: Disputed lands and “awards” according to the EEBC

Figure 1 provides useful information. First, the disputed areas are inland territories. Second, the
EEBC’s ruling was not based on the analysis of social, cultural and political constructs. It did not
consider the right of the people in the contested areas to express their wishes through a
referendum. Though not recognized by the international community the referendum in the oil
rich region of Abeye (disputed region between Sudan and South Sudan) provides a good
example of how border demarcation is not just a colonial legacy and cartographic problem.
Third, it did not learn from the colonial history that shaped the map of the rest of Africa
(See for example the map of West Africa where several countries are designed in such a way that they have
access to the sea through their own coastlines.) Fourth, Figure 1 also shows that the port of Assab is just about 70 kilometers (43 miles) from
Ethiopia’s border town of Bure. In other words the arbitration commission did not consider the
economic, political and security consequences of its decision. Therefore, its decision can never
be a source of sustainable peace. In this respect, in a document entitled approaches to solving
territorial conflicts, the Carter Center notes that:-

“..Territorial disputes are notoriously difficult to resolve peacefully and enduringly. The
outcome of adjudication on border issues is unpredictable, and political leaders are often
unwilling to accept the risks of losing territory. Arbitration or mediation (nonbinding
arbitration) provides a more flexible and balanced way to reach a satisfactory outcome, but
their finality also makes politicians nervous.”

Furthermore, a closer examination of the geopolitical map of the region and the ethnic map of
Eritrea reveal additional information. It is interesting to note that the Dankalia region in which
both ports are located is inhabited by an ethnic group which shares the same values with the
people in the Afar State of Ethiopia and the second largest population group in Djibouti. There is
also strong historical and religious tie between the inhabitants of low land Eritrea and the Middle
East. Similarly the Tigregna speaking people in Eritrea share similar cultural and religious values
with the people in the Tigrai State of Ethiopia. In terms of the area that is occupied by each
ethnic group in Eritrea, Tigre’e and Afar peoples occupy the bulk of the country while Tigrigna
speakers though live in the smaller and densely populated highland areas they are the majority.
The ramifications of these similarities and differences for peace, regional stability, cooperation
and governance require a separate work.

III

As noted earlier the balance of power in the Middle East is changing and this change has a
potential to spillover to the Greater Horn of Africa (including Yemen and the Red Sea region).
Hence, in considering new relationships in the Horn of Africa, one has to examine factors that
are beyond colonial treaties and cartographic lines. One needs to focus on real issues. As far as
the importance of Assab to Ethiopia is concerned, a number of articles, books, statements have
been written especially after the separation of Eritrea. For a more comprehensive analysis of the
economic implications see “Landlocked-ness as an Impediment to Economic Development in
Ethiopia: A Framework for a Durable Solution” by Getachew Begashaw, Ethiopian E Journal
for Innovation and Research Foresight, Volume 5 No.1. For a perspective from international law
and diplomacy, see the book by Yacob Haile Mariam, in Amarigna, Asseb Ye Man Nat?
YeEthiopia YeBahir Ber Tiyaqie, Atafzer Press. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 2011. For a perspective
about the United Nations decision to federate Eritrea with Ethiopia, and an eye-witness account
of the events between1941-1963 see Ye-ertra guday, in Amarigna, by Zewde Retta, Central
Printing Press Addis Ababa 1992 EC. For an Eritrean perspective to the relationship between
Eritrea and Ethiopia, see the works of Tesfatsion Medhane, Aleme Eshete, Tekeste Negash,
Bereket Habte Selassi, the EPLF’s version of the struggle for independence (“Gedli”) and Yosef
Gebre Hiwot.

Notwithstanding the debate in each country, one important point that is yet to happen is that
independent and honest scholars of substance from both countries need to find a way of
replacing the Algiers Agreement with a visionary document. At present the debates are polarized
and when they occur they appear to be more of publicity works. The Eritrea-Ethiopia friendship
networks in the diaspora might be genuine efforts to heal the wounds on both sides but are
unlikely to resolve the problems of landlocked-ness as many of the networks lack capacity and
independence. The quest for an innovative solution that is forward looking needs to be supported
by the governments of Eritrea and Ethiopia. Below I outline the action spaces that appear to be
available to the Government of Ethiopia. The options are not mutually exclusive. Which one of
the options will be selected depends on the situation, and sounds a good setting for game theory
based negotiation models. A similar analysis for Eritrea enables the formulation of the set of
feasible solutions.

Option #1: Accept the EEBC’s decision

1. Every landlocked country in the world has access to the sea through a “free port”
   arrangement. Hence, Eritrea will not be making any substantive concession. In fact as
   Professor Paulos Milkias reminded his readers Article 125 of the United Nations
   Convention on the Law of the Sea, of 10 December 1982 already gives Ethiopia the right
   to use the ports in the region, including the ports in Eritrea.

2. Comparison of the military, economy, governance and educational variables indicate that
   the two countries are not very different from one another, but most indicators marginally
   favor Ethiopia. These variables influence the outcomes of negotiations.

3. Though more expensive than Assab, there are a number of competing ports (including
   dry ports) in the region, and Ethiopia has managed to survive landlocked-ness in spite of
   higher than normal transportation costs.

4. Accepting this option legitimizes the landlocked-ness of 90 million people permanently;
5. The proposal ignores the changing security and geopolitical situation in the region;
6. There are a number of arguments that work against Eritrea’s claim of sovereignty over
   Assab and almost the entire sea coast is inhabited by Afars who appear to have
   grievances against the Government of Eritrea;

7. The free port option creates jobs and investments for Eritreans and makes marginal
   reduction in transport cost for Ethiopia, and hence the economic benefits from this
   arrangement largely accrues to Eritrea;

8. In the event of a crisis within Eritrea Ethiopia’s military will be forced to enter into
   Eritrea to protect the “free port”.

9. Throws the ruling party in Ethiopia into deeper political difficulty.

Therefore the proposal suggested by Ambassador Cohen and supported by Ambassador Shinn
has a number of difficulties which makes it a non-starter for Ethiopia.

Option #2:-Continue the current policy

The “no war no peace” situation is a de facto rejection of the EEBC’s decision, apparently by
both sides as Eritrea too has expelled the UN peace keeping force. Implicit in this policy is that
both parties are waiting for change of policy or leadership/regime change in the rival country.
This policy has forced Eritrea (i) to put its entire population on a war footing, the impact of
which is serious; and (ii) harboring/arming a variety of dissident groups from Ethiopia. The “no
war no peace” policy has also forced Ethiopia to move its core army to the front lines,
reciprocate by supporting dissident groups from Eritrea and providing shelters to Eritrean
refugees. The continuation of this policy evidently hurts both Eritrea and Ethiopia but the
severity of the hurt is being felt more in Eritrea than in Ethiopia.

Option #3:-Support regional nationalisms

Eritrea is openly supporting ethno-nationalist movements that are against the Government of
Ethiopia. It is also supporting groups that have grievances about the 2005 failed election. In the
context of Eritrea two regional nationalisms are known to exist. The first is the Tigrai-Tigrignu
political construct. The second is the Afar movement; which has relevance to the problems of
Ethiopia’s landlocked-ness. If the Government of Ethiopia pursues a policy of supporting Afar
movements in Eritrea, the policy has the potential to break up present day Eritrea into highland
and lowland on one hand, and resuscitates the politics of the 1950s and the 1980s. If the people
of Afar elect to have their own independent state, since Afars control the over 1000 kilometers
long of seacoast, Ethiopia could recognize that and negotiate closer association with the new
Afar State.

However, this option requires careful thinking as(i) Eritrea is also reciprocating and the conflicts
are essentially proxy wars; (ii) the behavior of the new state of Afar towards Ethiopia can be
worse than the behavior of the Government of the day in Eritrea; (iii) the break-up of Eritrea is
not necessarily in the interest of Ethiopia; (iv) the region can be another fertile ground for those
who fan the Middle East conflict in the Horn of Africa; and (v) the success of the policy would
be very much dependent on how China, Russia, Britain, France and the United States take the
emergence of yet another new country in the Horn of Africa.

Option #4: Start afresh and try to make a new comprehensive treaty with Eritrea

Expanding the scope of the 1928 agreement, Eritrea and Ethiopia can enter into a long term
irrevocable contract that has duration of say 100 years, at a token price. Evidently the negotiation
will have to take cognizance of present day realities and future trends. President Isayas does not
have the military might of Benito Mussolini of Italy to dominate or intimidate and eventually
capture Ethiopia. Here if there is the political will on the part of the TPLF/EPRDF, Ethiopia
might have the strength to demand the full control of a sizeable portion of the coast as this gives
the country the opportunity to secure the port areas. This type of agreement though is rooted in
colonial time, it can be modernized. The advantage for Ethiopia is that it resolves the problems
of landlocked-ness and eliminates the risk emerging from instability in Eritrea or the foreign
occupation/intervention of the region.

For Eritrea the long term irrevocable contract provides peace. It is a start of several confidence
building measures for a renewed association between the two countries. It is also a face saving
mechanism for the political leadership. Eritrea will not be threatened by successive Ethiopian
regimes. The country can be a conduit for trade and tourism. Places of worships can be
interconnected once again and social-cultural relationship can once again have their golden days.
The country does not have to spend on defense and security as it is doing now. Furthermore,
Eritreans nationalists will be able to understand the problems of landlocked-ness, and also learn
from other historical incidences:- Namibia and South Africa over the Walvis Bay, and United
States and Panama over the Panama Canal are examples. It can share revenues from joint
activities, and may negotiate to get arable land in the interior region. In other words the
opportunities for cooperation are infinite. If the relationship changes for the better, at the end of
the agreement period, Eritreans may want to have another referendum to form a union with
Ethiopia. Starting afresh with a comprehensive agreement paves the way for the normalization of
relations.

This option however is more than likely to face resistance from military strategists in Ethiopia as
they might see it as a weak strategy to resolve Ethiopia’s landlocked-ness. It must also be
examined against the backdrop of Ethiopia’s rejection of Somaliland’s proposal for closer form
of association between the two countries so that Ethiopian can upgrade and use the Ports in
Somaliland. Added to the list of port options is the proposal of building a dedicated port for
Ethiopia at Tajura (Djibouti).

Option #5 Find a military solution to the problem of Ethiopia’s landlocked-ness

However, this option is not without problems:- (i) it raises Eritrean nationalism; (ii) the invasion
is more than likely to bring in third parties (example Egypt, Iran, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, etc.)
into the conflict; (iii) the United States (with its drones in the region) and France are unlikely to
openly support this move; (iv) even if the Ethiopian Defense Forces succeed in the capturing of
Dankalia or indeed the entire country, pacifying the region and making it economically active
will not be easy. Military expedition of some sort however may make more sense in the unlikely
event of a major civil war in Eritrea or the country allows its territory to be used by countries that
are hostile to Ethiopia.

IV

In conclusion, there are a number of options that are available to the Government of Ethiopia.
Identification of the options that are available to the Government of Eritrea requires a separate
work. For Ethiopia, the least attractive is the option #1, the option supported by Ambassadors
Cohen and Shinn. Option #2 is the current situation, which is better for Ethiopian than option #1.
A win-win situation can be found around option #4 if Eritrea offers a better deal than Djibouti,
Somaliland, Somalia, Kenya and the Sudan. That suggests that Eritrea needs to consider the
voluntary loss of sovereignty over Assab. Option #3 has the potential to break up Eritrea and
taking cue from the experiences of Somalia and South Sudan it is undesirable. Option #5
involves force and depends on how the military wants to settle the matter.

Finally one might like to ask what the international community and the United States can or
cannot do. What are the roles of China and Russia in the geopolitics of the region? Is it too
difficult to convince the powers that the Algiers Agreement and the EEBC decision were not fair
to Ethiopia and its 90 million people? What are the lessons from the inactions and mistakes of
the past, and how can one undo the damages are important conversations that are waiting to
happen.